To bring this back to rifle country, the Talvisota is a good example of why knowing how to shoot well is tactically important. As noted in "Ivan's War" and other sources, the Red Army troops that arrived to take over Finland had little rifle training, much of it with wooden dummy rifles. They went up against a smaller military of citizen-soldiers who had at least competency with their weapons. Some, esp. in the Civil Guard, kept their issue rifles with them 24/7 and had extensive experience shooting them. Finland was a true nation of riflemen.
The USSR, in contrast, had gone to enormous pains to disarm the "comrades", even before the revolution was complete:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1919-mil/ch79.htm
On the battlefield, what this boiled down to is, while the Finns had a shortage of small arms and 54R at the outset, they made up for this by hitting paydirt more often. While this wasn't the whole recipe for victory, it was a key part of it. When combined with good training, excellent knowledge of the local terrain, arctic weather experience and a first class officer corps trained in the best Prussian manner, the Finns were able to do a lot with a little. The Red Army, OTOH, was like "an orchestra played out of time." The individual soliders were actually well motivated at the outset, and expected a romp through Finland to free the proletariat and liberate some nice shiny things. But when faced with determined resistance they found their leadership and training wanting. In the south they did charge after charge after charge, but none of them were well timed and any breakthroughs were isolated. They had vastly superior armor and artillery, but didn't seem to understand how to use it. The Finns, in the mean time, had to use their heavy weapons to maximum effect.
The Red Army's experiences in the icy boreal forests to the north were even more disasterous. They tried to penetrate the heavily wooded countryside to cut the nation in half, but as their lines stretched out over narrow rural roadways, the Finns "chopped them up" into individual pieces, then kept the pieces pinned down and out of communication with the rest of the column. The results there were nothing short of hell on earth, with the remnants of the Soviet forces turning on one another and resorting to cannibalism as Finnish snipers picked them off and ski troops assaulted their lines.
The cold can barely be understood by people from temperate climes. The soldiers there experienced artic cold for sustained periods. Very few military forces have even attempted combat in such conditions. The Soviet forces were dressed for mildly cold fighting in eastern Europe, with basic wool greatcoats, padded jackets and felt boots. But this was nowhere near enough to survive in deep cold for weeks on end. The Finns had excellent equipment, but not enough of it. Their forces also suffered frostbite injuries, though not nearly as many as the Soviets.
The USSR, in contrast, had gone to enormous pains to disarm the "comrades", even before the revolution was complete:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1919-mil/ch79.htm
On the battlefield, what this boiled down to is, while the Finns had a shortage of small arms and 54R at the outset, they made up for this by hitting paydirt more often. While this wasn't the whole recipe for victory, it was a key part of it. When combined with good training, excellent knowledge of the local terrain, arctic weather experience and a first class officer corps trained in the best Prussian manner, the Finns were able to do a lot with a little. The Red Army, OTOH, was like "an orchestra played out of time." The individual soliders were actually well motivated at the outset, and expected a romp through Finland to free the proletariat and liberate some nice shiny things. But when faced with determined resistance they found their leadership and training wanting. In the south they did charge after charge after charge, but none of them were well timed and any breakthroughs were isolated. They had vastly superior armor and artillery, but didn't seem to understand how to use it. The Finns, in the mean time, had to use their heavy weapons to maximum effect.
The Red Army's experiences in the icy boreal forests to the north were even more disasterous. They tried to penetrate the heavily wooded countryside to cut the nation in half, but as their lines stretched out over narrow rural roadways, the Finns "chopped them up" into individual pieces, then kept the pieces pinned down and out of communication with the rest of the column. The results there were nothing short of hell on earth, with the remnants of the Soviet forces turning on one another and resorting to cannibalism as Finnish snipers picked them off and ski troops assaulted their lines.
The cold can barely be understood by people from temperate climes. The soldiers there experienced artic cold for sustained periods. Very few military forces have even attempted combat in such conditions. The Soviet forces were dressed for mildly cold fighting in eastern Europe, with basic wool greatcoats, padded jackets and felt boots. But this was nowhere near enough to survive in deep cold for weeks on end. The Finns had excellent equipment, but not enough of it. Their forces also suffered frostbite injuries, though not nearly as many as the Soviets.
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