Pertua and Richards requests FULL en banc hearing in the 9th

[danez71]

The Plantiffs (Peruta and Richards) on 06-23 have requested a full en banc hearing in the 9th.

If I'm not mistaken, of maybe I'm wording it wrong, the cases were combined at some point (?).


On 06-24, Chief Judge Thomas has given the defendants (various Cal Govt entities) 21 days to respond. https://cdn.calgunsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/super-en-banc-briefing-order.pdf


(Ive tried to reformat a bit so its a little more easily read.)


Peruta is filing under the reasons of:
https://cdn.calgunsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/334-peruta-en-banc-full.pdf

Reasons for Granting Rehearing
I. This Case Is Not, and Has Never Been, About Whether the
Constitution Protects a Right to Concealed Carry

II. The Majority’s Decision Conflicts with Second Amendment
Decisions from the Supreme Court, This Court, and Other Courts of Appeals.

III. The En Banc Majority’s Approach Impermissibly Relegates the
Second Amendment to Second-class Status.

IV. The En Banc Panel Decision Unnecessarily Intrudes on the
Perogatives of the State.

RULE 35 STATEMENT
For the better part of a decade, this case has been litigated by
the parties and understood by the courts as a dispute over the
exceptionally important question of whether and to what extent the
Second Amendment extends beyond the home.

The basic question is, and always has been, whether prohibiting both open and
concealed carry to ordinary, law-abiding citizens violates the
fundamental right to “bear arms.”

The complaint, district court decision, three-judge panel opinion, and en banc submissions all recognized as much. And the State of California was permitted to intervene on the understanding that resolution of the constitutional
claim pressed in this case implicated the entirety of the State’s
statutory scheme for regulating outside-the-home carry, whether
open or concealed.

Yet after all that, the en banc panel dodged the real issue in this case and instead answered a question that no one asked—indeed, a question that Appellants expressly disclaimed any interest in resolving—holding only that there is no free-standing Second Amendment right to carry concealed firearms.

The en banc majority’s misreading of Appellants’ challenge is
no mere technicality. By conflating the remedy Appellants seek (a
concealed carry license) with the right they invoke (to “bear arms”
for self-defense), the majority diminished the scope of the Second
Amendment itself. Moreover, the reasoning that the majority
Case: 10-56971, 06/23/2016, ID: 10027645, DktEntry: 334, Page 7 of 121
employed in artificially constraining Appellants’ constitutional
challenge conflicts with decisions from the Supreme Court, this
Court, and other courts of appeals, including District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742 (2010), Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d
953 (9th Cir. 2014), and Kachalsky v. County of Weschester, 701
F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).

It is unimaginable that courts would deconstruct the First Amendment or another fundamental constitutional right as the majority did with the Second Amendment here. And the majority’s approach does not avoid any constitutional question, but instead sets up an unnecessary constitutional
confrontation over California’s open carry laws.

In short, the majority has taken a dispute that could have
been resolved by local officials through an administrative regulation
that would be consistent with state law—–i.e., identical to how state
law functions in other California counties—and turned it into a
dispute that likely will require a federal court to strike down a state
statute—all at the expense of constitutional avoidance, federalism,
and separation of powers.

Richards reasoning:
https://cdn.calgunsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/225-full-en-banc-petition-filed.pdf

Reasons for Granting the Petition.

I. The En Banc Majority’s Opinion Directly Contradicts
Controlling Supreme Court Precedent.

II. The En Banc Majority’s Opinion Does Not Advance the
Public Interest in Resolving Constitutional Controversies.

RULE 35 STATEMENT


No dispute exists as to whether Defendants’ constructive prohibition
of the right to carry handguns for self-defense “involves a question of
exceptional importance.” Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2). After all, the
Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment secures a right to
carry arms for the purpose of self-defense, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008), and has described this right as
fundamental, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).


Had this Court merely erased this right from our Constitution, such
a “shockingly broad act of judicial legislation” would be reason enough
to have the matter reheard by the full court. Compassion in Dying v.
Wash., 85 F.3d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting
from denial of reh’g by full court). But “[t]he jurisprudential
significance of this case” now “has far more to do with our role and
power as federal judges than with the merits or desirability of” the
right to carry handguns. Id. at 1447 (Trott, J., dissenting from denial of
reh’g by full court). It now implicates the right to access the federal
courts, and to obtain from them a meaningful hearing as to the
operative significance of one’s fundamental rights.
1
Case: 11-16255, 06/23/2016, ID: 10027827, DktEntry: 225, Page 6 of 111
To be sure, for the reasons stated by the plaintiffs in the companion
case, Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971, the en banc majority’s
opinion conflicts with:

Heller, by refusing to acknowledge that the concealed carrying of
arms, while assuredly not the right secured by the Second
Amendment, is a form of exercising Second Amendment rights;

Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.
2014), by considering only the most immediate regulation, in a
vacuum, without regard to its effect in a comprehensive
regulatory scheme; and the decisions of three other circuits, which decided (if wrongly) cases such as these when brought before them, see Kachalsky v.
Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d. Cir. 2012); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426 (3d Cir. 2013).


But more to the point, right or wrong, the en banc majority’s
decision has nothing to do with the case that the parties have been
litigating since May 5, 2009. Accordingly, to the decisions listed supra,
Plaintiffs would add another that stands in conflict with the en banc