Poper said:
Though I may be mistaken, it appeared to me he took great pains to equate the militia and the appropriateness of their arms with the necessity of the (well regulated - I.E. trained) militia having weapons appropriate to their service in event of their being called upon to serve.
The decision does say that, but qualifies it thusly:
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes
So that the 2nd is understood to protect "weapons. . .typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes" that are (in your words) appropriate to their service in event of their being called upon to serve.
This part of the decision is very confusing and takes very careful reading. But in any close reading, one needs to consider carefully the effect of what comes first on what comes later. The quote above is crucial to understanding the following:
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as
effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
The first sentence alone might be taken to mean that civilian members of the militia should be allowed "weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like." Notice the following sentence, however, in which the "but as we have said," refers to "weapons. . .
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes":
But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.
The next part of the paragraph,
It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require
sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited
the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right,
has a similar two-part structure in which the argument that the militia needs weapons that are common in military contexts but not "in society at large" is negated by the final sentence. This negation is indicated by the word "
But, The "interpretation of the right" is that it covers only those weapons that are "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes," regardless of the fact that, unlike in the constitutional era, the weapons possessed by the military are now very far removed in kind from those "
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."
The upshot of what Scalia said here is that in the Constitutional period citizen-militia members had the right to "weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes" that just happened to be pretty close to what the army used. The fact that the military now uses "sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large" does not mean that we have a right to the same kind of weapons they have: we are still limited to "weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."
While I am in a profession that requires close reading of texts of the sort that this one calls for, I am not a lawyer either. I would be most grateful if an attorney could confirm my reading, or for that matter, show me why I am wrong.
