Richard Chamberlain appeals from his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Maine on one count of possession of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. � 922(g)(4), which makes it unlawful for any person who has been "committed to a mental institution" to possess any firearm in interstate commerce. Under Maine law, Chamberlain had earlier been involuntarily admitted for five days, on an emergency basis, to a Maine mental hospital. Chamberlain moved to dismiss the federal information, contending that his involuntary emergency admission was not, as a matter of law, a "commitment" to a mental institution as required for conviction under � 922(g)(4). The district court denied the motion. Chamberlain entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge on appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to five years probation and ordered to pay a $100 assessment. This appeal followed. We affirm.
On June 25, 1996, Chamberlain was involuntarily admitted, on an emergency basis, to the Acadia Hospital in Bangor, Maine pursuant to an application filed under a Maine statute, 34-B M.R.S.A. � 3863(1)-(3).(1) In the application seeking Chamberlain's involuntary admission, a clinician at Acadia stated that "Chamberlain has a mental illness and, due to mental illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm, on the basis that he put a loaded gun to his head and threatened his wife." The application further stated that "suitable resources for care and treatment are unavailable in the community." Chamberlain was examined on June 25, 1996, by a licensed physician, who certified pursuant to section 3863 that Chamberlain posed a danger of serious harm due to mental illness because he "held a gun to his head tonight" and constituted a "[d]anger to [him]self and others." A judge of the Maine district court reviewed and endorsed the application and certification as being prepared in accordance with law, and ordered that Chamberlain be transported and admitted to Acadia for no more than five days, the maximum length of an emergency detention under section 3863.
After Chamberlain had been admitted to Acadia, a second physician examined him and completed a "24-Hour Certification Form." On the form, the physician certified that he had "examined [Chamberlain] and in my opinion the patient is mentally ill, and, due to his [] mental illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm to himself [] or others if discharged at this time." As grounds for the certification, the physician stated that Chamberlain had "put a gun to his head last evening with suicidal ideation" and "remains distraught today and constitutes a danger to [him]self."
A patient who has been detained for five days pursuant to section 3863 may thereafter remain at the mental hospital if (1) the patient voluntarily admits himself, see 34-B M.R.S.A. � 3831(2), or (2) the chief administrative officer of the mental hospital obtains from the state district court an "involuntary commitment order," see 34-B M.R.S.A. �� 3863 (5)(B), 3864.(3) After his initial five-day emergency detention, Chamberlain voluntarily admitted himself to Acadia on or about June 30, 1996, remaining there until his release on July 8, 1996. The chief administrative officer made no application in his case for an "involuntary commitment order."
On May 19, 1997, a police officer received a suicide/attempt to locate report from Chamberlain's brother. Chamberlain's brother told the officer that Chamberlain was upset over the breakup of his marriage, had stated that he had nothing to live for, and was suicidal. The officer located Chamberlain's pickup truck in an airport parking lot. Inside the truck were a loaded Remington .270 caliber rifle, a box of .270 caliber ammunition, and a Savage 30-30 caliber rifle. These items, which were manufactured outside the state of Maine, were seized and Chamberlain was arrested and charged in the federal district court with violation of 18 U.S.C. � 922(g)(4).
Chamberlain filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that he had not, as a matter of law, been "committed to a mental institution" within the meaning of � 922(g)(4). The federal district court denied the motion, and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Chamberlain entered a conditional plea of guilty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, reserving his right to appeal from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The court sentenced Chamberlain to five years' probation and a mandatory $100 assessment.
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We reject Chamberlain's argument that a person is not "committed" for purposes of the federal firearms ban unless all of the requirements set forth in section 3864 -- including provision of counsel, a full-blown adversary hearing, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers from a mental illness, and a judicial order of commitment -- are satisfied. Persons held under section 3863 are involuntarily detained as surely as are those held for longer periods under the more elaborate procedures of section 3864. Moreover, to treat section 3864 detention as the only "real" commitment would come close to limiting "commitments" to cases in which a person has actually been "adjudicated a mental defective" after an adversary hearing. 18 U.S.C. � 922(g)(4) separately bans persons who have been "adjudicated a mental defective" from owning firearms, in addition to those who have been "committed to a mental institution." In denying firearms to those "committed to a mental institution," Congress appears to have cast a wider net -- to "maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of [,among others, persons suffering from mental illness]." See 114 Cong. Rec. 21784 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Celler). Requiring an adversary hearing and a judicial finding of mental illness would conflate two of the categories Congress singled out for the firearms prohibition.
We repeat that Congress deemed the potential for misuse of firearms or violence sufficient to bring various categories of individuals within the firearms ban. The legislative history nowhere suggests the need for showing "clear and convincing evidence" of dangerousness with regard to other categories of individuals placed within the firearms ban -- including those under indictment, convicted felons, drug abusers, illegal aliens, and those who have renounced their citizenship. To require a full-scale adversary proceeding and a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person is mentally ill and poses a likelihood of harm to himself or others before giving effect to the firearms ban would undermine Congress's judgment that risk or potential, not likelihood, probability, or certainty, of violence is all that is required.
Nor does it appear that Congress intended that only persons conclusively found to be suffering from mental illnesses or difficulties after having been afforded the fullest possible panoply of due process rights be deemed to have been "committed to a mental institution" for purposes of the firearms ban.(12) That level of formality is not required for most of the categories Congress identified as within the firearms ban, including those who have merely been indicted for a crime. See 18 U.S.C. � 922(n). When Congress has intended that a particular status triggering the firearms ban be conditioned upon notice and the opportunity to be heard, along with other procedural rights, it has stated so explicitly. In 1994, for example, Congress amended the Gun Control Act to include within the firearms prohibition persons subject to a court order that . . . restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child . . .
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We reject Chamberlain's argument that a person is not "committed" for purposes of the federal firearms ban unless all of the requirements set forth in section 3864 -- including provision of counsel, a full-blown adversary hearing, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers from a mental illness, and a judicial order of commitment -- are satisfied.
