WA Appellate Court and Vehicle Searches

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Mainsail

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The state loses this one:



IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 24861-5-III
)
Appellant, )
) Division Three
v. )
)
CARLA RAE VELTRI, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Respondent. )
)

BROWN, J. -- Today, the State appeals the trial court's suppression order in its

prosecution of Carla Veltri for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.

Because the facts found by the trial court support its legal conclusion that an

unwarranted general search occurred, we affirm.

FACTS

The facts are drawn from the court's findings. Officer Allen Edwards noticed a

truck with mismatched license plates and decided to investigate to see if it was stolen.

He saw the driver lawfully park and get out with two passengers. One passenger ran,

and although Officer Edwards followed, he got away. When Officer Edwards returned

No. 24861-5-III
State v. Veltri

to the truck, he saw the driver and the other passenger walking away. He contacted

the driver and identified her as Carla Veltri. The other passenger was arrested on a

warrant, but the later questioning and search of the truck was not incident to that arrest.

Officer Edwards asked Ms. Veltri if she owned the truck. At first Ms. Veltri said

she did not, and later explained she had borrowed it. Ms. Veltri possessed solely a

Washington identity card and she did not have the vehicle registration or proof of

insurance. Officer Edwards learned the rear license plate belonged to the vehicle. The

truck had not been reported stolen. Officer Edwards turned his attention elsewhere

after he decided not to issue an infraction.

Officer Edwards decided Ms. Veltri was not free to leave because he wanted to

search further for "possible contraband or weapons" even though he knew "the vehicle

had not been reported stolen." Clerk's Papers at 71, 72. Without advising her of her

consent rights, Officer Edwards asked Ms. Veltri if he could look inside the truck. Ms.

Veltri did not care, and nothing suspicious was found. Officer Edwards then asked Ms.

Veltri for permission to search two suitcases in the truck bed. Ms. Veltri told Officer

Edwards the suitcases were not hers and she did not care if he searched them.

Controlled substance contraband was found in one suitcase.

Officer Edwards arrested Ms. Veltri. The State charged her with possessing a

controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. Ms. Veltri successfully

moved to suppress the evidence over the State's argument that the suitcases were

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State v. Veltri

abandoned. The court concluded the officer's search exceeded the scope of the initial

stop and Ms. Veltri's consent was involuntary. After suppressing the evidence, the

court dismissed the case. The State appealed.

ANALYSIS

The issue is whether, considering the State's abandonment theory, the trial court

erred in suppressing the evidence seized in the warrantless suitcase search.

We review a trial court's findings of fact in a motion to suppress for substantial

evidence. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999). Unchallenged

findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 745, 64 P.3d

594 (2003). We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. The court's

conclusions of law must be supported by its findings of fact. State v. Dodson, 110 Wn.

App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324 (2002). Unargued assignments of error in an opening brief

are deemed abandoned. Fosbre v. State, 70 Wn.2d 578, 583, 424 P.2d 901 (1967).

The State relies on State v. Evans, 129 Wn. App. 211, 224, 118 P.3d 419,

review granted, 157 Wn.2d 1001, 136 P.3d 758 (2006), for the proposition that an

individual's denial of ownership of a specific item in response to police questioning is

an abandonment and waiver of any privacy rights in that property. On the other hand,

police questioning must fall within the scope of the circumstances that initially justify an

interference or detention. State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 15-16, 948 P.2d 1280

(1997).

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State v. Veltri

If a traffic stop is initially justified, the detention length and scope must be

reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. RCW 46.61.021(2); State

v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626,

628-29, 811 P.2d 241 (1991). Once the initial stop purpose is accomplished, any

further detention must be based on "'articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity.'" Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 15-16 (quoting State v. Cantrell,

70 Wn. App. 340, 344, 853 P.2d 479 (1993)). In other words, "police officers may not

use routine traffic stops as a basis for generalized, investigative detentions or

searches." State v. Henry, 80 Wn. App. 544, 553, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995).

Here, the trial court found Officer Edwards stopped Ms. Veltri to investigate the

mismatched license plates and a possibly stolen truck. The rear license plate was

valid. The truck was not reported stolen. Officer Edwards decided not to issue an

infraction. The stop was extended by securing uninformed consent to search the truck-

cab, where nothing suspicious was found, and later, two suitcases in the truck-bed.

Ms. Veltri denied suitcase ownership and declared her lack of care about the extended

searches. From this, the court concluded Officer Edwards switched his investigatory

focus to looking for contraband and weapons.

First, the State argued solely abandonment in its opening brief, not mentioning

its other assignments of error. Thus, we do not analyze the State's other assignments

of error. Fosbre, 70 Wn.2d at 583. Even so, given the facts, substantial evidence

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No. 24861-5-III
State v. Veltri

supports the court's findings. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 214.

Second, our focus is whether the facts support the trial court's conclusions.

Officer Edwards dispelled his stolen truck suspicions and decided not to issue an

infraction, resolving the initial stop purposes. See Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 13, 15-16;

Henry, 80 Wn. App. at 550. Given the trial court's findings, it correctly concluded

Officer Edwards lacked further reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 13, 15-16. Thus, the trial court correctly decided an

impermissible general exploratory search occurred. Id.; Henry, 80 Wn. App. at 550-53.

Therefore, abandonment is not the issue; the continued detention, questioning, and

search were unlawful. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 15-16; Henry, 80 Wn. App. at 550-53.

Moreover, our Supreme Court has decided State v. Evans, No. 77700-4, 2007 Wash.

LEXIS 50 at *15-16 (Jan. 11, 2007), since argument of this case, rejecting the State's

abandonment argument.

Affirmed.
 
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