Terrorist tactics for war with the West: Al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have adopted the principles contained in an American military initiative as an attempt to overcome traditional strategic defenses - The nation: war on terror
Scott L. Wheeler
Experts and evidence confirm that the al-Qaeda terrorist organization has borrowed both doctrine and strategy from an American military initiative to fight the terror War against the United States. Called the "Fourth Generation Warfare" doctrine, it was laid out and codified in 1989 by a handful of American military officers and a civilian military adviser to a U.S. senator. But while the Department of Defense (DoD) ignored it, al-Qaeda's battle planners claim they have used it so successfully that, "in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations."
The new approach to warfare first was described to the public in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article. It was written by William S. Lind, who at the time was military-affairs adviser to Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), and two Army and two Marine Corps officers. They explained what they saw as the next, or fourth generation, of warfare. According to these tacticians, "First-generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket--the tactics of line and column." This, the authors explained, was dictated by technology, tradition and the training levels of conscripts.
The second generation began with grooved barrels on rifle muskets, then moved on to rapid reloaders, the machine gun and indirect fire from artillery. "Massed firepower replaced massed manpower," according to the article.
The third generation saw the tactics of outmaneuvering, rather than destroying, the opposing force. "The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces," the article states.
According to these tacticians, the purpose of their analysis was to predict the next generation of combat U.S. forces would encounter--the so-called "fourth generation." As they saw it, this type of warfare has "a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population's support for the war and the enemy's culture." The authors predicted that armies of the future would "be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts."
If this description of fourth-generation warfare seems familiar it is because that is how al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups conduct business against Israel, the United States and other Western nations.
But those who developed the concept of fourth-generation warfare warn that the DoD still does not get the picture. In an interview with INSIGHT, Lind says the Pentagon is stuck in linear thinking as it prosecutes the war on terror, without understanding that the United States is up against practitioners of fourth-generation warfare. "It's like it's 1942 and the Pentagon is ignoring carrier aviation," he says.
Lind, who now is with the Free Congress Foundation, explains that, "We define a bomb as legitimate if it is delivered by an airplane or a cruise missile," but points out that to terrorist armies it can be "a car or a suitcase." As the 1989 article put it, in the mind of the fourth-generation warriors, "the distinction between `civilian' and `military' may disappear."
The U.S. defense and intelligence community may or may not be in denial over what is happening, but there is no doubt that al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have embraced the tenets of fourth-generation warfare and see it as their way to victory against the vast military machine of the West in general and the United States in particular. In February, the Middle East Media Research Institute published excerpts from an article it found on a now-defunct al-Qaeda Website, Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War. The article, "Fourth-Generation Wars" by Abu 'Ubeid al-Qurashi, was pseudonymous, but intelligence sources tell INSIGHT that the writer is a figure of significant stature within al-Qaeda and should be taken seriously. He openly acknowledges the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article, embraces the principles advanced therein and says, "This new type of war presents significant difficulties for the Western war machine."
Al-Qurashi's article claims that by using the fourth-generation doctrine al-Qaeda overcame "the elements of America's strategic defense, which the former U.S.S.R. and every other hostile state could not harm. These elements are: early warning, preventive strike and the principle of deterrence." According to al-Qurashi, "With the Sept. 11 attacks, al-Qaeda entered the annals of successful surprise attacks ... because it put every individual in American society on alert for every possibility, whether emotionally or practically. This has an extremely high economic and psychological price."
With no early, warning of terror attacks, the al-Qaeda strategist says, terror has a force multiplier. With no early warning there can be no preventive strike, al-Qurashi says, because "it is very difficult to launch a successful preventive strike at an organization that maneuvers and moves quickly, and has no permanent bases."
Al-Qurashi says deterrence has been overcome because, "This principle is based on the assumption that there are two sides that seek to survive and defend their interests--but it is completely eliminated when dealing with people who don't care about living but thirst for martyrdom." He points out that deterrence "works well between countries; it does not work at all for an organization."
It is these organizations at war that are at the heart of fourth-generation warfare. The authors of that seminal Marine Corps Gazette article say that future war will be based on organizations, tribes and interest groups that bypass a nation-state's military altogether and instead inflict damage to the civilian infrastructure. Lind refers to it as "cause-oriented warfare," saying that future armies will be made up of individuals fighting for a cause without the glue of a nation-state. "The first loyalty will be to their cause, not to their country," says Lind, who thinks that nations in general are "losing their monopoly on loyalty."
According to military experts familiar with fourth-generation warfare, organizational strategies of this kind pose significant problems for the United States, whose defense doctrine relies mostly on conventional forces. Retired Army Lt. Col. Greg Wilcox tells INSIGHT, "We are not built for fourth-generation warfare in this country. We can't play by the same rules." But Wilcox is convinced the United States now has little choice but to "develop a countermeasure strategy against the terrorist." He says al-Qaeda is bound to strike civilian targets again. "They've got to hit the weak spots," he says.
Wilcox speculates that the reason the United States has not seen suicide-bomber attacks such as in Israel is that "al-Qaeda may have re-evaluated Sept. 11 and considered that it generated too much sympathy" from the international community. Sympathy for the United States would be inconsistent with the objectives of fourth-generation warfare that involve causing civilian casualties while simultaneously engendering sympathy for the cause of the aggressor organization so as to get the targeted people to blame their own leaders for allowing the continuing attacks.
Lind says that effectively combating fourth-generation warfare will present conflicts for American culture. The 1989 report states: "If we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy civilian dead brought into every living room in the country on the evening news can easily turn what may have been a military success--assuming we also hit the military target--into a serious defeat." Lind says that as the war continues, and U.S. forces pursue terrorist forces, Americans must get used to casualties among the civilians in whose midst the terrorist jihadists and their supporters will hide. Lind says Muslims who support terrorist attacks know and expect that. "As we weep even over their casualties," he says, "they will be cheering over ours."
SCOTT L. WHEELER IS A REPORTER FOR Insight.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_1_19/ai_95914216
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It seems to me that one of the defining elements of American culture the individual, personal, ownership of firearms by law abiding civilians would go a long way in preventing and deterring "fourth-generation warfare" attacks on the populace. An age-old solution to a modern problem.
Of course that's my answer to all of society’s problems.
Scott L. Wheeler
Experts and evidence confirm that the al-Qaeda terrorist organization has borrowed both doctrine and strategy from an American military initiative to fight the terror War against the United States. Called the "Fourth Generation Warfare" doctrine, it was laid out and codified in 1989 by a handful of American military officers and a civilian military adviser to a U.S. senator. But while the Department of Defense (DoD) ignored it, al-Qaeda's battle planners claim they have used it so successfully that, "in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations."
The new approach to warfare first was described to the public in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article. It was written by William S. Lind, who at the time was military-affairs adviser to Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), and two Army and two Marine Corps officers. They explained what they saw as the next, or fourth generation, of warfare. According to these tacticians, "First-generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket--the tactics of line and column." This, the authors explained, was dictated by technology, tradition and the training levels of conscripts.
The second generation began with grooved barrels on rifle muskets, then moved on to rapid reloaders, the machine gun and indirect fire from artillery. "Massed firepower replaced massed manpower," according to the article.
The third generation saw the tactics of outmaneuvering, rather than destroying, the opposing force. "The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces," the article states.
According to these tacticians, the purpose of their analysis was to predict the next generation of combat U.S. forces would encounter--the so-called "fourth generation." As they saw it, this type of warfare has "a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population's support for the war and the enemy's culture." The authors predicted that armies of the future would "be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts."
If this description of fourth-generation warfare seems familiar it is because that is how al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups conduct business against Israel, the United States and other Western nations.
But those who developed the concept of fourth-generation warfare warn that the DoD still does not get the picture. In an interview with INSIGHT, Lind says the Pentagon is stuck in linear thinking as it prosecutes the war on terror, without understanding that the United States is up against practitioners of fourth-generation warfare. "It's like it's 1942 and the Pentagon is ignoring carrier aviation," he says.
Lind, who now is with the Free Congress Foundation, explains that, "We define a bomb as legitimate if it is delivered by an airplane or a cruise missile," but points out that to terrorist armies it can be "a car or a suitcase." As the 1989 article put it, in the mind of the fourth-generation warriors, "the distinction between `civilian' and `military' may disappear."
The U.S. defense and intelligence community may or may not be in denial over what is happening, but there is no doubt that al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have embraced the tenets of fourth-generation warfare and see it as their way to victory against the vast military machine of the West in general and the United States in particular. In February, the Middle East Media Research Institute published excerpts from an article it found on a now-defunct al-Qaeda Website, Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War. The article, "Fourth-Generation Wars" by Abu 'Ubeid al-Qurashi, was pseudonymous, but intelligence sources tell INSIGHT that the writer is a figure of significant stature within al-Qaeda and should be taken seriously. He openly acknowledges the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article, embraces the principles advanced therein and says, "This new type of war presents significant difficulties for the Western war machine."
Al-Qurashi's article claims that by using the fourth-generation doctrine al-Qaeda overcame "the elements of America's strategic defense, which the former U.S.S.R. and every other hostile state could not harm. These elements are: early warning, preventive strike and the principle of deterrence." According to al-Qurashi, "With the Sept. 11 attacks, al-Qaeda entered the annals of successful surprise attacks ... because it put every individual in American society on alert for every possibility, whether emotionally or practically. This has an extremely high economic and psychological price."
With no early, warning of terror attacks, the al-Qaeda strategist says, terror has a force multiplier. With no early warning there can be no preventive strike, al-Qurashi says, because "it is very difficult to launch a successful preventive strike at an organization that maneuvers and moves quickly, and has no permanent bases."
Al-Qurashi says deterrence has been overcome because, "This principle is based on the assumption that there are two sides that seek to survive and defend their interests--but it is completely eliminated when dealing with people who don't care about living but thirst for martyrdom." He points out that deterrence "works well between countries; it does not work at all for an organization."
It is these organizations at war that are at the heart of fourth-generation warfare. The authors of that seminal Marine Corps Gazette article say that future war will be based on organizations, tribes and interest groups that bypass a nation-state's military altogether and instead inflict damage to the civilian infrastructure. Lind refers to it as "cause-oriented warfare," saying that future armies will be made up of individuals fighting for a cause without the glue of a nation-state. "The first loyalty will be to their cause, not to their country," says Lind, who thinks that nations in general are "losing their monopoly on loyalty."
According to military experts familiar with fourth-generation warfare, organizational strategies of this kind pose significant problems for the United States, whose defense doctrine relies mostly on conventional forces. Retired Army Lt. Col. Greg Wilcox tells INSIGHT, "We are not built for fourth-generation warfare in this country. We can't play by the same rules." But Wilcox is convinced the United States now has little choice but to "develop a countermeasure strategy against the terrorist." He says al-Qaeda is bound to strike civilian targets again. "They've got to hit the weak spots," he says.
Wilcox speculates that the reason the United States has not seen suicide-bomber attacks such as in Israel is that "al-Qaeda may have re-evaluated Sept. 11 and considered that it generated too much sympathy" from the international community. Sympathy for the United States would be inconsistent with the objectives of fourth-generation warfare that involve causing civilian casualties while simultaneously engendering sympathy for the cause of the aggressor organization so as to get the targeted people to blame their own leaders for allowing the continuing attacks.
Lind says that effectively combating fourth-generation warfare will present conflicts for American culture. The 1989 report states: "If we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy civilian dead brought into every living room in the country on the evening news can easily turn what may have been a military success--assuming we also hit the military target--into a serious defeat." Lind says that as the war continues, and U.S. forces pursue terrorist forces, Americans must get used to casualties among the civilians in whose midst the terrorist jihadists and their supporters will hide. Lind says Muslims who support terrorist attacks know and expect that. "As we weep even over their casualties," he says, "they will be cheering over ours."
SCOTT L. WHEELER IS A REPORTER FOR Insight.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_1_19/ai_95914216
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems to me that one of the defining elements of American culture the individual, personal, ownership of firearms by law abiding civilians would go a long way in preventing and deterring "fourth-generation warfare" attacks on the populace. An age-old solution to a modern problem.
Of course that's my answer to all of society’s problems.
More things change, the more they stay the same.
pacifism
