223 Effectiveness in Combat

[henschman]

I will maintain that a 6.5 thru 7mm, around 120-130 grains, leaving at around 2500 fps would be about as close to a "do it all" cartridge as we could come up with. Tell me one thing it could NOT do well?

Put it in a modular type rifle, with separate upper and lower receivers like the AR, and possibly a quick-change barrel as well, so it could be set up in a variety of ways with different barrels, handguards, optics, and other accessories for any mission. Preferably with a gas piston operating system and an ambidextrous side charging handle that works in both directions. Also produce a dedicated SAW similar to the FN Minimi in that same caliber.

That's my $.02.

 

[JASmith]

I will maintain that a 6.5 thru 7mm, around 120-130 grains, leaving at around 2500 fps would be about as close to a "do it all" cartridge as we could come up with. Tell me one thing it could NOT do well?...

It would indeed, but a 90gr .224 or a 107 gr 6mm would do as well. Both can be implemented on AR15 class (i. e., 5.56 NATO cartridge length) with loadouts comparable to the AK47 for the .224 and the M14 in the case of the 6mm

For details see http://shootersnotes.com/battle-rifle-cartridge/

 

[W.E.G.]

I don't think the .223 is a very good sniper round.

But, if I got shot in the head with one, I might change my mind.

 

[txhoghunter]

I don't think the .223 is a very good sniper round.

But, if I got shot in the head with one, I might change my mind.

.....I don't have to get shot in the head to change my mind

I fear being on the receiving end of any bullet, much less one that is carried by multiple armed forces. Though it is not the heaviest bullet, it is a manstopper, and has been proving it for 50 years

 

[HorseSoldier]

How come few, if any, consider the tactical doctrine at the time the M16/.5.56 were first introduced?

First off, the expected enemy was the USSR. Next was the use of air and artillery as the primary weaponry.

I'd question that to an extent. The M14 came up short in small unit actions against insurgents in SE Asia, and its adoption was partly fueled by the extremely enthusiastic evaluations sent back by SF teams who were operating outside timely assistance from air and arty.

And fighting guerrillas in SE Asia was the main focus of M16 fielding -- there wasn't any particular rush to get the M14 to troops with a NATO mission, even those staring eyeball to eyeball at their Warsaw Pact counterparts on the German border.

Now, there is something to the idea that air power and artillery were conceived as the main killer in US doctrine, but that was because the rifle armed infantryman had time and again demonstrated himself to be an ineffective killer on the battlefield. Doctrine didn't drive the adoption of 5.56mm and the M16 so much as it correctly identified problems and sought solutions that were more adaptive for how combat had been documented to be occurring for the whole of the 20th century.

 

[mugsie]

Spent 68 & 69 in Nam. At the time, we were using 52 or 55 grain bullets (not sure which). There were a lot of dead VC / NVA who can attest to the damage this round did. The lighter bullets upset quicker, tumbled more and did a tremendous amount of damage. IMHO, going up to a heavier bullet didn't do us any favors, since they traveled through the target without as much collateral damage.

 

[JASmith]

I think there is a point to be made for the M16/M4 being just fine for our soldiers in the major combat role. The problem is that we haven't seen the large-scale combat for which this rifle and cartridge were designed since Baghdad was taken.

Combat engagements today, while intense and life-changing for the participants, do not have the same character. If they did, there would be precious little debate about the suitability of the 5.56 NATO round.

Enough of our troops have encountered bad guys at longer ranges than the M4 with green-tip ammunition can handle that our conversations have some validity.

Even though I advocate a new cartridge, the answer may be as simple as increasing the numbers of M14s and grenade launchers at the platoon and squad levels. In this model, the role of the M4 shooter is to protect the M14 and grenade launcher.

This could make a big difference for those units who have to operate semi-independently and cannot get timely air and arty support often enough to be useful.

 

[Slamfire]

A shooting bud of mine, a Vietnam Veteran, I met his son at the range prior to his shipping over to Iraqi. They were getting some trigger time.

Junior became a battalion scout squad sniper. So I asked Dad about the performance of the weapons. Junior said "in city" engagements were never more than 200 yards. Junior said that the 308 was entirely satisfactory within that range, but over 100 yards, the .223 just “did not keep them down”.

As for shot placement under combat conditions, it would be lovely if all the opponents our guys faced were perfectly still and had great contrast from the background, like the targets we shoot, then you could pick your aiming point.

Apparently, live targets are moving, hiding, and generally not cooperative for picking your shot.

And then, if the guy is a belt bomber, or driving a car filled with explosives, are varmint rounds really the best choice against someone who is intent on dying, and taking you with him?

 

[blackops]

I see many guys point out that it really depends on what type of engagement your fighting in as to whether the 223 is effective and pointing out it's weaknesses in certain applications. Again, I'd like to point out that no one cartridge is "best," but for a majority carry and spread out to cover every application for our military, what cartridge would be more efficient?

 

[mljdeckard]

I have every confidence that it, with the AR platform of rifles, allows my petite female soldiers to get more good hits.

 

[HorseSoldier]

Enough of our troops have encountered bad guys at longer ranges than the M4 with green-tip ammunition can handle that our conversations have some validity.

Again, I have to ask where's the proof that at longer range the round is coming up short rather than weapons training coming up short? It's been my observation that as you focus more on guys with actual shooter type jobs (and the training to do it) complaints about the 5.56mm/M4 combo decrease. Infantry guys are less likely to complain about 5.56mm lethality than support guys whose combat experience is running convoys. SF guys don't complain about 5.56mm/M4 lethality -- and even in Afghanistan the team guys in my last unit were jumping through hoops to get even shorter barreled uppers on their guns than a standard M4.

This only tracks and makes sense if the problem is primarily about ability, not a technical issue. If it were a tech issue, the relationship would be completely inverse of what I've observed.

And it gels with what battlefield studies have been showing time and again for the last 100 years. The point where the breakdown occurs and where all that nice target shooting in peacetime fails to translate into dead bodies on the ground when it's for real is not about terminal ballistics. It's about target acquisition and positive ID and then about putting hits on the target. In the vast majority of cases the bullet does its job just fine once we get to terminal ballistics -- and in any number of documented cases it does not do so, regardless of whether we're talking about 62 grain 5.56mm, 147 grain 7.62x51, 150 grain 30-06 or whatever. Everybody wants to talk about how the Filipino insurgents ushered in the "man stopping" 45ACP and 1911, but what they fail to talk about is how failures to stop with .30 cal Krags and even NG guys armed with 45-70s were noted during that war as well.

I admire the sentiment that goes into a lot of this discussion about how we need to change service rifle caliber to the 6.8 SOF Silver Bullet or 6.5 Siegfried or whatever todays latest and greatest are . . . but it's missing the point. If we're going to spend a bunch of money on anything relating to service rifles we need to look at improving issue optics and basis of issue for them and we need to spend tons more money -- tons of it -- on additional weapons training for troops.

Of course that's a big problem for lots of people since producing skilled and competent shooters really does take money and it's a bit too abstract for easy quantifying. And, to be honest, it doesn't appear to our inherent American fascination for gadgets and technical fixes to training issues. Whole lot easier for a congress critter to get his constituents to buy he's working for the troops by being able to show him going after a tool, or fondling some fancy new replacement in a PR event dressed up as media than to try to explain that he wants the troops better trained. Same with the media -- agitate for better training and people think you're saying the troops aren't adequately trained . . . and then you're an al-Qaeda sympathizer or something.

So we get all worked up about the smoke rather than paying any attention to the fire that's getting fully engaged on the structure. Because fixating on the smoke is the easy part.

 

[shootr]

Yep.

Used to work gun shows for a friend who owned a small shop. Always recommended a case of cheap ammo over the latest whiz-bang accessory as the thing that would most improve performance.

 

[Float Pilot]

For many years the Brits argued that the 303 was just not nearly as good as the 450 Martini had been.

In Cuba the 6mm Lee Navy was suspect. Not because the bolt would occasionally fall out, (which it did) but because a high velocity .243 bullet was thought not to have enough whammy compared to the old 45-70 and the new fangled 30-40 Krag.

 

[JASmith]

FloatPilot has nicely captured the essence of progress!

Absent the complaints and inventiveness to improve things, we might still be ignoring rocks as potential tools and weapons!

 

[JASmith]

Again, I have to ask where's the proof that at longer range the round is coming up short rather than weapons training coming up short?...

...It's about target acquisition and positive ID and then about putting hits on the target...

...Of course that's a big problem for lots of people since producing skilled and competent shooters really does take money and it's a bit too abstract for easy quantifying...

...where's the proof that at longer range the round is coming up short...

In the world I've worked in, "proof" is an incredibly strong term, since it applies to physical and mathematical processes. It is true that wound ballistics is a physical process and that mathematics are involved, but the science is still dominated by subjective judgements.

The closest to an easily understood and definitive statement is slide #15 in a paper by Mark Minisi: www.firearmstactical.com/pdf/picatinny.pdf. In this paper he indicates that the M855 bullet needs to be going at least 2500 ft/sec to get the desired terminal performance in soft targets.

The chart also suggests that this 2500 ft/sec minimum velocity is reached at about 125 meters when using the 14" barrel.

The paper was written before the introduction of the M855 A1, so I don't know how the bottom line may have changed.

...It's about target acquisition and positive ID and then about putting hits on the target...

Absolutely, and hard to train for and incredibly difficult to actually do in an environment when the head that sticks up for a look-see can get blown off. Nonetheless, some folks can do it. We need to serve them better.

...Of course that's a big problem for lots of people since producing skilled and competent shooters really does take money and it's a bit too abstract for easy quantifying...

This takes us back to the combined arms doctrine where the mass-killers (air & arty) dominate the budget.

My point in all this discussion is that the current conflict no longer maps into engagements where the full-blown application combined arms is useful or appropriate. We need to make sure that the folks going into this arena are better trained and equipped. The problem is that we can't abandon the ability to fight the big wars because that's what helps us contain the conflicts to the levels they're at today---

 

[chuckfw]

The m16/ar15 is a lot better of a weapon if chambered in 7.62x39 upper. Increased stopping power at decent ranges. Why can't NATO admit that round is superior to the dinky varmit round we now have to use in combat.

 

[d2wing]

Changing the rifle, optics or round will make little difference in most engagements because you don't get time for aimed shots. You're lucky to see the shooters. Someone accused soldiers of pray and spray. I resent that attitude. I was too busy to pray. Most people have no clue if they think they could show up with a super deluxe whammo rifle and make a difference. The problem is not the rifle, training or tactics. It that the sneeky son a guns won't stand there and get shot or fight like we want them to. There's more to it than picking off the bad guys. No doubt the 7.62 Nato in a AR 10 would have better performance. Would it help many guys or affect the outcome of any battle? I say trade off. More no than yes. Any gain in another round or platform? Hard to say.
Better supporting fire needed? Yes.

 

[Slamfire]

Of course that's a big problem for lots of people since producing skilled and competent shooters really does take money and it's a bit too abstract for easy quantifying. And, to be honest, it doesn't appear to our inherent American fascination for gadgets and technical fixes to training issues. Whole lot easier for a congress critter to get his constituents to buy he's working for the troops by being able to show him going after a tool, or fondling some fancy new replacement in a PR event dressed up as media than to try to explain that he wants the troops better trained. Same with the media -- agitate for better training and people think you're saying the troops aren't adequately trained . . . and then you're an al-Qaeda sympathizer or something.

The military hardly cuts back on big weapon acquisitions, between wars, but they sure do cut back on training budgets.

On Capital Hill, budget line items for expensive gadgets are protected by a lot more people than training budgets.

And that is due to the concentration of monies involved. Prime contractors on expensive weapons systems send big campaign contributions to Washington. Military Program Managers are advocates within the Pentagon for their contractor. No one is looking out for the Soldier, or the readiness of the force because the profits, promotions, and future employment are in expensive weapon procurements.

Small arms are in fact chump change compared to Ships, Planes, Missile Systems.

 

[PandaBearBG]

5.56 does the job and has done it well for decades. Yes 30 caliber rounds pack more puch and better penetration and definitly shoot farther, but for the most part most current wars are primarily medium/close range (less 300 m) and lately urban terrain. A smaller lighter weapon platform that has high capacity and allows high mobility. It kills just as fine as any other infantry round, as other posters have stated its about shot placement, contolled fire, and usually a healthy dose of luck. No matter how hard you train the average infantryman is not bang on first shot nerves of steel sniper. However combining grunts, arty, mortars, and heavy weapon support, along with snipers and some companies using designated marksman (somewhere between sniper and basic rifleman) gets the job done.

Troops now a days are getting better trained and more and more optics for their rifles which greatly increases accuracy and kill shots. Also the modern day soilder and marine carry more and more gear, armor, and equipment than the boys of WW2 and Vietnam, and bulky heavy 30 caliber weapon along with heavier fewer rounds just isn't in the books.

Bigger guns and bigger bullets are always prefered to an infantryman when in a firefight, but most of the time the idea of carrying that bulk letting it wear you down and slow you down is a BIG turn off.

 

[henschman]

I agree that the best thing that we could be doing to improve combat effectiveness is to properly teach the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship to all soldiers.

At the Infantry Symposium last year, the attendees were on the topic of the effectiveness of the SS109 round in combat. The Commander of GSG-9, Germany's elite force, said "The SS109 round was perfectly lethal up to 400 meters if the soldiers would hit what they were shooting at. I love the American soldier but they are not being taught marksmanship. The best rifle marksmanship training in America is from a private group called 'Johnny Appleseed' or some such thing." At this point a member of the American special forces community jumped up, corrected the name (he was referring to Project Appleseed) and said he had taken the course and qualified because he came with some basic knowledge, but that the weekend was a real "ball buster."

Appleseed marksmanship clinics do a great job of teaching all the fundamentals in a single weekend. I think Appleseed's way of teaching instills the fundamentals better... they are taught in a more clear, concise, logical, and refined way. I think that initial military marksmanship training ought to be something along those lines, to give soldiers a strong set of fundamentals to build on. Of course the military should take the training beyond what is taught at those weekend clinics, because they have a lot more time with the soldiers, and of course the soldiers need to be able to apply those fundamentals to shooting in all their gear, and from some different positions other than the traditional field positions taught at Appleseed, and need to learn close quarters shooting techniques as well. But fundamentals are what it is all about. If you don't build on a strong foundation, the entire house will be weak. And I think the military (with the possible exception of the Marines) generally does a poor job of teaching the fundamentals.

They need to teach the steps to firing the shot better -- BRASS leaves a lot out. They need to teach Natural Point of Aim, how to check it, how to place it on target, and actually drill the students on it so they understand it and are doing it. And no one can find their NPOA if they aren't in a solid position that you can relax into... the positions taught by the Army could use some tweaks. They also need to actually teach the conversions from Inches to Minutes to Clicks for sighting in a rifle, so the students actually understand the concepts involved, instead of just having them shoot a zeroing target and count the little squares. I also believe soldiers should be taught how to use a sling to stabilize the rifle. I realize this isn't always practical in the field, but there are times it would help out a lot for getting that extra stability for a small or distant target. The Marines still teach it, and it is in the Army's SDM curriculum... I don't see any reason why something so simple and versatile that has such a great effect on accuracy shouldn't be taught to everybody.

Appleseed has actually trained several Army units, with highly positive results. At the White Sands Missile Range, the instructors had the soldiers consistently getting hits out to 600 yards with M-4 carbines. Every unit that has been trained by Appleseed has shown vastly improved qualification scores and increased knowledge of the soldiers' max effective range and confidence that they can hit small or distant targets.

I firmly believe that when it comes to the fundamentals, Appleseed's way is a lot better than Uncle Sam's way. I think they could take a lot of cues from the program. And that would be a lot cheaper, more effective, and feasable than switching everybody over to a new service rifle.

 

[Art Eatman]

This is getting mostly repetitive, with little new being added. So, until sometime on upcoming page five...

 

[Float Pilot]

This is getting mostly repetitive, with little new being added. So, until sometime on upcoming page five...

You got that right. I am sure the zombie shooting crowd will soon chime in.

Back in the early and mid 1960s my dad was involved in weapons R&D. He was a hard stripe Chief Warrant who started in 1945 as a E-2 grunt in the Pacific.

Even back then, he and his work buddies would have these long heated discussions about the 5.56mm round that was being forced onto them by the yahoos in Washington. These guys were still upset about the 7.62 Nato round since it was not really a real 30 caliber as far as they were concerned.
This continued when he went into weapons R&D as a civilian.
They always had a beef with the non-military service poughs in the system who counted the beans and pulled the strings.
The same type of yahoos that I came to hate when I entered the service.

Now, 45-50 years later people are still complaining and supposing.....

When they goes to a light-pulse weapon, you guys will be talking about the good old days when you could actually poke a hole in somebody with a 5.56mm

 

[Hangingrock]

WW2 solidified Field Artillery of the United States Army as the primary killer on the battle field because of the abundance of field radios. German military accounts clearly stated that their military feared USA-FA more so than the mass firing of the Russians. Accurate and timely delivery of fire by USA-FA was the difference.The Korean and Vietnam experiences were more of the same. Yes air power is a very significant contributor also.

After Vietnam the USMC looked towards NATO and land warfare in Europe. A Marine Commandant of that era concluded the USMC could not survive with out the Multiple Launch Rocket System and made it a number one priority. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire priorities changed. I believe the Marine Corps has a truck mounted version designated to reserve units.

Between Vietnam and the current Iraqi/Afghanistan wars there has not been a period of such protracted land warfare where infantry tactics and weapons are scrutinized so thoroughly.

That said the 300 yard concept goes back to Hatchers studies of WW1 and apparently accepted as doctrine in WW2 and Korea. Hatcher basically said the average rifleman could not distinguish and hit a target on the battle field beyond 300yds.

In my time the NVA and VC main force units were very adaptive to battle field conditions. How effective was the M-14 in comparison to the M-16. I simply don’t know. I do know that Air-Cav units had the highest kill ratios of all units deployed. In my experience the NVA and VC main force did every thing they could to negate the firepower advantage of US forces. They would hug in close meaning really close to reduce their vulnerability to artillery fire.

We had Staff NCO’s relate their experiences in Korea when the lines became more or less static. Squad leaders or platoon sergeants would use tracers in their rifles to designate a beaten zone and all opened up to rid themselves of Chinese snipers.

How effective is the current service cartridge only as effective as circumstances/tactical situation allows which maybe said for what ever war you are in.

 

[Tirod]

It is without a doubt, more effective as a rifleman's rifle in aimed fire.

Well, you can wish that all you want; the truth to it is that the Army thought otherwise. The M14 was tossed in the dumpster because it's size and weight impeded the concept of putting a lot of bullets downrange at the enemy.

Don't blame beancounters, Congress, or whatever, it's reality. It started with the GERMANS, who saw the bolt action 8mm Mauser, one of the most highly respected firearms in the world, becoming obsolete on the battlefield. They studied the problem, and moved to self loading actions, and even designed a new weapon using an intermediate caliber. The point has been made elsewhere, take two squads of soldiers in the Ardennes, give one the Garand, the other the STG44, and stand back. Sorry, the reports are right there, Garands got their butt kicked by superior firepower. Extended range had nothing to do with it.

Fast forward to the 'Stan, we did need a bit more range, because we couldn't reach out to 800m. The answer was to refurbish the M14 - and there are only 5,000 going. Compared to over 100,000 M16's and M4's, the need was considered supplemental, not a massive changeover so every soldier could get one.

Every soldier doesn't NEED an 800m weapon, it's a known fact in tactical circles most soldiers can't target past 500m or shoot it. They don't need to, other weapons are available, and that's where the Main Battle Rifle drum pounders show a consistent lack of view.

It's not about a single shooter or two man team, it's about what a squad or platoon has given to it to control the area they command. Mortars, rockets, grenade launchers, machine guns, and even bigger resources exist.

You can always tell who hasn't served, they think it's all about them and their rifle, mano a mano, them vs. the entire opposing force. It's a false argument to think the individual soldier has to carry The One. No, he just gets one, and uses what he has, which works as well as he does.

I see inadequacy issues in the argument, not competent knowledge of firearms, or experience behind the trigger. It seems the ones who don't like the M4 are the least qualified to know. Somebody has to make a responsible decision and did, they didn't pick the 15% solution for 85% of the shooting, they issued what fit as the better tool.

Some folks are too used to being on a cruise boat in the Nile, and face reality in the field.

 

[EdLaver]

Here is my take on the .223/5.56...

The military is only allowed to use FMJs so the effectiveness is somewhat rendered. If there are any SWAT officers or LEOs that have had engagements I think their input would be better. Most likely they are using hollowpoints or VMAX rounds which are much more devastating than FMJs.