does anyone have a link to the actual decision? We need to see the actual language.
Here you go -
https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2023/10a22.pdf
SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND
KOBINA EBO ABRUQUAH v. STATE OF MARYLAND
Filed: June 20, 2023
Firearms identification, a subset of toolmark identification, is “the practice of investigating whether a bullet, cartridge case or other ammunition component or fragment can be traced to a particular suspect weapon.” Fleming v. State, 194 Md. App. 76, 100-01 (2010). The basic idea is that (1) features unique to the interior of any particular firearm leave unique, microscopic patterns and marks on bullets and cartridge cases that are fired from that firearm, and so (2) by comparing patterns and marks left on bullets and cartridge cases found at a crime scene (“unknown samples”) to marks left on bullets and cartridge cases fired from a known firearm (“known samples”), firearms examiners can determine whether the unknown samples were or were not fired from the known firearm.
At the trial of the petitioner, Kobina Ebo Abruquah, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County permitted a firearms examiner to testify, without qualification, that bullets left at a murder scene were fired from a gun that Mr. Abruquah had acknowledged was his. Based on reports, studies, and testimony calling into question the reliability of firearms identification analysis, Mr. Abruquah contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting the firearms examiner’s testimony. The State, relying on different studies and testimony, contends that the examiner’s opinion was properly admitted.
Applying the analysis required by Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), we conclude that the examiner should not have been permitted to offer an unqualified opinion that the crime scene bullets were fired from Mr. Abruquah’s gun. The reports, studies, and testimony presented to the circuit court demonstrate that the firearms identification methodology employed in this case can support reliable conclusions that patterns and markings on bullets are consistent or inconsistent with those on bullets fired from a 2 particular firearm. Those reports, studies, and testimony do not, however, demonstrate that that methodology can reliably support an unqualified conclusion that such bullets were fired from a particular firearm.
The State also contends that any error in the circuit court’s admission of the examiner’s testimony was harmless. Because we are not convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict,” Dionas v. State, 436 Md. 97, 108 (2013) (quoting Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976)), we must reverse and remand for a new trial.
(Page 55)
J. Relationship Between Reliability of Methodology and Opinion to Be Offered
Based on the State’s evidence concerning the reliability of firearms examinations and “a dearth of real-life examples of erroneous examinations,” the circuit court concluded that “firearm and toolmark evidence is known to reach reliable results” and, therefore, that this final factor favors admission of the evidence. We do not question that firearms identification is generally reliable, and can be helpful to a jury, in identifying whether patterns and markings on “unknown” bullets or cartridges are consistent or inconsistent with those on bullets or cartridges known to have been fired from a particular firearm. For that reason, to the extent Mr. Abruquah suggests that testimony about the consistency of such patterns and markings should be excluded, we disagree.31 It is also possible that experts who are asked the right questions or have the benefit of additional studies and data may be able to offer opinions that drill down further on the level of consistency exhibited by samples or the likelihood that two bullets or cartridges fired from different firearms might exhibit such consistency. However, based on the record here, and particularly the lack of evidence that study results are reflective of actual casework, firearms identification has not been shown to reach reliable results linking a particular unknown bullet to a particular known firearm.
For those reasons, we conclude that the methodology of firearms identification presented to the circuit court did not provide a reliable basis for Mr. McVeigh’s unqualified opinion that four bullets and one bullet fragment found at the crime scene in this case were fired from Mr. Abruquah’s Taurus revolver. In effect, there was an analytical gap between the type of opinion firearms identification can reliably support and the opinion Mr. McVeigh offered.32 Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting Mr. McVeigh to offer that opinion.
(Page 57)
IV. HARMLESS ERROR
The State argues in the alternative that any error in admitting Mr. McVeigh’s testimony was harmless. We disagree.
... Upon our review of the record, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the expert testimony in no way contributed to the guilty verdict. The firearm and toolmark identification evidence was the only direct evidence before the jury linking Mr. Abruquah’s gun to the crime. Absent that evidence, the guilty verdict rested upon circumstantial evidence of a dispute between the men, a witness who heard gunfire around the time of the dispute, a firearm recovered from the residence, and testimony of a jailhouse informant. To be sure, that evidence is strong. But the burden of showing that an error was harmless is high and we cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of the particular expert testimony at issue did not influence or contribute to the jury’s decision to convict Mr. Abruquah. See Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 372 (2006) (stating that “[l]ay jurors tend to give considerable weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ with impressive credentials” (quoting Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386 (1978))).
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented at the hearings, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Mr. McVeigh could testify about firearms identification generally, his examination of the bullets and bullet fragments found at the crime scene, his comparison of that evidence to bullets known to have been fired from Mr. Abruquah’s Taurus revolver, and whether the patterns and markings on the crime scene bullets are consistent or inconsistent with the patterns and markings on the known bullets. However, the circuit court should not have permitted the State’s expert witness to opine without qualification that the crime scene bullets were fired from Mr. Abruquah’s firearm. Because the court’s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we will therefore reverse the circuit court’s ruling on Mr. Abruquah’s motion in limine, vacate Mr. Abruquah’s convictions, and remand for a new trial.
