With a decision that will only further muddy the waters as to how it's legal to transport firearms in Illinois the 3d District Appellate Court has affirmed an appeal of a Peoria County case of Unlawful Use of a Weapon where a man had two unloaded handguns in the console of his car.
DO NOT GO OUT AND PUT YOUR HANDGUNS IN THE CONSOLE IN ILLINOIS BASED ON THIS RULING UNLESS YOU ARE WILLING TO CHANCE THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT WHERE YOU ARE WILL RULE THE SAME WAY. THIS IS NOT, I REPEAT NOT AN ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULING MAKING TRANSPORT IN A CONSOLE LEGAL STATEWIDE.
There are some weird things in this case. Diggins, the defendant, is supposedly a resident of Florida yet he has a FOID Card. The only thing I can think of is that he has dual residency and maintains a residence in both states.
Here is the ruling, all 8 pages so it may take a couple posts:
http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2008/3rdDistrict/March/3070016.pdf
DO NOT GO OUT AND PUT YOUR HANDGUNS IN THE CONSOLE IN ILLINOIS BASED ON THIS RULING UNLESS YOU ARE WILLING TO CHANCE THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT WHERE YOU ARE WILL RULE THE SAME WAY. THIS IS NOT, I REPEAT NOT AN ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULING MAKING TRANSPORT IN A CONSOLE LEGAL STATEWIDE.
There are some weird things in this case. Diggins, the defendant, is supposedly a resident of Florida yet he has a FOID Card. The only thing I can think of is that he has dual residency and maintains a residence in both states.
Here is the ruling, all 8 pages so it may take a couple posts:
http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2008/3rdDistrict/March/3070016.pdf
No. 3--07--0016
_________________________________________________________________
Filed March 11, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 06--CF--356
)
MICHAEL DIGGINS, ) Honorable
) Stephen Kouri,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:
________________________________________________________________
The defendant, Michael Diggins, was convicted of aggravated
unlawful use of weapons following a jury trial and was sentenced
to a term of 30 months imprisonment. On appeal, defendant
maintains that the trial court erred: (1) in precluding defense
counsel from arguing that the center console of the defendant’s
automobile was a "case" during closing arguments; (2) in
instructing the jury that a center console is not a "case" under
Illinois law; (3) in refusing defendant’s proposed jury
instruction defining aggravated unlawful use of weapons; (3) in
refusing to allow defendant to argue that the laws of Florida and
other states would allow defendant to transport guns and
ammunition in the manner he was transporting them in Illinois;
and in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because we find the trial court erred in holding that the center
console was not a case, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Peoria police officers stopped defendant’s vehicle for
making a right turn without signaling on March 24, 2006. An
officer asked the defendant for his license and proof of
insurance. The defendant obtained his insurance card for the
glove box and handed it to the officer. When the officer asked
about defendant’s driver’s licence, defendant told the officer
that defendant had a firearm owner’s identification card. The
officer asked the defendant if he had a gun, and defendant
responded "Yes, I do." The defendant pointed to the center
console of his vehicle and told the officer that there were two
firearms in the console. The officer then told the defendant not
to reach in the console and he and his partner handcuffed
defendant and defendant’s passenger and removed them from the
vehicle.
One officer then entered the vehicle and observed that the
lid on the center console was raised and that a key was inside
the lock of the console. The officer lifted the console lid
further and observed two handguns, a chrome revolver and a semiautomatic
pistol. The officer also observed six rounds of .357
ammunition and a magazine loaded with .45 ammuntion. On crossexamination,
the officer confirmed that the lid of the console was open and that the key was in the locking mechanism of the console.
The defendant and his passenger each testified that the
center console was locked and the keys thereto were kept in the
glove box of the car. Both described the center console as being
a fully enclosed space between the driver and the passenger in
the front seat of the vehicle.
Prior to trial, the court granted the People’s motion in
limine to prohibit any argument that the defendant was a resident
of Florida and that the laws pertaining to the transportation of
firearms was different in Florida and in every state between
Florida and Illinois.
At the close of all the evidence, defense counsel sought a
jury instruction, based upon section 24-1.9 of the Illinois
Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2004)), to instruct the
jury that under Illinois law a person is not guilty of aggravated
unlawful use of weapons if the weapons are enclosed in a "case,
firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container" by a
person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card (FOID card). The record was un-controverted
that the defendant had a current valid FOID card, and that the
weapons were unloaded.
The trial judge denied the jury instruction sought by the
defendant.
On the People’s motion, the defendant was prohibited from
making arguments during closing argument that the location in
which the officers found the firearms was a "case" or "other
container" under section 24-1.6. During the People’s closing
argument, the prosecutor argued that the center console was not a
"case."
During deliberations, the jury queried the trial judge,
asking "what is the legal definition of a case?" Over defense
objection, the trial judge to the jury that a center console was
not a "case" under Illinois law. The jury then quickly returned
a guilty verdict.
Defendant maintains on appeal that the trial court erred
when it refused to allow him to argue and establish that the
center console of his car was a "case" under an exception to the
unlawful use of weapons statute. The question presented concerns
the construction and application of a statute to undisputed facts
and therefore raises a question of law. A question of law is
considered de novo. People v. Stanitz, 367 Ill. App. 3d 3d 980
(2006).
Section 24-1.6 of the Illinois Criminal Code mandated that a
person is not guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon if
that weapon is "unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying
box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been
issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card."
720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2004).
In the instant matter, the uncontested testimony revealed
that the defendant owned the weapons, and the weapons were stored
in the center console and were unloaded. The defendant provided
a valid FOID card to the arresting officer. Thus, the only
question remaining was whether the center console constituted a
"case" under the statute.
In People v. Cameron, 336 Ill. App. 3d 548 (2002), the
Fourth District of this court affirmed a trial court’s ruling
that a glove compartment of the defendant’s car was not a "case"
or "other container" under section 24-1.6. According to the
Cameron court:
"Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, when
a statutory clause specifically describes
several classes of things and then includes
"other things," the word "other" is
interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’" *
* * People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 138
(1998). * * * Applying the doctrine of
ejusdem generis and strictly construing the
container exemption, we determine that a
vehicle’s glove compartment is not an "other
container" under the container exemption. A
glove compartment is fundamentally different
from a case, firearm carrying box, or
shipping box because those receptacles are
portable whereas a glove compartment is a
fixed area in the dashboard of a vehicle.
Therefore, a glove compartment is not an
"other container" similar to the ones
enumerated in the container exemption."
Cameron, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 548.
The Cameron court focuses its analysis on the fact that
carrying boxes and shipping boxes are portable. However, there
is nothing in the plain meaning of the word "case" "firearm
carrying box," "shipping box" or "other container" which when
considered together indicate that the legislature intended the
statutory exemption to apply only to portable carrying devices.
There is nothing in the plain meaning of the statute to indicate
a limitation on the definition of a case. The statute does not
say "portable" case, firearm box, shipping box or other
container.
If the legislature intended the word "case" to be limited
to portable containers, it would have stated so in the statute.
For example, in the Illinois Wildlife Code (520 ILCS 5) the
legislature defined "case" for the purposes of describing a
container used to contain a weapon as:
"Case. Case means a container specifically
designed for the purpose of housing a gun or
bow and arrow device which completely
encloses such gun or bow and arrow device by
being zipped, snapped, buckled, tied or
otherwise fastened with no portion of the gun
or bow and arrow device exposed." 520 ILCS
5/1.2b-1 (West 2004).
When the legislature intended for the word "case" to have a
special meaning, as in the Wildlife Code, it wrote that special
meaning into the statute. In the Criminal Code, at issue in the
instant matter, there is no special meaning attached to the word
"case." The omission of a special meaning indicates that the
term is to have its ordinary meaning. People v. Smythe, 352 Ill.
App. 3d 1056, 1059 (2004).
Webster’s dictionary defines the term "case" as "a box or
receptacle to contain or hold something." Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 346 (1986). Further, the statute
requires that the weapon be "enclosed" in a "case." To "enclose"
means "to envelop" (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
746 (1986) and to "envelop" means "to enclose completely within a
garment or other covering" (Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 759 (1986). Thus, as the court noted in Smythe,
"given the plain meaning of term in light of all the relevant
provisions of the statute, it is evident that the term "case"
refers to an item that completely encloses the weapon in a
firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container." Smythe,
352 Ill. App. 3d at 1059.
We note that the court in Smythe referred to the legislative
history of this provision of the criminal code, wherein the
sponsoring legislator referred to the Wildlife Code as his
understanding of the meaning of the word "case" in Criminal Code.
See, Smythe, 352 Ill. App. At 1060. However, we would not resort
to legislative history, as we find the common definition of the
term is sufficient and unambiguous. Where the term is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to legislative history
for clarification. See, People v. Hicks, 164 Ill.2d 218, 222
(1995).
Moreover, we see no logical reason to distinguish between
portable and fixed containers, as the court did in Cameron, Under
the analysis articulated in Cameron, the defendant could not keep
his unloaded weapon locked in a fixed area such as a glove box or
center console, yet he could keep the weapon in a duffel bag
anywhere in the vehicle. The law is well established that
"statutes are to be construed in a manner that avoids absurd or
unjust results." People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. App. 486 (2003).
Allowing drivers to hide weapons anywhere in the vehicle, so long
as the case is portable, while prohibiting the storage of such
weapon in a glove box or center console absurd, illogical and
unjust.
The People submit that People v. Williams, 368 Ill. App. 3d
616 (2006) is on point. The Williams court, relying in part upon
Cameron held that a zippered compartment that was attached to the
back of the driver’s seat was not a case under the statute at
issue. Since Williams relies upon Cameron, and we decline to
follow Cameron, we also decline to follow Williams.
Having determined that the center console is a case as
intended by the legislature in providing exceptions to the
aggravated unlawful use of weapons statute, we must now determine
the practical effect of the trial court’s error in holding
otherwise. First, we find the jury was improperly instructed as
to the statutory exception. The defendant proposed instructing
the jury on the exception for FOID card holders carrying firearms
unloaded and cased. The defendant proposed the following
instruction:
"A person commits the offense of Aggravated
Unlawful Use of Weapons when he knowingly
possesses an uncased and unloaded firearm
with the ammunition immediately accessible,
in a vehicle except when on his land, in his
abode, or in his fixed place of business. A
person does not commit the offense where the
transportation or possession of a weapon that
is not immediately accessible or is unloaded
and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box,
shipping box, or other container, when that
person has a currently valid firearms owner’s
identification card."
A trial court’s refusal to issue a specific instruction is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. People
v. Douglas, 362 Ill. App. 3d 65 (2005). We find the trial court
abused its discretion in not giving this instruction. "Where an
instruction is given in the language of a statute which is
pertinent to the issues it must be regarded as sufficient.
Laying down the law in the words of the law itself ought not be
pronounced as error." Deming v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. 341,
345 (1948).
As it was error to instruct the jury without reference to
the container exception, it was also error not to permit the
defendant to argue in his closing argument that the console fit
within the legislative exception for encased weapons. These
errors require the matter to be reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
Prior to remand, we must address the defendants contention
that he was not proven guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106
Ill.2d 237 (1985).
Here, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, evidence was presented which, when taken in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, would have shown that
the console was open. Thus, even if the jury had been properly
instructed as to the console being a case, it is possible that
the jury could have found that the console was open, thus making
the statutory exception inapplicable. Such factual question
precludes our finding that the defendant was not proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. We must therefore remand for a new
trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Peoria County is reversed and the matter is remanded for a new
trial consistent with this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHMIDT and O’BRIEN, JJ., concur
