gc70
Member
Jim, it seemed quite clear that Justice Kennedy had already made up his mind to separate the "militia" clause from the "operative" clause. Most discussion of 2A has inextricably linked the concepts of the militia to the RKBA; separate the two concepts and the landscape changes dramatically.
The idea that the militia clause simply affirms the value of the militia as articulated in other provisions of the Constitution would allow the RKBA clause to be divorced from most military implications. Taken alone, the RKBA clause could then be viewed as articulating an individual self defense right (albeit one that might at times be exercise collectively). A self defense right would not necessarily include a right to military weapons, which association with the militia does suggest. Viola - citizens have a right to common arms, but not scary things like machine guns.
In short, I don't think it would be necessary to look to the 14th to be able to construe 2A as a self defense right. The 14th becomes icing on the cake by affirming the newly discovered 'original intent' of 2A. While Kennedy might have such a sweeping theory, it remains to be seen whether Roberts tries to constrain the scope of the decision as much as possible or allows a broader scope that would put the stamp of his court more firmly on 2A.
The idea that the militia clause simply affirms the value of the militia as articulated in other provisions of the Constitution would allow the RKBA clause to be divorced from most military implications. Taken alone, the RKBA clause could then be viewed as articulating an individual self defense right (albeit one that might at times be exercise collectively). A self defense right would not necessarily include a right to military weapons, which association with the militia does suggest. Viola - citizens have a right to common arms, but not scary things like machine guns.
In short, I don't think it would be necessary to look to the 14th to be able to construe 2A as a self defense right. The 14th becomes icing on the cake by affirming the newly discovered 'original intent' of 2A. While Kennedy might have such a sweeping theory, it remains to be seen whether Roberts tries to constrain the scope of the decision as much as possible or allows a broader scope that would put the stamp of his court more firmly on 2A.
