I seem to remember that the Court ruled very narrowly concerning only the case that was before them. (i.e. Thompson Center kits.)
There was no "et al" involved regardless of how bad we wanted it to be.
It looks like the BATFE is enforcing exactly what was handed down and not an iota less. Only T/C Kits, sold as kits are exempt.
No.
SCOTUS decisions address the law at hand and its Constitutionality. They are then binding on the law addressed, and can further change other issues the court addresses in the majority opinion.
The law which was being originally addressed was what was handled by a lower court of appeals resulting in further appeal to the SCOTUS. That being what the definition of "made" was within the NFA and how it applied to a SBR.
The points and counter points argued by both sides then centered around why "made" did or did not apply in the specific case. However the final decision is binding on what the definition of "made" is.
Setting firearm case law precedent.
Were they talking about kits or about application of the NFA as it pertains to short barreled rifles in general is therefore the proper question, not if it is specific to the Thompson kit.
Much of the decision would point to the latter, that how the NFA pertains to "made" for short barreled rifles in general is what precedent was set for.
For example these passages in the decision show the issue originally being decided upon quite clearly:
the company brought this suit in the United States Claims Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, arguing that the unit registered was not a firearm within the meaning of the NFA because Thompson/Center had not assembled a short-barreled rifle from its components.
The Claims Court entered summary judgment for the Government, concluding that the Contender pistol together with its conversion kit is a firearm within the meaning of the NFA. 19 Cl. Ct. 725 (1990).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a short-barreled rifle "actually must be assembled" in order to be "made" within the meaning of the NFA. 924 F.2d 1041, 1043 (1991). The Court of Appeals expressly declined to follow the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Drasen, 845 F.2d 731, cert. denied, 488 U. S. 909 (1988), which had held that an unassembled "complete parts kit" for a short-barreled rifle was in fact a short-barreled rifle for purposes of the NFA. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 502 U. S. 807 (1991).
The conflict to be resolved? What does "made" mean under the NFA passages regarding a "short-barreled rifle".
How does that then apply to the Thompson case in particular.
We think the language of the statute provides a clear answer on this point. The definition of "make" includes not only "putting together," but also "manufacturing ... or otherwise producing a firearm." If as Thompson/Center submits, a firearm were only made at the time of final assembly (the moment the firearm was "put together"), the additional language would be redundant. Congress must, then, have understood "making" to cover more than final assembly, and some disassembled aggregation of parts must be included. Since the narrowest example of a combination of parts that might be included is a set of parts that could be used to make nothing but a short-barreled rifle, the aggregation of such a set of parts, at the very least, must fall within the definition of "making" such a rifle.
So possession of parts which can only be used to assemble an NFA item is still possession of that item but...
Here, however, we are not dealing with an aggregation of parts that can serve no useful purpose except the assembly of a firearm, or with an aggregation having no ostensible utility except to convert a gun into such a weapon. There is, to be sure, one resemblance to the latter example in the sale of the Contender with the converter kit, for packaging the two has no apparent object except to convert the pistol into something else at some point. But the resemblance ends with the fact that the unregulated Contender pistol can be converted not only into a short-barreled rifle, which is a regulated firearm, but also into a long-barreled rifle, which is not. The packaging of pistol and kit has an obvious utility for those who want both a pistol and a regular rifle, and the question is whether the mere possibility of their use to assemble a regulated firearm is enough to place their combined packaging within the scope of "making" one.
Neither the statute's language nor its structure provides any definitive guidance. Thompson/Center suggests guidance may be found in some subsections of the statute governing other types of weapons by language that expressly covers combinations of parts. The definition of "machinegun," for example, was amended by the Gun Control Act of
We get no more help from analyzing the machinegun definition's reference to parts. It speaks of "any combination" of them in the possession or control of anyone person. Here the definition sweeps broader than the aggregation of parts clearly covered by "making" a rifle. The machinegun parts need not even be in any particular proximity to each other. There is thus no conflict between definitions, but neither is much light shed on the limits of "making" a short-barreled rifle. We can only say that the notion of an unassembled machine gun is probably broader than that of an unassembled rifle. But just where the line is to be drawn on shortbarreled rifles is not demonstrated by textual considerations.
After applying the ordinary rules of statutory construction, then, we are left with an ambiguous statute. The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the NF A has criminal applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness. Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 200 (1991) ("Congress has ... softened the impact of the common-law presumption [that ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution] by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses"); 26 U. S. C. §§ 7201, 7203 (criminalizing willful evasion of taxes and willful failure to file a return). Making a firearm without approval may be subject to criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and failure to pay the tax on one, 26 U. S. C. §§ 5861, 5871. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 168 (1990) (applying lenity in interpreting a criminal statute invoked in a civil action); Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U. S. 87, 91 (1959).9 Accordingly, we conclude that the Contender pistol and carbine kit when packaged together by Thompson/Center have not been "made" into a short-barreled rifle for purposes of the NF A.lO The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed.
with other potential uses it is not automatically possession of that item in an unassembled state, because it must be assembled as a SBR to demonstrate that is the intent.
Because it is a tax issue, and because Congress had made a requirement of "specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses", they decided that the benefit of the doubt must be given in such cases.
That if there is a potential legal use, absent proof of illegal use or intent, the assumption must be that the product will be used legally.
Or
'
In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.'
So if a person has 1 AR pistol, 49 AR rifles, and 50 AR pistol barrels, absent any demonstrated intent or assembly of a short barreled rifle, they are still supposed to receive the benefit of the doubt.
If they have 49 AR pistols, 1 AR rifle, and 50 AR stocks the same is also true.
In fact in a more realistic circumstance, it would be quite common for someone to have several times more stocks or other accessories for thier firearm intended for legal use than total firearms that can use those accessories.
They could have a different stock for different environments or uses, all for use on the same rifle.
Or likewise to have multiple barrels, perhaps for some replacements, and others in different calibers or with different twist rates.
If there is a legal potential use, then the benefit of the doubt must be given.
Where that gets extra tricky is if you have 1 AR rifle, 1 AR pistol, and decide to sell one, (but may even wish to purchase a replacement in the future.)
You may for example have 5 different stocks, with a sizable investment in some you wish to retain for the future firearm or sell seperately for greater profit, but once you sell that AR rifle a case can be made that the only use for them is on the AR pistol, in violation of the NFA.
So you practically are forced under the law to purchase more weapons which can use any accessories you do not dispose of before selling a firearm which can use them if they can also be used in combination with any other firearm to create an NFA item. Or to dispose of accessories before or with the firearm, even if you would want those accessories for legal use in the future.