In the 1934 hearings, Attorney General Homer S. Cummings explained in detail how the NFA would be based on the tax power. National Firearms Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). Cummings denied that machineguns could be banned, because "we have no inherent police power to go into certain localities and deal with local crime. It is only when we can reach those things under ... the power of taxation, that we can act." Id. at 8.
When Congressman Harold Knutson asked "why should we permit the manufacture, that is, permit the sale of the machine guns to any one outside of the several branches of the Government," Congressman Sumners suggested "that this is a revenue measure and you have to make it possible at least in theory for these things to move in order to get internal revenue?" Id. at 13 14. Cummings agreed: "That is the answer exactly." Id. at 14. The following dialogue ensued:
Attorney General CUMMINGS.... If we made a statute absolutely forbidding any human being to have a machine gun, you might say there is some constitutional question involved. But when you say, "we will tax the machine gun," ... you are easily within the law.
Mr. LEWIS. In other words, it does not amount to prohibition, but allows of regulation.
Attorney General CUMMINGS. That is the idea. We have studied that very carefully.
Id. at 19.
The National Firearms Act was originally passed as a taxing statute under the authority of Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 48 S.Ct. 388, 72 L.Ed. 600 (1928). See National Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, supra, at 101 02, 162. Upholding the Harrison Anti Narcotic Act, Nigro noted:
"In interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress and must be regarded as invalid....
276 U.S. at 341, 48 S.Ct. at 390. The Court added:
Congress by merely calling an act a taxing act cannot make it a legitimate exercise of taxing power under § 8 of article 1 of the Federal Constitution, if in fact the words of the act show clearly its real purpose is otherwise."
Id. at 353, 48 S.Ct. at 394.
The committee reports on the National Firearms Act mention the constitutional basis of federal jurisdiction. The House Ways and Means Committee report, which the Senate Finance Committee report repeats verbatim, explained the basis of the NFA in part as follows:
In general this bill follows the plan of the Harrison Anti Narcotic Act and adopts the constitutional principle supporting that act in providing for the taxation of fire arms and for procedure under which the tax is to be collected.
Rept. No. 1780, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); Rept. No. 1444, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).