Sending battle-weary, clinically stressed soldiers back into the heat of Iraq?

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Is America sending battle-weary, clinically stressed soldiers back into the heat of Iraq?
By Andrew Gumbel in Los Angeles
03 April 2004


Just ten days ago, Jason Gunn didn't think he was in any shape to be sent back to active duty in Iraq.

That's what the 24-year-old tank driver told his family, and what he told the commanders at his US military base in Germany. It is also what he told a team of psychiatrists at Heidelberg Hospital, who not only agreed with his assessment but issued a formal recommendation that he be kept with them for further treatment.

Back in November, Specialist Gunn had suffered devastating injuries up and down the left side of his body when a roadside bomb obliterated the Humvee he was driving on the north side of Baghdad. Over and above his physical wounds, he also had to deal with the trauma of the sergeant in the seat behind his being ripped to shreds in the explosion.

Soon he was displaying classic symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, (PTSD) - anxiety, insomnia interspersed with recurring nightmares, and extreme agitation. Army doctors put him on two different medications to lift his mood and suppress his bad dreams. But the gung-ho, happy-go-lucky, overtly fearless soldier who had existed before last November obstinately refused to resurface.

It used to be accepted practice in the US military not to return a soldier to active duty unless he was fully fit - not just out of consideration for his own needs, but also to protect other members of his unit. In Iraq, however, growing anecdotal evidence suggests that a new policy is emerging - to patch up the wounded as quickly as possible and ship them straight back, threatening them with disciplinary action or even court martial if they show the slightest reluctance.

That, according to the available evidence, is what happened to Jason Gunn. On 23 March, he telephoned his mother in Philadelphia and told her he would refuse to go back to Iraq even if they ordered him to. The very next day, however, he was on a plane to Kuwait, and from there was told to make his own way back to his unit with the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad.
…
Mr Robinson said he knew of an injured soldier evacuated from Iraq who became so exasperated at the lack of medical care offered by the military that he decided to pay for his own private treatment. That led to a charge of being absent without leave, as a result of which the soldier had a psychological breakdown and tried to kill himself. Rather than show any sympathy, Mr Robinson said his superiors tracked him down and sent him back to Iraq.

Similar cases have been collected by the group Military Families Speak , (MFSO), which represents US soldiers and their families who oppose the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Nancy Lessin, MFSO's co-founder, said she knew of several traumatised soldiers who had attempted suicide, either while recuperating or after they had been sent back.

"Jason Gunn is not an isolated case. The only thing unique about him is that the family is willing to speak out publicly," she said. "We see this as the tip of the iceberg. We are seeing for the first time the military laying out their strategy in writing - to send victims of PTSD back into battle, back to the front. This is how they are dealing with a situation where they are in over their heads without a plan in a war that should never have happened. The attitude is: as long as you can breathe, you can be redeployed."

While the individual stories are necessarily anecdotal, the big picture - of plummeting morale and record numbers of soldiers taking their own lives - is not since it has been documented by the Pentagon.

Last week, a much-delayed official report showed that the suicide rate in the military was higher now than it had been during Vietnam or since, with at least 23 soldiers committing suicide in Iraq last year and another seven killing themselves back home.

A survey by an Army mental health advisory team also found 52 per cent of troops in Iraq reporting low or very low personal morale, and 72 per cent complaining of low or very low unit morale.

A wide range of critics - including John Kerry, the Democratic presidential challenger, and General Eric Shinseki, the recently departed army chief of staff - have charged that too few soldiers are being deployed in Iraq to carry out the ambitious tasks being asked of them.
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=507855
 
With the military being as small as it is, it stands to reason that people in uniform are going to be making multiple tours into the hot spots.

Don't know how they collected their findings on the number of suicides or how in the world they compared it to the Viet Nam era.

The veterans of that war pushed for years just to get PTSD recognised, and only through an exhaustive study by the DAV, and with support from the other Veterans groups did it get on the books. I had the honor of interviewing the person hired by the DAV for the study-his name escapes me, but he served as a Marine grunt his first tour, and as a psycologist his second.

Back in the bad old days, it was tough to get the government to treat anyone past one year beyond their ETS. Gulf war syndrome was all in their minds a generation later.

Uncle Sam better get this one right and get it early if the above is true-I cannot imagine a faster way to turn Americans away from this fight than to abandon and/or mistreat the warriors.
 
Since I have been back in the army(All of a month and a half):

I have met soldiers who I would gladly follow to combat tomorrow with as an untrained unit and die beside. From privates to Colonels.

And I have met soldiers who I wouldn't follow through the line at McDonald's. From privates to Colonels.

It seems that this article is quite generalized. I read it as inferring that most units in the army are not sensitive to the needs of their soldiers. There are certianly some units with a "jacked up" chain of command, but that is CERTIANLY not the norm. I seriously doubt that it is even very common at all.

This is how they are dealing with a situation where they are in over their heads without a plan in a war that should never have happened. The attitude is: as long as you can breathe, you can be redeployed."

Then I read this and realized what this article was.... Bulls#!+.
 
Folks, please, please consider the source...

1. Note the newspaper concerned. Is this a newspaper noted for objectivity?

2. Note the name of the organization making the complaints, and the style of its pronouncements. For example:
the group Military Families Speak , (MFSO), which represents US soldiers and their families who oppose the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
"Jason Gunn is not an isolated case. The only thing unique about him is that the family is willing to speak out publicly," she said. "We see this as the tip of the iceberg. We are seeing for the first time the military laying out their strategy in writing - to send victims of PTSD back into battle, back to the front. This is how they are dealing with a situation where they are in over their heads without a plan in a war that should never have happened. The attitude is: as long as you can breathe, you can be redeployed."
Does this (particularly the text in bold print) sound to you like an impartial, disinterested, objective comment? Who, do you think, would use such phraseology and vocabulary? I'll give you three guesses...

3. Consider who has posted this report. I'll say no more than that.

Any questions?
 
I agree 100% that the best place to turn for advice on running our military is a leftist European newspaper.:rolleyes:

At least it doen't try to personally blame President Bush, which is somewhat of a surprise.
 
Preacherman, while you disagree with that comment, it may be an impartial, disinterested, objective look at the situation. The people in the US government make mistakes, too. They are human and aren't above reproach.
 
There will always be disgruntled troops. Par for the course. That is why the military relies on DISCIPLINE to enforce the rules. If the soldier had sustained wounds sufficient to meet the prescribed procedures for removal from duty, then that is what would have happened. This is not public school PE or college funtime.

Preacherman has nailed it, as usual.

If one had served in the armed services, then one would understand this BS for what it is.

Source: The LA Slimes, paragon of the truth (and published by the Independent, another paragon).
:rolleyes:
 
There are more details in this article:
Broken US troops face bigger enemy at home
A stretched Pentagon is sending unfit soldiers back to Iraq long before they are ready to serve again

Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington
Saturday April 3, 2004
The Guardian

…
Gunn is not the only broken soldier being sent to battle. The Guardian has uncovered more than a dozen instances in which ill or injured soldiers were sent to war by a US military whose resources have been stretched near to breaking point by the simultaneous fronts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In its investigation, the Guardian learned of soldiers who were deployed with almost wilful disregard to their medical histories, and with the most cursory physical examinations. Soldiers went to war with chronic illnesses such as coronary disease, mental illness, arthritis, diabetes and the nervous condition, Tourette's syndrome, or after undergoing recent surgery.

One sergeant major was shipped out two months after neck surgery, despite orders from his military doctor for six months' rest. "The nurse told me to put my hands above my head and said you are good to go," he told the Guardian. A female supply sergeant said she was sent to Kuwait under medical advice not to walk more than half a mile at a time, or carry more than 50lb. Both had to be medically evacuated within weeks; the sergeant major required surgery on his return.

In some cases, the wounded were recycled with alarming speed. A mechanic, who suffered brain damage last June when his vehicle was hit by a suicide bus, was sent back to Iraq in October despite reported blurred vision and memory loss. He returned with his unit last month, and medical evaluations showed he had continued bleeding from the original head injury.

In Gunn's case, the determination to return him to battle is puzzling. His unit, the 1-37 Armoured Division, is due to return from Iraq in May. "They are sending an injured soldier back there for seven weeks. I can't for the life of me imagine why," says Ms Gunn. "They say they want him to go back and face his fears, but I just keep thinking what this whole thing will do to a person. What are they going to send home to us? Someone who is going to be on disability for the rest of their lives?"

All of the injured or ill soldiers knew of other unfit troops who were sent to Iraq last year, or have recently been redeployed. Some, who like Gunn suffered combat stress after sustaining serious injury, came under enormous pressure from their commanders to return to Iraq. Equally disturbing, a number of returning soldiers declared unfit for service told the Guardian the military had tried to force through their discharge to take them off the benefit rolls.

Such soldiers are almost never seen or heard from in a war now entering its second year, but their numbers are growing. The Pentagon's senior health official told Congress this week that the military had carried out 18,000 evacuations from Iraq of wounded or ill soldiers.

Disability claims

Meanwhile, 15,000 soldiers who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan have filed for disability claims. Some 12,000 have sought medical treatment from facilities run by the department of veterans affairs. About 4,600 have sought psychological counselling. That demand threatens to overwhelm a veterans' healthcare system that has received no new funding since the Iraq war began.

The drain on combat-ready soldiers - and the costs of carrying those damaged by this war - are becoming logistical nightmares for military planners. The Pentagon has already been forced to extraordinary measures. Last year, it locked up the service contracts of National Guard members and army reservists, preventing them from leaving the military when their time is up.
…
Veterans' advocates say Gunn's saga reflects a pattern in the Pentagon's dealings with casualties of the war: send them back to battle fast or get them off the military's books before their ailments drive costs up. "This is a particularly stressful time for the military because they have been committed far far beyond their capability, and that is the reason there is such pressure," says Stan Goff, a veterans' activist and writer. "The numbers are becoming more and more important. They have got to keep more bodies in theatre."

Battle readiness barely registers. Veronica Torres, a supply sergeant with 27 years service, was sent to Kuwait four months after toe surgery, and with previous injuries that restricted her movement. "Could I run? No. Could I jump in and out of trucks? No. Could I march a mile or two? No," she says.

She was there less than a week before reporting to sick bay. After being medically evacuated last July, she was diagnosed with diabetes and fibromyalgia.

Others who were evacuated for injury or illness say their real war started on their return - with the military bureaucracy.

Gerry Mosley, 49, a first sergeant in a transportation unit, was injured jumping off a truck that came under fire. By the time he was medically retired on March 17, he was taking 56 pills a day for shoulder, back and spinal conditions, post-traumatic stress disorder, and Parkinson's which was not diagnosed when he was shipped out.

Mosley also developed an abiding anger against an institution he served for 31 years, accusing the army of trying to shirk responsibility for his condition now he was surplus to requirements.

"I went to Iraq and fought the enemy, not knowing I was going to come back to the United States and fight a bigger enemy," he says.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1184960,00.html
 
Whilst the stories posted here might be a little...err...biased perhaps, there is no question that some troops will be suffering PTSD. Whether or not they are being sent back whilst not ready is another matter. Is the 'stop loss' order still in effect?
 
Is the 'stop loss' order still in effect?
Yes.

Army expanding 'stop loss' order to keep soldiers from leaving
By Tom Squitieri, USA TODAY
Posted 1/5/2004 9:45 PM Updated 1/6/2004 12:39 AM


WASHINGTON — The Army will announce as early as Tuesday new orders that will forbid thousands of soldiers from leaving the service after they return this year from Iraq, Afghanistan and other fronts in the war against terrorism, defense officials said Monday.
…
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-01-05-army-troops_x.htm
 
There are also "reports' and "investigations" out there that show high morale and that re-enlistment goals (for units in Iraq and Afghanistan) are being met.

None of the "reports" or "investigations" have been corroberated or vetted very well.

"The nurse told me to put my hands above my head and said you are good to go," he told the Guardian.

Nurses do not write medical orders.

One sergeant major was shipped out two months after neck surgery, despite orders from his military doctor for six months' rest.

On whose say? His? A Sergeant Major no less :eek: These guys are usually crusty and tough. This one is a whiner. I have never seen any order for "6 months rest" in a military hospital.
:what: I wish :what:

Battle readiness barely registers. Veronica Torres, a supply sergeant with 27 years service, was sent to Kuwait four months after toe surgery, and with previous injuries that restricted her movement. "Could I run? No. Could I jump in and out of trucks? No. Could I march a mile or two? No," she says.

Unfortunately, for those that have not served, soldiers do not get to write their own medical orders. If that happened, every body would be in Hawaii for 6 months rest. Maybe she should retire after 27 years, you think?
 
Of course if you're sending green soldiers to replace the old ones they will have alot to learn. The less casualties the better. But the sooner we get out of that sandpit the better.
 
growing anecdotal evidence suggests that a new policy is emerging - to patch up the wounded as quickly as possible and ship them straight back
One lie in the midst of an otherwise simpering, whining psychobabble article.

The military has tried it both ways time and again since the civil war. In the end the only humane way of handling battle stress is to put troops back with their units as soon as possible. Sending them home for their anxiety symptoms usually guarantees a lifetime disability but sending them back to duty gives them a chance of recuperation.

Remember the principles of Proximity, Immediacy, Expectancy and Simplicity.

Of course the problems started a long time before the battle began, about the time this happy go lucky guy was recuited.

When I was in the service we had a few guys who realized after they signed up they wanted to be in the "nice" Air Force, the one where Jimmy Stewart and Clarke Gable act brave with music in the background. They didn't like to be in the real Air Force where our job was dropping bombs and killing people. If this idea was caught in basic training they were gently and firmly shown the door with no hard feelings on either side.

Then coincidentally the year I resigned my reserve commission President Bubba chose to reframe the military and make it more politically correct. So now in a real war we are suffering from a decade of don't ask don't tell, gender-equal, kinder, gentler, affirmative, proactive recruiting policies.
 
I gotta call BS on the CSM being ordered to deploy despite a physicians orders to the contrary. I never saw that happen in my time in the service-actually, I never even heard of that happening.
An issue like that would have gone to the surgeon general in the blink of an eye. NO military doctor is going to sit back and have their orders countermanded.

Whether this report is a stinker or has an element of truth, our government has a long history of treating veterans issues with less scrutiny than they deserve.

Years ago, when I was at the VA hospital having my leg cut off due to a service connected injury, there were a few atomic test veterans dying of lukemia. It was not recognised by the Gov't back in the 80's as a service connection, so the doctors tried to do an end around and help these guys with an article 99. For those who don't know, an article 99 allows a VA doctor to treat a non-service connected disease or injury if they can get them admitted on any service connected issue. No sense in just treating a service connected injury when they are dying of something else.
 
Holy smokes!!! What do we tell the boys who fought at Bastogne in '44?

Raise your voices and lower them standards. Thank you DNC.

Tim
 
the Guardian learned of soldiers who were deployed with almost wilful disregard to their medical histories, and with the most cursory physical examinations. Soldiers went to war with chronic illnesses such as coronary disease, mental illness, arthritis, diabetes and the nervous condition, Tourette's syndrome, or after undergoing recent surgery.

The vast majority of recent surgeries would of course be c-sections had by that vast pool of semi-deployable women in the US military, brought to you by Pat Schroeder and Bubba Klintoon, who suddenly and mysteriously seem to get pregnant just prior to any deployment.

GI Jane; an Army of One (...ok, make that two counting the baby:D)
 
Cool Hand-kind of a cheap shot on the girls, don't ya think? Not all of them are like that, and after watching my eldest son graduate from 91W school last week, I'd say the vast majority of the women seemed to be pretty motivated.

On the other hand-most folks are after AIT-its the big green machine wearing you down over time which gets some folks to look for a way out. With a few of them, any way will do.
 
It used to be accepted practice in the US military not to return a soldier to active duty unless he was fully fit
When was this?

Hey, I can play the copy and paste game, too!
Field Manual No. 22-51: Leaders' Manual for Combat Stress Control: Combat Stress Behaviors

Chapter 5: Battle Fatigue
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC
Peer Review Status: Internally Peer Reviewed


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5-1. Introduction
Battle fatigue is the approved US Army term (AR 40-216) for combat stress symptoms and reactions which --

Feel unpleasant.
Interfere with mission performance.
Are best treated with reassurance, rest, replenishment of physical needs, and activities which restore confidence.
a. Battle fatigue can also be present in soldiers who have been physically wounded or who have nonbattle injuries or diseases caused by stressors in the combat area. It may be necessary to treat both the battle fatigue and the other problems.

b. Battle fatigue may coexist with misconduct stress behaviors. However, battle fatigue itself, by definition, does not warrant legal or disciplinary action.

c. Several of our allies use other terms for battle fatigue such as combat reaction, combat stress reaction, or battle shock.

5-2. Contributing Factors Which Cause Battle Fatigue
There are four major contributing factors which cause battle fatigue. They are --

Sudden exposure.
Cumulative exposure.
Physical stressors and stress symptoms.
Home front and other existing problems.
Any one factor may suffice if intense enough. Usually two, three, or all four factors can collectively produce battle fatigue.

a. The first factor is the sudden exposure or transition to the intense fear, shocking stimuli, and life-and-death consequences of battle. This occurs most commonly when soldiers are committed to battle the first time but can happen even to veteran soldiers when they come under sudden, intense attack. Soldiers in "safe" rear areas may be overwhelmed by the horrible stimuli and consequences of war without themselves being under fire. This is an occupational hazard for rearward command and support personnel, including medical.

b. The second factor is the cumulative exposure to dangers, responsibilities, and horrible consequences. Exposure can cause repeated grief and guilt over loss of fellow soldiers. It can also give the sense that one's own luck, skill, and courage have been used up. The rate of accumulation depends on the rate of losses (KIA, WIA, died of wounds [DOW], and other causes) and of "close calls" with disaster and death (including being wounded oneself). Periods of rest, recreation, and retraining in which new supportive, cohesive bonds are formed may temporarily reverse the accumulation but not stop it completely.

c. The third factor is the physical stressors and stress symptoms which reduce coping ability. Sleep loss and dehydration are especially strong contributors. Also important are physical overwork, cold, heat, wetness, noise, vibration, blast, fumes, lack of oxygen, chronic discomfort, poor hygiene, disrupted nutrition, low-grade fevers, infections, and other environmental illnesses. These stressors are also in the area of responsibility of preventive medicine. In moderate amounts, such physical stressors contribute to battle fatigue but are reversed by rest and time for restoration. In higher doses, they cause serious illness or injury requiring specific medical or surgical treatment. When the major contributing factors to battle fatigue are physical stresses that can be reversed, treatment is usually simple and recovery is rapid. However, physical factors are not necessarily the cause of battle fatigue. When the soldier is diagnosed, the absence of obvious physical stressors should not detract from the positive expectation of rapid and full recovery.

d. The fourth factor is the home front and preexisting problems.

(1) Israeli studies found that the strongest factor which distinguished between soldiers who were decorated for heroic acts and those who became battle shock casualties was having had many recent changes on the home front. The negative home front problem may be a "Dear John" letter, a sick parent or child, or bad debts. Or it may be something positive -- being recently married or becoming a parent. Worrying about what is happening back home distracts soldiers from focusing their psychological defenses on the combat stressors. It creates internal conflict between performing their combat duty and perhaps resolving the home front problems or concerns.
(2) The second strongest factor found in the Israeli studies was unit cohesion: the soldiers who became stress casualties were often committed to battle alongside strangers, while those who became heroes were alongside unit members they knew well, trusted, and depended on. These findings confirm observations from previous wars. Other baseline stressors which are often cited include lack of information; lack of confidence in leaders, supporting units, or equipment in comparison with the enemy's; and lack of belief in the justness of the war (which may reflect lack of support for the effort in the US).

(3) It is worth noting that individual personality makeup does not predict susceptibility to battle fatigue. Careful studies by the US Army after WWII and by the Israelis since the Yom Kippur War all show that there is no clear relationship between neurotic traits or personality disorders and battle fatigue. People with these traits were no more likely to become battle fatigue casualties and no less likely to be decorated for valor than were those soldiers who tested as normal.

(4) There are personality factors which may predict who will be poor soldiers (or who may be prone to commit acts of misconduct if given opportunities or excuses to) but not who will get battle fatigue. There are good predictors of battle fatigue but individual personality type is not one of them. Anyone may become a battle fatigue casualty if too many high-risk factors occur. However, personality factors may help predict who is less likely to recover quickly after being disabled by battle fatigue.

e. There are two common themes which interact in varying combinations in most battle fatigue casualties -- loss of confidence and internal conflict of motives.

(1) Battle-fatigued soldiers have often lost confidence in --
Themselves -- their own strength, alertness, and abilities, or the adequacy of their training.
Equipment -- their weapons and the supporting arms.
Buddies -- other members of the small unit, or in the reliability of supporting units.
Leaders, to include --
The skill and competence of the small unit leader or the senior leadership.
Whether the leaders care about the soldiers' well-being and survival.
The leader's candor (honesty) or courage.
These doubts, plus the soldiers' estimate of the threat situation, raise questions about their chances of surviving and/or of succeeding with the mission. Loss of faith in whether the "cause" is worth suffering and dying for also plays a role. It has been said that soldiers join the military services for patriotism, but they fight and die for their buddies and trusted leaders. Soldiers do not want their comrades or themselves to die for an unjust cause or for other's mistakes. Loss of faith may even spread to a painful loss of belief in the goodness of life and other spiritual and religious values.

(2) Combat, by its nature, creates conflicts between motives within an individual. The desire for survival and comfort is in conflict with the fears of failure or disgrace and the soldier's loyalty to buddies. Leaders' actions must --

Raise the soldiers' confidence. Help resolve the soldiers' internal conflict in favor of his sense of duty.

5-3. Signs/Symptoms of Battle Fatigue
a. Simple Fatigue. The simple fatigue or exhaustion form of battle fatigue is normally the most common. It involves tiredness, loss of initiative, indecisiveness, inattention, and, when extreme, general apathy. These cases may show some features of the other forms, especially anxiety and pessimism, but not to the degree that they cannot rest and recover in their own unit (duty) or in a nonmedical support unit (rest). However, the tactical situation may call for them to rest in medical cots if no other suitable place is practical.

b. Anxious. The anxious form is naturally one of the most common, given the danger of combat. Symptoms include verbal expressions of fear; marked startle responses which cease to be specific to true threat stimuli and become generalized; tremor; sweating; rapid heartbeat; insomnia with terror dreams, and other symptoms of hyperarousal. This form is often seen while the soldier is close to the danger and shifts to the exhausted or depressed forms as he is evacuated towards the rear.

c. Depressed. The depressed form is also common. It may have the slowed speech and movement of the simple fatigue form or the restlessness and startle responses of the anxious form. The depressed form also has significant elements of self-doubt, self-blame, hopelessness, and may include grief and bereavement. The soldier may be pessimistic about the chance for victory or survival. The self-blame and guilt may be about perceived or actual failures in the combat role or mistakes made. It may be related to home front issues. Or it may be relatively pure survivor guilt -- the irrational feeling of a survivor that he should have died with members of his unit or in place of a buddy.

d. Memory Loss. The memory loss form is usually less common, especially in its extreme versions. Mild forms include inability to remember recent orders and instructions. More serious examples are loss of memory for well-learned skills or discrete loss of memory for an especially traumatic event or period of time. Extreme forms include disorientation and regression to a precombat (for example, childhood) state. Total amnesia, or a fugue state in which the soldier leaves the threatening situation altogether, forgets his own past, and is found wandering somewhere else (having taken on another superficial identity), can also occur. Physical causes of amnesia such as concussion or substance misuse (for example, alcohol) must be ruled out in such cases.

e. Physical Function Disturbance. Disturbance of physical function includes disruptions of motor, sensory, and speech functions. Physical injuries or causes are absent or insufficient to explain the symptoms.

Motor disturbance includes --
Weakness or paralysis of hands, limbs or body.
Sustained contractions of muscles (for example, being unable to straighten up or to straighten out the elbow).
Gross tremors; pseudoconvulsive seizures (sometimes with loss of consciousness).
Visual symptoms may include --
Blurred or double vision.
Tunnel vision.
Total blindness.
Auditory symptoms may involve --
Ringing (or other noises) in the ears.
Deafness.
Dizziness.
Tactile (skin) sensory changes include --
Loss of sensations (anesthesia).
Abnormal sensations, such as "pins and needles" (paresthesia).
Speech disturbance may involve --
Stuttering.
Hoarseness.
Muteness.
(1) The physical symptoms often begin as normal but transitory incoordination, speech difficulties, or sensory disruption. These symptoms are triggered by physical events, such as explosions, mild concussion, or simple fatigue. They are magnified when emotions cannot be expressed because of social pressure or heroic self-image. They are, therefore, most often seen in the "elite" units or groups who show few other cases of battle fatigue, such as officers or the airborne and rangers in WWII. They are also more common in individuals from social classes and cultures that receive less education and/or do not learn how to express feelings in words.

(2) In some cases, the physical "disability" may have a clear symbolic relationship to the specific emotional trauma or conflict of motivation which the soldier has experienced. The disability may make the soldier unable to do his job and so relieve him from danger, such as classic "trigger-finger palsy." The symptoms may be reinforced by reducing his anxiety and eliminating internal conflict of combat duties. Symptoms also may be reinforced by receiving the relative luxury of rear area food, hygiene, and sleep. However, not all cases fit that pattern. Some soldiers with significant loss of function from battle fatigue have continued to perform their missions under great danger. Medical personnel must be alert to new physical forms of battle fatigue which mimic physical injury, such as might be attributed to lasers, radiation, or chemical agents.

f. Psychosomatic Forms. These psychosomatic forms of battle fatigue commonly present with physical (rather than emotional) symptoms due to stress. These include --

Cardiorespiratory --
Rapid or irregular heartbeat.
Shortness of breath.
Light-headed.
Tingling and cramping of toes, fingers, and lips.
Gastrointestinal --
Stomach pain.
Indigestion.
Nausea/vomiting.
Diarrhea.
Musculoskeletal --
Back or joint pain.
Excessive pain and disability from minor or healed wounds.
Headache.
According to some WWII battalion surgeons, the psychosomatic form of battle fatigue was the most common form seen at battalion level. This type of case may have accounted for a large percentage of all patients seen at battalion aid stations (BASs) during times of heavy fighting.

g. Disruptive Forms. Disruptive forms of battle fatigue include disorganized, bizarre, impulsive or violent behavior, total withdrawal, or persistent hallucinations. These are uncommon forms of battle fatigue, but they do occur. Battle fatigue symptoms are a nonverbal way for soldiers to communicate to comrades and leaders that they have had all they can stand at the moment. Battle fatigue takes on whatever form the soldiers expect. It is important, therefore, to create positive expectancies and to eliminate the belief that battle fatigue soldiers usually do crazy, senseless, or violent things. Leaders, medics, and combat stress control personnel must ensure that battle fatigue casualties are never referred to as psychiatric casualties.

5-4. Labeling of Battle Fatigue Cases
a. As stated earlier, battle fatigue is the US Army approved label for this condition. Fatigue implies that it is a normal condition which can occur in anyone who is subjected to the extreme mental and emotional work of combat missions. Fatigue also implies that it gets better quickly with rest. The term should be applied to the normal but uncomfortable reactions to combat stress. It should also be used with the more seriously impairing responses in order that it not take on the connotations of breakdown or a release from duty. However, some cases do require treatment in medical facilities, skilled counseling, and even brief tranquilizing or sedative medication.

b. Historical experience proves that it is important not to try to make early distinctions among battle fatigue cases based on presumed causes and likely response to treatment. Cases due to acute emotional stress versus subacute physical stress versus chronic cumulative stress may need somewhat different treatment. These cases have, on the average, different likelihood for successful return to duty. However, these battle fatigue cases may be quite impossible to distinguish at first by their appearance and symptoms. Accurate individual history may be unattainable during battle and especially during the first interviews. All cases should, therefore, be called battle fatigue and be treated immediately with positive expectation of rapid, full recovery, as close to their units as the tactical situation permits. It is essential to avoid dramatic or medical/psychiatric labels for this condition.

Caution
Do not prejudge whether a battle fatigue soldier will recover quickly or slowly based on initial appearance. The symptoms are very changeable. Do not rely on initial information about the relative contributions of acute emotional stress, physical fatigue, chronic exposure, or baseline factors. The incomplete history may be misleading.
(1) Consider each contributing factor in designing treatment.
(a) How to reassure.
(b) How much rest.
(c) What to replenish first and most.
(d) What activities to assign to restore confidence.
(2) Keep positive expectation for recovery.
(3) Get more validated information from the rested soldier and the unit.
(4) Revise the plan based on response to treatment.
c. Battle fatigue may occur in anticipation of the action, during the action, or after the action (during lulls when sick call is again possible or when the unit returns to a safe rear area). Usually, the rise in battle fatigue casualties is preceded by 1 to 3 days of increases in the number of soldiers wounded and killed. All of these cases are still called "battle fatigue" as long as the soldiers are in the theater of operations and are expected to recover and return to duty. The terms conflict fatigue, crisis fatigue, stress fatigue, or field fatigue may be used for peacetime cases which are reactions to intense mission stressors but do not involve actual battle or life-and-death consequences. These cases should be treated the same way as battle fatigue with no negative connotations.

d. Sublabeling of battle fatigue cases is based solely on where they can be treated. Hence, sublabels depend as much on the situation of the unit as on the symptoms shown by the soldier. The labels light and heavy, duty and rest, hold and refer, when added to the label battle fatigue, are nothing more than a short-hand or brevity code for saying where the soldier is being treated or sent. They have no other meaning and only transient significance. The sublabel should be updated as the soldier improves or arrives at a new echelon of care.

e. Figure 5-1 diagrams the choices that lead to the several sublabels for battle fatigue cases.

Figure 5-1. Diagram of sorting choices and labels for battle fatigue cases.



(1) Light battle fatigue can be managed by self and buddy aid, unit medics, and leader actions. Most soldiers in combat will have light battle fatigue at some time. This includes the normal/common signs of battle fatigue listed in the Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 21-3-4 (available from US Army Training Audiovisual Support Centers). Light battle fatigue also includes the warning (or more serious) signs listed in GTA 21-3-5, provided the signs respond quickly to helping actions. Soldiers with these symptoms do not need to be sent immediately for medical evaluation and can continue on duty. If the symptoms persist after rest, they should be sent to their unit surgeon or physician assistant at routine sick call as heavy.
(2) Heavy battle fatigue (previously called severe) deserves immediate medical evaluation at a medical treatment facility. The symptoms may be --
 
Temporarily too disruptive to the unit's missions.
A medical/surgical condition which requires observation and diagnosis to rule out the necessity for emergency treatment. The medical triager sorts the heavy battle fatigue soldiers based on where they can be treated.
(3) Duty cases (previously called mild) are those who are seen by a physician or physician assistant but who can be treated immediately and returned to duty in their small unit.

(4) Rest cases (previously called moderate) must be sent to their unit's nonmedical CSS elements for brief rest and light duties; rest cases do not require continual medical observation.

Note
Duty and rest cases are not medical casualties because they are still available for some duty in their units. However, those heavy cases who cannot return to duty or rest in their unit the same day are battle fatigue casualties.
(5) Hold cases are those who can be held for treatment at the triager's own medical treatment facility because both the tactical situation and the battle fatigue casualties' symptoms permit. This should be done whenever feasible.

(6) Refer cases are those who must be referred (and transported) to a more secure or better-equipped medical treatment facility, either because of the tactical situation or the battle fatigue casualties' symptoms. Refer becomes hold when the soldiers reach a medical treatment facility where they can be held and treated.

Note
The hold and refer sublabels of heavy battle fatigue do not necessarily mean that a soldier is less likely to recover or will take longer to recover than cases treated as rest. However, the simple fact of holding or evacuation itself often prolongs the treatment and decreases likelihood of full recovery and return to duty.
f. There is no easy rule for deciding whether any specific symptom of battle fatigue makes the soldier a case of duty, rest, hold, or refer battle fatigue. That will require judgment based on --

What is known about the individual soldier.
The stressors involved.
How the soldier responds to helping actions.
What is likely to happen to the unit next.
What resources are available.
Battle fatigue symptoms can change rapidly based on a soldier's expectations. A successful combat stress control program prevents unnecessary evacuation and shifts battle fatigue cases from refer to the hold combat neuropsychiatric triage category. More importantly, it shifts many soldiers from hold category to rest and duty category. This allows them to recover in their units and keeps them from overloading the health service support system.

5-5. Severity of Symptoms and Response to Treatment
a. The severity of symptoms and the speed and extent to which they respond to treatment are directly related to the intensity, lethality, and duration of the battle incidents which caused them. The following are general planning estimates which may be modified greatly by specific factors, such as unit cohesion, training, and leadership.

b. Leader and medical personnel in forward areas should expect as many or more soldiers to present with duty or rest battle fatigue as there will be hold and refer cases. It is essential that the former not become casualties by unnecessarily evacuating or holding them for treatment.

c. In general, the more intense the combat, especially with indirect fire and mass destruction, the more cases become heavy and need holding or referral, and the harder it is for them to recover quickly and return to duty.

d. Fifty to eighty-five percent of battle fatigue casualties (hold and refer) returned to duty following 1 to 3 days of restoration treatment, provided they are kept in the vicinity of their units (for example, within the division).

Note
When returned to their original units after successful treatment for battle fatigue, soldiers have no increased risk of relapse compared to their buddies who have not yet had battle fatigue. New soldiers who suffer battle fatigue during their first combat exposure deserve a second chance under supportive circumstances. They are no more likely to breakdown again than is another new replacement. However, it must be noted that treatment for battle fatigue will not turn a previously poor soldier into a good soldier. Soldiers who have accumulated too many terrible experiences may also reach a stage where reassignment to less dangerous duties is advised.
The variation of success rates between 50 and 85 percent can be due to several factors besides the intensity of the combat. Combat stress control planners must evaluate them critically. An 85 percent restoration rate could be the result of effective far forward treatment of true hold cases. Alternatively, it could occur because many easily treated cases are being held and rested in medical cots (and classified as hold) instead of being released to their units as duty or rest battle fatigue. That situation, in turn, could be due either to inadequate training and consultation to forward units or to a tactical situation which prevents maneuver units from resting any marginally effective soldiers.e. Fifteen to fifty percent of battle fatigue casualties do not recover within 72 hours. The wide variation is due both to the intensity and nature of the battle and to the availability of far forward treatment. A large number of these battle fatigue casualties (10 to 40 percent of the original total) do return to some duty within 1 to 2 weeks. This is accomplished only if they continue structured, equally positive treatment. This treatment may be provided in a nonhospital like atmosphere of a medical treatment (tactical) facility in the combat zone. Premature evacuation of battle fatigue soldiers out of the combat zone must be prevented as it often results in permanent psychiatric disability. If the tactical situation permits, the evacuation policy in the corps should be extended from 7 to 14 days for the reconditioning program, as this will substantially improve the returned to duty rate and decrease subsequent chronic disability.

f. Five to fifteen percent of battle fatigue casualties fail to improve sufficiently to return to duty in the combat zone. Further reconditioning treatment can return many of these to useful duty in the COMMZ. Final evacuation to CONUS should not exceed 5 percent of total battle fatigue casualties. In retrospect, many of these soldiers have preexisting personality types or other neuropsychiatric conditions which did not make them become battle fatigue casualties in the first place but did interfere with full recovery. A lesson plan on how to identify, treat, and prevent battle fatigue is provided in Appendix E.

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How about a point to your posts, rather than this sort of tripe?
 
Great posts Destructo. To my best recollection that was doctrine as far back as mid 70's when I had to study it.

Delmar, that wasn't a cheap shot at all. Pregnancy before/on deployment isn't the worst problem however. Morale problems related to who is sleeping with who and who isn't getting any immediately come to mind but they aren't the biggest problem either.

With the advent of the New Age military comes the highest suicide rate since the American revolution. I could dig up some studies which show that women under stress/deprivation conditions develop a major depression rate in excess of 25%, but they're listed on the password protected Medscape site.
 
-ThreadKiller
Holy smokes!!! What do we tell the boys who fought at Bastogne in '44?

Not a thing. They deserve their rest. And no we aren't lowering our colors over here at 327th Infantry (the "Bastogne Brigade") thank you very much. Come over and visit sometime.

Dorian, welcome back to service. Hope you aren't too disappointed in what it's become.

Preacherman, right on the money. Thank you for the cogent analysis.

For the record, I didn't want to leave Iraq. Big fat IED hit a convoy I was in, crippled one of my best friends, sent a hunk of shrapnel into the chest of an NCO sitting behind me, and did wonderful things to my vision and hearing for weeks. No PTSD, no depression, nada. It made me want to stay in theater for longer. Even volunteered for a GAC through Iraq to Kuwait so I could stay a few more weeks and go through some wonderful places (i.e. Tikrit) ... a lot of my buddies wanted to fight it out harder. I haven't heard of a single case of a soldier trying to kill himself in my battalion, or from my buddies in the other two battalions, but then again there are no women in any of them.

I can attest to low unit morale, but that's mostly from everyone having to work and fight under idiotic ROEs and dealing with the plethora of PC officers and NCOs who make this job so painful. Add that to the current crop of troops who came out of OSUT classes with 90% graduation rates after 9/11 and you have such a wonderful time here in the line.

And reading FM 22-51 really makes me depressed. I think it has to do with having to wade through lines and lines of copious psychobable. I think a visit to the chaplain is in order ... er, no.

Peace out.
 
Cool Hand-kind of a cheap shot on the girls, don't ya think? Not all of them are like that, and after watching my eldest son graduate from 91W school last week, I'd say the vast majority of the women seemed to be pretty motivated.

On the other hand-most folks are after AIT-its the big green machine wearing you down over time which gets some folks to look for a way out. With a few of them, any way will do.


I wasn't trying to portray all women in the service as slackers. I've seen some that were well motivated as well. But on the other hand I've seen statistics that indicate at any point in time, nearly 1/3 of service women can't be deployed for reasons of pregnancy or other OB-GYN issues.
 
What we need is Gen Patton to give them a slap and send them back to the front.
 
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