Bartholomew Roberts
Member
http://www.bob-oracle.com/SWATreport.htm
I just copied a few small arms systems, there is a LOT more...
There is a lot more in there on just specifically issues with the M16 and on other weapons systems and gear as well - a good read for anyone.
http://www.bob-oracle.com/SWATreport.htm
I just copied a few small arms systems, there is a LOT more...
Lethality:
It is apparent that the close range lethality deficiency of the 5.56mm (M855) is more a matter of perception rather than fact, but there were some exceptions. The majority of the soldiers interviewed that voiced or desired “better knock-down power†or a larger caliber bullet did not have actual close engagements. Those that had close engagements and applied Close Quarters Battle (CQB) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) – controlled pairs in the lethal areas: chest and head and good shot placement, defeated the target without issue. Most that had to engage a target repeatedly remarked that they hit the target in non-vital areas such as the extremities. Some targets were reportedly hit in the chest numerous times, but required at least one shot to the head to defeat it. No lethality issues were voiced with targets engaged at 200 meters and beyond. It is apparent that with proper shot placement and marksmanship training, the M855 ammunition is lethal in close and long range.
Units deployed in Iraq are experiencing the same issues with the Generation I M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) raised from Afghanistan. Condensation inside the body, loose power switches, poor durability and short battery life were all primary issues raised. However, units that received improved M68s (Gen II) through the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) did not have any issues – the sights were well received and did not experience the same issues as the Gen I CCOs. All the soldiers equipped with the Gen II M68s reported longer battery life. The antireflection device (ARD) provided an unexpected advantage in Iraq – reduction of glare. Soldiers were able to distinguish the red dot better in direct sunlight.
Magnified optics was used more during OIF. Soldiers and units purchased several types and brands, but the most popular was the Trijicon, Advance Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) 4x, a Special Operations Peculiar Modification (SOPMOD) component. Leaders primarily used these sights for target detection and identification, but the majority of the soldiers used the capability to acquire and engage targets. Soldiers were more confident in their ability to engage targets with more precision. There is some debate to the utility of a magnified optic during CQB situations. This item is part of the Rapid Fielding Initiative.
Soldiers voiced a need for an integrated sight. Although the accessories enabled soldiers to acquire and engage targets more effectively, weapon real estate was at a premium. Soldiers were limited to mounting a day or night sight and were required to boresight and/or zero the sights individually each time they were mounted. Soldiers strongly suggested a combinatorial day/night sight with an integrated laser aiming device and capable for close and long range engagements.
As the mission transitioned from combat operations to SASO, soldiers were faced with different situations that did not warrant deadly force. Several soldiers voiced the need for a non-lethal capability. There are six brigade Non-lethal Mission Capability Kits (NLMCK) in theater, but they are allocated to the Provost Marshal. It was apparent that the Infantry Divisions and brigades were not aware that the kits were available in theater. This issue was an asset visibility and logistics issue, but units began to requisition the NLMCK upon notification of its availability.
Maintainability/Reliability:
Though were minimal maintainability and reliability issues raised, a number of universal issues were voiced related to the M249 SAW maintainability, the M203 durability, lubrication types, and magazines. SAW gunners were unanimously dissatisfied with the complexity of the M249 SAW. Its numerous small parts encumbered field stripping and were easily lost. Some SAW gunners resorted to extremely unorthodox methods to retain weapon availability. The M249 SAW was the most problematic weapon in the theater.
Figure 4. M249 SAW with field expedient repair.
The biggest issue among M249 SAW gunners is the 200 round plastic ammunition box. Some box and weapon interfaces were observed as weak and unreliable. SAW gunners consistently remarked that the box habitually falls-off no matter the movement technique: walking or rushing. The spring tension is insufficient to retain the box in the slot. Soldiers are using bolts, screws or wire to act as a retaining pin in order to keep the box from slipping from the slot. The box was extremely brittle and prone to break, especially at the box and weapon interface. Discussions with weapons engineers upon return to CONUS revealed that the weak interfaces were previously addressed in a change of the plastic ammunition box design. Some of the problems encountered may have been due to issue of the old design ammunition boxes. Also, the ammunition tends to rattle against the box and soldiers were using MRE cardboard or moleskin to buffer the noise. However, the M249 SAW 100 round soft Combat Ammunition Pack (CAP) was universally praised and was preferred over the 200 round plastic box. Gunners conveyed that they would rather repack their ammunition basic load in several 100 round soft pouches than use the 200 round plastic box.
The M203 GL was most affected by the desert environment. Sand and dirt migrated into the trigger housing and clogged or jammed the safety. This issue is compounded by excessive lubrication. Fine powdery sand easily entered this area and could not be prevented without placing the weapon in a hermetically sealed bag. Additionally, the hand guards tended to slip-off. It is believed that the extreme heat caused the glue to melt and the bonding properties to break-down.
No one type of lubricant stood-out as the best in OIF. A wide variety was used to include: CLP, Graphite, Motor Oil, Strike Hold®, LSAT, Gun Wipes®, and Mil Tech ®. But no matter the lubricant, the common denominator was periodic maintenance. Every soldier described cleaning the weapon, applying lubrication, removing the excess lubricant and periodically brushing-off the dust. When soldiers conducted daily operator level maintenance and applied a light coat of lubricant (regardless of type) to the weapon, the weapon functioned reliably. The best lubricant of all was determined to be soldier elbow grease.
Numerous weapon magazine reliability issues were cited by soldiers. Many of the M16 series and M9 magazines exhibited the same issues raised in Afghanistan. Several of the magazines failed to feed. It is evident that the spring tension was inadequate to feed the rounds in several magazines observed. Some of the M9 magazines had no tension at all. Several observed M16 magazines were difficult to seat in the weapon, or the feed lips tended to spread apart. Soldiers resorted to loading less than 30 rounds into the magazine. These issues may be attributed to worn out magazines and from a lack of maintenance. However, these issues were not cited with the Beretta® or OKAY® magazines. OKAY® magazines were fielded under the Rapid Fielding Initiative.
There is a lot more in there on just specifically issues with the M16 and on other weapons systems and gear as well - a good read for anyone.
http://www.bob-oracle.com/SWATreport.htm
