280PLUS
Member
From an old friend, concerns some action my ship was in prior to my time:
I don’t know how many of you might have watched the show, which was aired on November 12. It showed the BUCHANAN and briefly mentioned the gunfire support our ship provided. It didn’t go into much detail about BUCHANAN’s role.
The following is a letter from a Major John Ripley, USMC, which was sent to BUCHANAN’s CO at the time of the episode. It explains in greater detail how our ship helped out.
I will caution you though, that it’s a pretty long letter.
The gunfire support action described in this letter by Major Ripley (he was a Captain at the time of the fighting and must have been promoted shortly after the battle) took place six months after I left the ship, so I'm not claiming any part in whatever happened. I would like to say, however, that most of my snipes were still aboard at the time of this action, and you will notice that at no time in the story does the Major say anything that would even remotely imply that BUCHANAN ever lost the load, not even once, while raining havoc and 5-inch shells upon the enemy.
Regards,
Dick
-------------------------------------------------------
8 September 1972
Commander William J. Thearle, USN
Commanding Officer
USS BUCHANAN (DDG-14)
FPO San Francisco 96601
Dear Commander Thearle:
We have not met. My first introduction to your ship was somewhat indirect, in fact at the time I had no way of identifying the ship with which I was working. Our relationship was established of operational combat necessity, and in very short order was proven to be one of the most successful and rewarding relationships from the standpoint of combat effectiveness in the war--specifically during the continuing enemy Easter Offensive of 1972.
My purpose in writing is to relate to you some background relative to the invasion, the part my battalion played, and the part played by the USS BUCHANAN, during the first few days of the invasion. Hopefully it will provide a clearer picture to you and your crew of the vital role of NGF as a supporting arm to ground combat forces, and in particular the superlative effectiveness of the BUCHANAN in this role.
The Intelligence information disclosed that the enemy Easter Offensive began 30 March 1972. On that day the northern and western DMZ fire bases began receiving heavy or indirect fire from enemy artillery along both fire base lines. The fact that the enemy was able to take almost all of these fire bases under fire either simultaneously or in rapid succession should have been sufficiently significant to indicate that this was more than just a diversion. He was using more than one tube, more than a battery, and he was firing from multiple positions. We now know that he was employing in excess of a regiment of artillery from fixed, prepared positions with two additional regiments in reserve. All of his ordnance had been stockpiled and in such quantities that his rate of fire/target coverage in virtually every attack was staggering. Rarely was any attack by fire less than 1000 rounds.
Enemy ground forces began their attacks by probing the fire bases. Within two days of these indirect attacks they initiated standard infantry assaults against these fire bases, always heavily supported by their artillery and other crew served weapons. The western fire bases, all in heavy jungle and mountainous terrain did not experience any attacks by armor, however, these same terrain limitations removed any hope of resupply to, or evacuation from the fire bases. On the other hand, the northern fire bases lay along the coastal plain from A-2 (Gio Linh) to A-4 (Con Tien) and the majority of this terrain lent itself to vehicular movement, either limited wheeled vehicular movement or general use of tracked vehicles. Taking advantage of this terrain the enemy attacks along the northern base line, immediately below the DMZ, were characterized by an almost exclusive use of armor. Having generally overrun each of the bases with tanks, the enemy infantry would then come along for the consolidation, or "mopup," of what little resistance remained.
With the foregoing as background I will now turn to the events centering around the battalion I advised, the 3rd Vietnamese Infantry Battalion. We were positioned at Dong Ha as Division Reserve for the 3d ARVN Division. When the enemy attack reached us on Easter Sunday morning April 2nd, we were the last unit lying astride the enemy's route of advance, National Route #1 (QL-1). There was still one more Marine battalion south of us at Quang Tri Combat Base (Ai Tu Base), which was the 6th battalion. Their mission was the defense of the entire base including the remaining elements of the 3d ARVN Division and that portion of Route #1 which ran through the base. It would have been virtually impossible for them to successfully defend the road at this point because of their necessarily excessively thin defense and the fact that there was no natural barrier at that point. There were units south of us but they were "disorganized" to the point that they were ineffective. The headquarters of the 3d ARVN Division had moved to Quang Tri City so officially there was a Division Command Post behind us. However, the regiments of this Division were either heavily engaged, had disappeared altogether, or as in the case of the 56th Regiment, were on the point of surrender. The closest organized force was another 30 to 40 miles away to the west of Hue. Here the bulk of the ARVN lst Division was defending Fire Bases Bastogne and Birmingham. There was so little of the Ist Division remaining other than what was necessary for the defense of those hills that it could not spare as much as one battalion for the defense of Hue.
It is seen then that the hopes of a nation rested on the shoulders of that battalion of Marines along with their support. I trust this is not too strong a wording of a situation which had quite rapidly gone from grim to hopeless. The enemy firepower and massive use of armor had blitzed the strong points he had thus far encountered and had taken him to the north bank of Mieu Giang/Cua Viet River at Dong Ha. Three full mechanized divisions were in the attack, and one was attacking due south along Route #1. These divisions consisted of approximately, the following figures:
8,000-10,000 infantry
150 tanks (Russian T54, T55, and PT76)
50-75 tracked, mobile antiaircraft vehicles
one artillery regiment - approximately 47 130mm guns
anti-aircraft missile units (SAM's)
Then there were the various other special units which make up a division, i.e., engineers, heavy weapons, etc. A conservative figure of the total strength of this division would be 15,000 men with related equipment. The preponderance of force is staggering when one considers that the Marine Battalion defending Dong Ha numbered just 700 men and at the time of the enemy's attack that morning only half of the battalion, two rifle companies, were actually in Dong Ha. When the enemy arrived on the north bank, these two companies defended the village along the river alone. One company went into position along the highway bridge and the other just off of Route #9 near the partially destroyed railroad bridge which was already in enemy hands. These two companies defended the village against a furious attack by the enemy to cross at both places. The enemy actually did get across at the railroad bridge site establishing a foothold there, but was contained by the Marines. It was at this point that I employed my first Naval Gunfire mission. I requested a continuous NGF mission in the vicinity of the railroad bridge, 300 meters to the right and left of the bridge, and 200 meters deep (north) as interdiction to the enemy forces attempting to cross. My request was sent directly to the senior advisor with the VN Marine Brigade then located at Quang Tri Combat Base. There was an ANGLICO team co-located with the Brigade advisory staff which forwarded my request to your ship. This was to be my primary and most effective method of requesting and employing NGF during our defense of Dong Ha. Occasionally a spotter aircraft with NGF capability was used, but never as effectively or with as rapid a response as the ANGLICO teams. This same advisory team with the Brigade worked up a number of defensive fire boxes (targets) north of the river in the general vicinity of the highway and began firing indiscriminate unobserved fire. None of us could see the impact of the rounds, but as most were landing in this area where the concentration of the enemy forces was the greatest the effect of this varied and continuous mission in disorganizing the enemy must have been superb. It forced him to go to ground or to suffer casualties, thus definitely limiting his ability to mass for attack. Still the enemy had many tanks and these were generally unaffected by NGF except for a direct hit, although the infantry normally accompanying the tanks were seriously limited in providing any protection to them.
This was the situation when the enemy finally arrived at the highway bridge around 1015 that morning. Naval Gunfire had been in continuous use for at least an hour interdicting the approaches to both bridges. I was personally too busy to adjust the fire and had requested that it be fired in boxes approximately 2000 X 1000 meters with the linear axis generally east to west and that these fires be shifted from bridge to bridge, as well as north of the bridges, randomly. in accordance with a fire plan worked up by the Brigade advisory staff and the ANGLICO team. It was a simple, efficient system, very effective primarily because of its simplicity. It was only necessary for me to say "give me more fire at the bridge" or, "I can hear tanks on the north bank about 200 meters up the road" and in less than a minute the NGF would come rolling in. No fire commands, no lengthy map checks, or adjustments, nothing but "give me some fire here" and in it came. Furthermore it kept coming until I wanted it turned off, a very helpful factor. It was the perfect example of the flexibility of our system. I needed fire support and needed it badly; I had no direct communication link with you; I didn't even know if you were out there, or even if I was within range; and for your part, you couldn't have known very much about friendly locations. None of us did. It almost seems like a compilation of the worst possible factors regarding fire support, except one: you had the support and I needed it. This fact was abundantly clear to us all and you lost no time in getting it to me.
It is unfortunate that a battlefield assessment could not be made to determine just how much damage NGF did. Nevertheless, one fact is obvious; it contributed greatly to the overall success of our defense and without it, I have serious doubts that this letter would have been possible. On the many, many occasions that I used it, it was totally responsive and accurate. Furthermore, it impressed the South Vietnamese and inspired confidence in them when their need for confidence was the greatest. We were watching from a vantage point when the four PT76 tanks were destroyed by your ship on the beach just south of Cua Viet. We could see them burning clearly. My counterpart, the Marine Battalion CO, and the tank Battalion CO were both observing this superb display of Naval Gunfire. When the tanks were hit and burning they were both surprised and elated in seeing the potential of NGF. I was to receive many requests for NGF by the Vietnamese after this attack.
Another celebrated incident occurred the night of the second after the bridge had been blown. We could hear tanks moving on the north bank then soon could see approximately 20 of them moving westerly along what appeared to be route TL-8B. They were apparently making a dash for the Cam-Lo area where they hoped to be able to cross the river. NGF was requested to interdict the road along its entirity to the maximum range limit which was approximately half way to Cam Lo. The mission was worked up right away and very shortly thereafter we could both see and hear the effects of the mission. One tank was actually hit and remained on the road burning, thus illuminating the other tanks as they passed close by. We were able to take the other tank under fire more easily while they were illuminated by the burning one. This tank kill was credited to NGF but I don't know if you ever received it. None of the tanks ever reached the Can Lo area either so the interdiction mission must be considered a success. Our own forces were firing on the tanks that night also, but NGF was first to engage and apparently scored the first kill.
Another area where NGF was used to a very good effect was in the rescue attempts of downed pilots and other aviation personnel. We knew the general location of one pilot just across the river and approximately 2000 meters west of us. He was unable to move and completely surrounded as he described his situation to us. I fired NGF close enough to his position to remove most of the immediate enemy threat and permit him to move somewhat. This same type mission was fired on other indiscriminate targets nearby so as to avoid pointing out his location to the enemy. In two days time he walked into friendly lines. I think that the contribution of NGF to the success of this joint operation is more than obvious.
When I went to work at the bridge, I had to leave my radio and operator back south of the bridge in a covered position. Thus I was out of communication for the hour or so that I was under the bridge. I had previously requested that the NGF fires then in effect be continued and shifted on the north bank opposite me. This was done by the advisory staff at Brigade with the ANGLICO team. Your fire support and the classic defense of the bridge by the Vietnamese Marines permitted me to get on with my task and successfully complete it.
MY battalion was replaced at Dong Ha by an ARVN Army unit a week later and we returned to Quang Tri Combat Base. Our operations continued in this area although we were generally out of range of NGF and therefore saw very little use of it.
Leaving the field just prior to my return to the United States, I reported to my commanding Officer In Hue. It was here that I learned that during our week in Dong Ha, I had used over 10,000 rounds of NGF. I was interviewed by the press a number of times and carefully pointed out on each occasion the role of NGF in the successful defense of Dong Ha. I also emphasized this role to my Commandant and to the Secretary of the Navy in my discussions with them. Of course they were quite aware of the vital necessity of NGF, but at that time neither had talked with someone who had recently been on the receiving end of this outstanding support.
Summarizing the events which took place that week at Dong Ha the following becomes apparent:
Because of the almost complete loss of artillery assets the only all weather indirect fire supporting arm available was Naval Gunfire.
Naval Gunfire was capable of firing all standard fire support missions. e.g., destruct, interdiction, etc., as well as special purpose missions (protection of downed pilots), limited only by the initiative of the ship and the observer.
Naval Gunfire was responsive to fire requests in every case and was the only supporting arm which could respond with a volume of fire approaching that of the enemy's.
The interdiction of enemy armor was found to be a valid use of NGF. The destruction of enemy armor by NGF was considered effective, but normally only when the ship could observe its target.
For other missions Naval Gunfire remained very effective, even when it could not be directly observed or controlled by the observer.
An intermediate agency apart from the observer (ANGLICO team or Advisory team) could control the fire with reasonable effectiveness once the fire mission had been established.
The use of air was severely limited as close air support for two reasons: first, the preponderance of enemy anti-aircraft fire was of such an extent that any ground support mission was considered unacceptably hazardous by the VNAF and secondly, the scale of the enemy attack throughout the country was so large that the availability of friendly air was limited, due to other priorities. These factors combined to make Naval Gunfire the primary supporting arm from the standpoint of availability. BUCHANAN exemplified the flexibility and responsiveness of Naval Gunfire in the support of ground forces. The South Vietnamese were impressed with the continuous availability of Naval Gunfire. Almost In every case their first reaction to an enemy threat was to request NGF. There have been many times in history, of course, when NGF was called on, to provide fire support to ground forces. I feel that the performance of BUCHANAN at Dong Ha represents one of the finest examples of this support in recent history. The professional and aggressive fire support delivered by your ship was made more noteworthy because of the urgency of our needs during this defense.
Please pass to all hands of BUCHANAN my deepest appreciation, and on behalf of my counterpart, the Battalion Commander, and the 200 Marines who left Dong Ha a week later, our sincere praise for the exemplary support given us.
Kindest regards,
JOHN W. RIPLEY
MAJ USMC
I don’t know how many of you might have watched the show, which was aired on November 12. It showed the BUCHANAN and briefly mentioned the gunfire support our ship provided. It didn’t go into much detail about BUCHANAN’s role.
The following is a letter from a Major John Ripley, USMC, which was sent to BUCHANAN’s CO at the time of the episode. It explains in greater detail how our ship helped out.
I will caution you though, that it’s a pretty long letter.
The gunfire support action described in this letter by Major Ripley (he was a Captain at the time of the fighting and must have been promoted shortly after the battle) took place six months after I left the ship, so I'm not claiming any part in whatever happened. I would like to say, however, that most of my snipes were still aboard at the time of this action, and you will notice that at no time in the story does the Major say anything that would even remotely imply that BUCHANAN ever lost the load, not even once, while raining havoc and 5-inch shells upon the enemy.
Regards,
Dick
-------------------------------------------------------
8 September 1972
Commander William J. Thearle, USN
Commanding Officer
USS BUCHANAN (DDG-14)
FPO San Francisco 96601
Dear Commander Thearle:
We have not met. My first introduction to your ship was somewhat indirect, in fact at the time I had no way of identifying the ship with which I was working. Our relationship was established of operational combat necessity, and in very short order was proven to be one of the most successful and rewarding relationships from the standpoint of combat effectiveness in the war--specifically during the continuing enemy Easter Offensive of 1972.
My purpose in writing is to relate to you some background relative to the invasion, the part my battalion played, and the part played by the USS BUCHANAN, during the first few days of the invasion. Hopefully it will provide a clearer picture to you and your crew of the vital role of NGF as a supporting arm to ground combat forces, and in particular the superlative effectiveness of the BUCHANAN in this role.
The Intelligence information disclosed that the enemy Easter Offensive began 30 March 1972. On that day the northern and western DMZ fire bases began receiving heavy or indirect fire from enemy artillery along both fire base lines. The fact that the enemy was able to take almost all of these fire bases under fire either simultaneously or in rapid succession should have been sufficiently significant to indicate that this was more than just a diversion. He was using more than one tube, more than a battery, and he was firing from multiple positions. We now know that he was employing in excess of a regiment of artillery from fixed, prepared positions with two additional regiments in reserve. All of his ordnance had been stockpiled and in such quantities that his rate of fire/target coverage in virtually every attack was staggering. Rarely was any attack by fire less than 1000 rounds.
Enemy ground forces began their attacks by probing the fire bases. Within two days of these indirect attacks they initiated standard infantry assaults against these fire bases, always heavily supported by their artillery and other crew served weapons. The western fire bases, all in heavy jungle and mountainous terrain did not experience any attacks by armor, however, these same terrain limitations removed any hope of resupply to, or evacuation from the fire bases. On the other hand, the northern fire bases lay along the coastal plain from A-2 (Gio Linh) to A-4 (Con Tien) and the majority of this terrain lent itself to vehicular movement, either limited wheeled vehicular movement or general use of tracked vehicles. Taking advantage of this terrain the enemy attacks along the northern base line, immediately below the DMZ, were characterized by an almost exclusive use of armor. Having generally overrun each of the bases with tanks, the enemy infantry would then come along for the consolidation, or "mopup," of what little resistance remained.
With the foregoing as background I will now turn to the events centering around the battalion I advised, the 3rd Vietnamese Infantry Battalion. We were positioned at Dong Ha as Division Reserve for the 3d ARVN Division. When the enemy attack reached us on Easter Sunday morning April 2nd, we were the last unit lying astride the enemy's route of advance, National Route #1 (QL-1). There was still one more Marine battalion south of us at Quang Tri Combat Base (Ai Tu Base), which was the 6th battalion. Their mission was the defense of the entire base including the remaining elements of the 3d ARVN Division and that portion of Route #1 which ran through the base. It would have been virtually impossible for them to successfully defend the road at this point because of their necessarily excessively thin defense and the fact that there was no natural barrier at that point. There were units south of us but they were "disorganized" to the point that they were ineffective. The headquarters of the 3d ARVN Division had moved to Quang Tri City so officially there was a Division Command Post behind us. However, the regiments of this Division were either heavily engaged, had disappeared altogether, or as in the case of the 56th Regiment, were on the point of surrender. The closest organized force was another 30 to 40 miles away to the west of Hue. Here the bulk of the ARVN lst Division was defending Fire Bases Bastogne and Birmingham. There was so little of the Ist Division remaining other than what was necessary for the defense of those hills that it could not spare as much as one battalion for the defense of Hue.
It is seen then that the hopes of a nation rested on the shoulders of that battalion of Marines along with their support. I trust this is not too strong a wording of a situation which had quite rapidly gone from grim to hopeless. The enemy firepower and massive use of armor had blitzed the strong points he had thus far encountered and had taken him to the north bank of Mieu Giang/Cua Viet River at Dong Ha. Three full mechanized divisions were in the attack, and one was attacking due south along Route #1. These divisions consisted of approximately, the following figures:
8,000-10,000 infantry
150 tanks (Russian T54, T55, and PT76)
50-75 tracked, mobile antiaircraft vehicles
one artillery regiment - approximately 47 130mm guns
anti-aircraft missile units (SAM's)
Then there were the various other special units which make up a division, i.e., engineers, heavy weapons, etc. A conservative figure of the total strength of this division would be 15,000 men with related equipment. The preponderance of force is staggering when one considers that the Marine Battalion defending Dong Ha numbered just 700 men and at the time of the enemy's attack that morning only half of the battalion, two rifle companies, were actually in Dong Ha. When the enemy arrived on the north bank, these two companies defended the village along the river alone. One company went into position along the highway bridge and the other just off of Route #9 near the partially destroyed railroad bridge which was already in enemy hands. These two companies defended the village against a furious attack by the enemy to cross at both places. The enemy actually did get across at the railroad bridge site establishing a foothold there, but was contained by the Marines. It was at this point that I employed my first Naval Gunfire mission. I requested a continuous NGF mission in the vicinity of the railroad bridge, 300 meters to the right and left of the bridge, and 200 meters deep (north) as interdiction to the enemy forces attempting to cross. My request was sent directly to the senior advisor with the VN Marine Brigade then located at Quang Tri Combat Base. There was an ANGLICO team co-located with the Brigade advisory staff which forwarded my request to your ship. This was to be my primary and most effective method of requesting and employing NGF during our defense of Dong Ha. Occasionally a spotter aircraft with NGF capability was used, but never as effectively or with as rapid a response as the ANGLICO teams. This same advisory team with the Brigade worked up a number of defensive fire boxes (targets) north of the river in the general vicinity of the highway and began firing indiscriminate unobserved fire. None of us could see the impact of the rounds, but as most were landing in this area where the concentration of the enemy forces was the greatest the effect of this varied and continuous mission in disorganizing the enemy must have been superb. It forced him to go to ground or to suffer casualties, thus definitely limiting his ability to mass for attack. Still the enemy had many tanks and these were generally unaffected by NGF except for a direct hit, although the infantry normally accompanying the tanks were seriously limited in providing any protection to them.
This was the situation when the enemy finally arrived at the highway bridge around 1015 that morning. Naval Gunfire had been in continuous use for at least an hour interdicting the approaches to both bridges. I was personally too busy to adjust the fire and had requested that it be fired in boxes approximately 2000 X 1000 meters with the linear axis generally east to west and that these fires be shifted from bridge to bridge, as well as north of the bridges, randomly. in accordance with a fire plan worked up by the Brigade advisory staff and the ANGLICO team. It was a simple, efficient system, very effective primarily because of its simplicity. It was only necessary for me to say "give me more fire at the bridge" or, "I can hear tanks on the north bank about 200 meters up the road" and in less than a minute the NGF would come rolling in. No fire commands, no lengthy map checks, or adjustments, nothing but "give me some fire here" and in it came. Furthermore it kept coming until I wanted it turned off, a very helpful factor. It was the perfect example of the flexibility of our system. I needed fire support and needed it badly; I had no direct communication link with you; I didn't even know if you were out there, or even if I was within range; and for your part, you couldn't have known very much about friendly locations. None of us did. It almost seems like a compilation of the worst possible factors regarding fire support, except one: you had the support and I needed it. This fact was abundantly clear to us all and you lost no time in getting it to me.
It is unfortunate that a battlefield assessment could not be made to determine just how much damage NGF did. Nevertheless, one fact is obvious; it contributed greatly to the overall success of our defense and without it, I have serious doubts that this letter would have been possible. On the many, many occasions that I used it, it was totally responsive and accurate. Furthermore, it impressed the South Vietnamese and inspired confidence in them when their need for confidence was the greatest. We were watching from a vantage point when the four PT76 tanks were destroyed by your ship on the beach just south of Cua Viet. We could see them burning clearly. My counterpart, the Marine Battalion CO, and the tank Battalion CO were both observing this superb display of Naval Gunfire. When the tanks were hit and burning they were both surprised and elated in seeing the potential of NGF. I was to receive many requests for NGF by the Vietnamese after this attack.
Another celebrated incident occurred the night of the second after the bridge had been blown. We could hear tanks moving on the north bank then soon could see approximately 20 of them moving westerly along what appeared to be route TL-8B. They were apparently making a dash for the Cam-Lo area where they hoped to be able to cross the river. NGF was requested to interdict the road along its entirity to the maximum range limit which was approximately half way to Cam Lo. The mission was worked up right away and very shortly thereafter we could both see and hear the effects of the mission. One tank was actually hit and remained on the road burning, thus illuminating the other tanks as they passed close by. We were able to take the other tank under fire more easily while they were illuminated by the burning one. This tank kill was credited to NGF but I don't know if you ever received it. None of the tanks ever reached the Can Lo area either so the interdiction mission must be considered a success. Our own forces were firing on the tanks that night also, but NGF was first to engage and apparently scored the first kill.
Another area where NGF was used to a very good effect was in the rescue attempts of downed pilots and other aviation personnel. We knew the general location of one pilot just across the river and approximately 2000 meters west of us. He was unable to move and completely surrounded as he described his situation to us. I fired NGF close enough to his position to remove most of the immediate enemy threat and permit him to move somewhat. This same type mission was fired on other indiscriminate targets nearby so as to avoid pointing out his location to the enemy. In two days time he walked into friendly lines. I think that the contribution of NGF to the success of this joint operation is more than obvious.
When I went to work at the bridge, I had to leave my radio and operator back south of the bridge in a covered position. Thus I was out of communication for the hour or so that I was under the bridge. I had previously requested that the NGF fires then in effect be continued and shifted on the north bank opposite me. This was done by the advisory staff at Brigade with the ANGLICO team. Your fire support and the classic defense of the bridge by the Vietnamese Marines permitted me to get on with my task and successfully complete it.
MY battalion was replaced at Dong Ha by an ARVN Army unit a week later and we returned to Quang Tri Combat Base. Our operations continued in this area although we were generally out of range of NGF and therefore saw very little use of it.
Leaving the field just prior to my return to the United States, I reported to my commanding Officer In Hue. It was here that I learned that during our week in Dong Ha, I had used over 10,000 rounds of NGF. I was interviewed by the press a number of times and carefully pointed out on each occasion the role of NGF in the successful defense of Dong Ha. I also emphasized this role to my Commandant and to the Secretary of the Navy in my discussions with them. Of course they were quite aware of the vital necessity of NGF, but at that time neither had talked with someone who had recently been on the receiving end of this outstanding support.
Summarizing the events which took place that week at Dong Ha the following becomes apparent:
Because of the almost complete loss of artillery assets the only all weather indirect fire supporting arm available was Naval Gunfire.
Naval Gunfire was capable of firing all standard fire support missions. e.g., destruct, interdiction, etc., as well as special purpose missions (protection of downed pilots), limited only by the initiative of the ship and the observer.
Naval Gunfire was responsive to fire requests in every case and was the only supporting arm which could respond with a volume of fire approaching that of the enemy's.
The interdiction of enemy armor was found to be a valid use of NGF. The destruction of enemy armor by NGF was considered effective, but normally only when the ship could observe its target.
For other missions Naval Gunfire remained very effective, even when it could not be directly observed or controlled by the observer.
An intermediate agency apart from the observer (ANGLICO team or Advisory team) could control the fire with reasonable effectiveness once the fire mission had been established.
The use of air was severely limited as close air support for two reasons: first, the preponderance of enemy anti-aircraft fire was of such an extent that any ground support mission was considered unacceptably hazardous by the VNAF and secondly, the scale of the enemy attack throughout the country was so large that the availability of friendly air was limited, due to other priorities. These factors combined to make Naval Gunfire the primary supporting arm from the standpoint of availability. BUCHANAN exemplified the flexibility and responsiveness of Naval Gunfire in the support of ground forces. The South Vietnamese were impressed with the continuous availability of Naval Gunfire. Almost In every case their first reaction to an enemy threat was to request NGF. There have been many times in history, of course, when NGF was called on, to provide fire support to ground forces. I feel that the performance of BUCHANAN at Dong Ha represents one of the finest examples of this support in recent history. The professional and aggressive fire support delivered by your ship was made more noteworthy because of the urgency of our needs during this defense.
Please pass to all hands of BUCHANAN my deepest appreciation, and on behalf of my counterpart, the Battalion Commander, and the 200 Marines who left Dong Ha a week later, our sincere praise for the exemplary support given us.
Kindest regards,
JOHN W. RIPLEY
MAJ USMC
