Al Norris
Member
Well, some things haven't changed since King George...long before Waco or Ruby Ridge.
Actually, we were advised by some of the founders to never trust the .gov
Well, some things haven't changed since King George...long before Waco or Ruby Ridge.
Indeed we were. I believe it was our first President who said...Actually, we were advised by some of the founders to never trust the .gov.
Government is not reason; it is not eloquence; it is force! It is a dangerous servant and a terrible master.
And I though I was the only one who thought '68 festivities was a police riot.The '68 Chicago police riot and Kent State shootings taught me.
This documentary really opened my eyes to Sen. Charles Schumer. I could not believe his comments in the Senate hearings. He is absolutely insane if he believes half of what he was saying; brazenly defending the FBI/ATF when they were clearly in the wrong.
JMusic, one of the issue in contention with the Waco debacle was just WHO fired first. F-Troop contends that the Davidians fired first, while the Davidians contend that it was F-Troop. IIRC, a crucial peice of evidence about WHO fired first was the front door of Davidans home. A peice of evidence that went "missing" and has yet to be found.Let me say this to those who want to meet a search warrant with resistance, (You will Lose!).
Well, drinking is bad for you anyways.That little bet cost me a 12-pack.
Derek Zeanah said:Back in my comparative religions class (Catholic high school, ya know) we went over the definitions of "cults." The teacher wasn't amused when I pointed out that according to their definitions, the Catholic Church met most of the guidelines as well...
You need to watch these sorts of accusations. There are people here (and in the US in general), who would happily label catholics, mormons, jehova's witnesses, quakers, and other non-mainstream non-fundamentalist groups "cults." Others would do the same with the fundies.
There's this interesting thing about this country though: historically, we've always valued religious freedom more than any other nation on earth. It's even codified in the first amendment to the constitution.
To suggest that it was somehow more OK to burn children to death in their homebuilt church because it was really a "compound" and they weren't so much churchgoers but a "kooky cult" strikes me as a terribly offensive way to view the entire situation.
Dammit, I want to live in a country where the government doesn't burn any children to death in any buildings, whether they're viewed as a legitimate church or not. But my standards might be higher than most...
End of ExtractLegal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army
COL. THOMAS R. LUJAN, JAG
Parameters
The U.S. Army War College Quarterly
Autumn 1997, pp. 82-97.
. . . .
Joint Task Force 6 is a long-standing operational unit; in 1993,
it was under the operational control of US Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) and the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM). For
several years this standing task force, located just outside Fort
Bliss, Texas, was a key part of Operation Alliance, a joint
local, state, and federal entity that provided an intelligence
fusion center and rapid response for surveillance needs along the
Southwest border.
Essentially, requests for military support of law enforcement
agencies would flow into JTF 6, be vetted by its staff as having
the appropriate drug nexus, and be approved with deployment
orders transmitted by the JCS. Major projects included area, as
opposed to pinpoint, surveillance and reporting, and the use of
aviation assets to ferry law enforcement officers. Soldiers
detailed to JTF 6 were attached to that organization from their
parent unit for specified periods of time; thus a Special Forces
Operational Detachment with supporting aviation was part of a
Rapid Reaction Support Unit assigned to JTF 6 in early 1993 for a
six-month period.
During this same period a request came into Operation Alliance
for military assets to support a BATF operation against a
methamphetamine laboratory located on the outskirts of Waco. The
request detailed the needs of the BATF: military training in the
specific areas of medical treatment, communications procedures,
operational plan development, review, and approval, and "room
clearing discriminate fire operations," termed "close-quarter
combat" by the military. More important, the BATF requested that
Army medics and communicators actually accompany them to the
forward staging base if not on the actual mission. Clearly, the
request was more expansive than those normally received.
The original request was initially approved by the JTF 6 staff.
However, questions by the Commander of the Special Forces
detachment relayed to his home-unit legal advisor resulted in a
review of the extent of Army involvement. Consequently, in the
actual operation the Army provided only a training site at Fort
Hood, safety inspection of the training lanes set up by the BATF,
and medical and communications training and equipment. All
members of the Special Forces detachment departed the training
site at Fort Hood before the operation at the Branch Davidian
compound took place.
The results of the attempt by the BATF to forcibly serve a
warrant at the Branch Davidian compound were disastrous. In the
initial assault, four BATF agents were killed and 20 were
wounded, the greatest loss of life in the bureau's history. Six
Branch Davidian members were killed and four were wounded. The
resulting siege captured the attention of the nation, and its
tragic, fiery conclusion two months later resulted in the deaths
of 74 Branch Davidians, including 21 children under the age of 14.
While some lessons for America's military leaders from this
incident remain obscure, there are at least three that can be
derived from it.
First, military decisionmakers cannot rely on the assertions of
other federal agencies.
The BATF knew of the requirement to establish a drug nexus in
order to obtain needed military support from JTF 6. Authoritative
evidence conclusively demonstrates that any precursor chemical or
methamphetamine connection at the Waco compound had occurred in
1987, fully six years before the raid. It is probable that David
Koresh was in fact responsible for expelling the member involved
in the fledgling illegal drug activity, going so far as to report
the offender to police. The six-year lapse in these events
clearly attenuates the underlying rationale for illegal drug
activity; the BATF request nevertheless boldly asserted the
needed nexus.
It became clear from the after-action reports and investigations
that BATF's primary interest in this case stemmed from their
conclusion that the Branch Davidians were stockpiling weapons in
their compound. That conclusion perhaps could have been
foreshadowed by a series of anomalies related to the BATF request
for Special Forces support. They were the peripheral nature of
BATF in drug operations (usually spearheaded by the Drug
Enforcement Agency at the federal level), the lack of involvement
of the specialized drug laboratory reaction force, and the
extensive nature of military support requested. All provided
strong indications that further command inquiry was advisable.
And although the commanding general of the JTF testified before
Congress that he saw no reason to pierce the veil of the BATF
request, the implications of this sequence of events should be
understood by commanders and senior staff officers engaged in
such operations in the future.
The specter of members of the Army's special operations forces
accompanying BATF agents storming a religious compound, however
misguided its leader, could have seriously compromised public
support of the US Army. Had the initial request been approved (it
was) and acted upon (it wasn't), this could easily have been the
single most debilitating event to occur within the Army since the
tragedy at My Lai. In fact, this occurrence could have been even
more egregious because it would have taken place on American
soil, would have been a clear violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, and would have raised the issue of military involvement in a
case of alleged religious freedom.
The second important lesson for both leaders and followers is to
recognize that the military's fervor to complete the mission, so
essential in desperate battles to take the high ground, needs to
be curtailed while supporting other federal agencies in
suppressing drugs.
The military mentality that breeds conformance and dedication to
team effort must give way to healthy skepticism and critical
analysis. Missions such as those described above are on the
periphery of the role of the US Army. Any actual or perceived
departure from applicable legal restrictions can lead to an
unacceptable loss of confidence in the Army. In testimony before
Congress, the officer who questioned the legality of the proposed
mission at Waco related that his JTF 6 counterpart, a
higher-ranking officer, had indicated that the witness was being
an unwarranted obstacle to mission success. In fact, the officer
who objected to the mission was asking probing questions for all
the right reasons, thus precluding a significant role for the
Army in the debacle at Waco.
Finally, leaders can take heart from the fact that the training
and experience of today's soldiers allow them to make the right
decisions in situations fraught with career and personal
implications.
Granted, in this instance the soldiers were mature commissioned
and noncommissioned officers with substantial operational
experience. However, at considerable personal risk they had the
integrity and wisdom to question the propriety of the proposed
mission within their operational chain of command. When the
answer did not comport with their training and experience, they
had the moral courage to go outside official channels to receive
an independent legal opinion from their parent unit's legal
advisor. Had they simply gone along with the attitude that an
order is an order, they would have involved the Army in a
violation of Posse Comitatus, contributed to a great scandal,
potentially subjected themselves to personal liability, and
unnecessarily complicated the criminal prosecutions.
. . . .