Was S.L.A Marshall Full Of B.S.?

[Gator]

Actually. what Marshall said was this:

"In an average experienced infantry company in an average day's action, the number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per cent of the total strength. In the most aggressive companies, under the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 percent of the total strength from the opening to the close of the action."

It sounds to me like he did not limiting his findings to "an average day".

 

[Deaf Smith]

I've pretty much read most of S.L.A. Marshals works. Hackworth and Anthony Hubert to among others.

We all know of accounts where green troops panicked and fired at shadows. We all know quick draftees with very little boot training are vunerable to either freezing or panick firing.

At least on green troops, I pretty much feel Marshal was right. Experienced troops? I bet some didn't fire. 80 percent? No. 10 percent, maybe. Maybe less.

The best thing he did was force the military to go to more 'human' targets and get more realistic. Add to that the issuing a full automatic rifle (yea the M-14 at first, then the M-16) so the soldiers would have more confidence in their ability to alter the situation (just as today, with such as EOT and Aimpoint, the soldier has some real ability to alter any firefight.)

Was his work perfect? No. Was it valuable? Yes. It did much good. Especialy exposing the fog-of-war that happens so often in small unit firefights.

 

[Cosmoline]

a very small percentage of soldiers do most of the killing in combat.

True, because they're the most trained and experienced. And because they know how to survive. As far back as "All Quiet on the Western Front" soldiers were remarking how much different the survival rates were for those with a little front line experience and those with none. I see no evidence that they do most of the killing because everyone else is a shrinking violet. Indeed all I've read and heard from vets indicates that the newbies die because they're *too* bold and brave. They don't know how to use cover, and don't appreciate how quickly they can be gunned down even at several hundred yards.

 

[Cosmoline]

In an average experienced infantry company in an average day's action, the number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per cent of the total strength. In the most aggressive companies, under the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 percent of the total strength from the opening to the close of the action.

Good quote, and what bothers me is that this has NOTHING to do with the ability or willingness of soldiers to shoot. It has to do with how battles are fought in the modern world. We don't rise up and charge en masse at entrenched positions anymore. It's supposed to be done with careful positioning and tactical movements. Ideally no mano-a-mano shots or very few shots will be needed at all, and the entire enemy camp can be taken captive. So if only 25 percent of the soldiers ever fire, this does not mean they've backed down in the face of manly Germans. They probably never even saw them.

Put another way, if 100% of your unit is having to throw down and fire, it's a sign that somebody screwed up BIG TIME and you're probably getting overrun.

It reminds me of that urban myth that we "only use 5% of our brain" that gets spewed out in ever High School biology class. Of course the fact is only a fraction of our brain has anything to do with higher thought, and the only way we'd use 100% of our brain is if someone stuck a high voltage line in our ear.

 

[isp2605]

It sounds to me like he did not limiting his findings to "an average day".

How about quoting me exactly. You misquoted me yet you included in your quote the exact phrase I did. I quoted him, as did you, with "average day's action". Don't leave out the word "action" as it changed the meaning considerably. If you want to limit it to just "average day" then on an "average day" no infantryman or anyone else will be shooting.

Good quote, and what bothers me is that this has NOTHING to do with the ability or willingness of soldiers to shoot. It has to do with how battles are fought in the modern world. We don't rise up and charge en masse at entrenched positions anymore. It's supposed to be done with careful positioning and tactical movements. Ideally no mano-a-mano shots or very few shots will be needed at all, and the entire enemy camp can be taken captive. So if only 25 percent of the soldiers ever fire, this does not mean they've backed down in the face of manly Germans. They probably never even saw them.

Put another way, if 100% of your unit is having to throw down and fire, it's a sign that somebody screwed up BIG TIME and you're probably getting overrun.

Which is exactly what I was talking about in my first post. It's also the reason that I believe SLAM might have gathered the data but didn't sift thru it adequately enough to understand what the data actually meant. Maybe 15% actually fired. Of the other 85% how many of the company were being held back in reserve, how many were positioned elsewhere to where they couldn't engage, and how many of the company was actually deployed out. If only a platoon was sent out on patrol and 100% of the entire platoon actually fired, statistics would show then that only 25% of the company actually fired that day. If only a squad was sent out to recon an area and 100% of that squad engaged then the stats would show that only about 10% of the company returned fire. Since SLAM talked of company size numbers actually firing then how did he sift thru the numbers? We'll never know. It's a matter of does a person gathering the data fully understand the data, or fully explain the data, that they have collected.

 

[Cosmoline]

Was his work perfect? No. Was it valuable? Yes. It did much good. Especialy exposing the fog-of-war that happens so often in small unit firefights.

I'm not sure what you mean by the fog of war in this context. From what I've seen, including videos on youtube from Iraq, small units lost in the fog of war are likely to start firing everything they have and calling in the thunder. I've never heard of small units lost in a panic that simply stop shooting for fear of hitting somebody. Ever, in fact.

 

[Jim K]

No combat veteran I, and no comment on S.L.A. Marshall, but I liked the quote from the German that the Americans fired a few shots, then pulled back and called the artillery. Not a bad way to fight. Why take casulaties in "heroic" actions if you don't need to? "Gung Ho" gets you killed, and that business of charging machineguns with bayonet between teeth is pretty stupid.

Jim

 

[Gator]

isp2605, you are right I should have included the word "action" if I was using quotes, my apologies. However, the inclusion or exclusion of that word does not change my point. Marshall considered both "an average day's action" for an experienced company, and "intense local pressure" on the most aggressive companies in his statement; two entirely different things. I may have misunderstood you, I thought you were the one trying to limit it to just an average day's action.

...

I wonder why Grossman bases so much of his work on Marshall when not even the Army took Marshall's claim seriously when he wrote it. And since then Marshall's "Ratio of Fire" has been thoroughly debunked, all long before Grossman wrote his book. My conclusion is that what Grossman was really interested in was self promotion.

 

[Cosmoline]

I think you hit a bullseye there ;-)

He has a PhD in KILLOLOGY lol

 

[Elmer Fudd]

I wonder why Grossman bases so much of his work on Marshall when not even the Army took Marshall's claim seriously when he wrote it. And since then Marshall's "Ratio of Fire" has been thoroughly debunked, all long before Grossman wrote his book. My conclusion is that what Grossman was really interested in was self promotion.

I remember one of my ROTC instructors in the late 80s still using this statistic. He was one of the best officers I ever met. I don't think the word made it out to the broad Army.

I would like to see the issue of the CIB and the 82nd unit patch answered definitively. You would expect a military historian to get that right. If he was wearing insignia and/or awards he was not entitled to then I would tend to discount his entire body of work. That would make him a very low form of wannabe indeed.

 

[Trebor]

While there is much debate about Marshall's methodology, there seem to be quite a bit of evidence to support his conclusions.

What evidence? Marshall's work has been discredited by serious historians. Is there other evidence you are aware of that supports his claims?

"Men Against Fire" was one of the prime factors in the US Army adopting operant conditioning, and after action analysis clearly showed that in Vietnam, more than 95% of all infantrymen engaged in combat.

Even assuming that the stat that "In Vietnam, 95% of all infantrymen engaged in combat," is accurate, that doesn't necessarily support Marshall's work or that operant conditioning made any difference. If Marshall's data and conclusions are bogus, then how to we know the *more* infantrymen fired their weapons in combat in Vietnam then in WWII.

My point is that Marshall's conclusions can *only* be validated if there is other evidence, outside of Marshall's "research," that supports Marshall's conclusions. Since his research was bogus, his conclusions can not be accepted as valid if they rely only on his research.

Btw, I have read "Men Against Fire." If you have access to a decent size university library you might find it there. That's where I found a copy to read several years back.

 

[Erik]

I imagine more than one weary combatant, not wanting to jaw jack with a non-combatant looking for a story, blew said non-combatant off with a "I didn't even fire a shot" comment.

That it may have become a "truism" probably amuses them.

 

[BigG]

I imagine more than one weary combatant, not wanting to jaw jack with a non-combatant looking for a story, blew said non-combatant off with a "I didn't even fire a shot" comment.

Watch Hamburger Hill if you want to see the contempt a combat veteran has for the shiny seat bureaucrat press MOS.

 

[Thin Black Line]

a very small percentage of soldiers do most of the killing in combat.

True, because they're the most trained and experienced. And because they know how to survive. As far back as "All Quiet on the Western Front" soldiers were remarking how much different the survival rates were for those with a little front line experience and those with none. I see no evidence that they do most of the killing because everyone else is a shrinking violet.

I can't speak regarding WWI --I can only speak regarding my experience in
Iraq. Only a small percentage of soldiers leave the wire at any given time.
In fact, there are many soldiers who NEVER leave the wire. In some places
the guy driving the truckload of toilet paper catches more fire than the guy
in the Bradley. It can be safer on a foot patrol in a farming village than
driving down the road.

There are some FOBs where the same soldiers are sent out on missions over
and over again while others are held back. Yes, experience becomes a factor
in that choice but there are other considerations made by commanders.
Whatever reasons those might be still gives rise to a difference in perception
by those who go out vs those who don't and you get terms like "fobbit" in
the current war and "REMF" back in Vn. Names are irrelevant, what is relevant
is the fact that people who don't go out, have less of a chance of meeting
the enemy and actually testing themselves under fire. The soldiers who go
out do have more opportunity for fighting. But, yes, you can go out and
not see anything or fire a weapon where someone 10 yards away has all sorts
of stuff going on. This is shown in monthly stats where the same companies
are taking the fire, producing dead enemy, but also taking their own WIA/KIA,
yet other companies in the same battalion aren't seeing squat.

There were combat medics who got more opportunities to shoot at the enemy
because they were exposing themselves to tend to people who were
wounded. Quite frankly I could be a block away from that same medic
outside the wire sitting in a humvee with a loaded weapon or sitting
under reinforced concrete inside the FOB with an empty weapon, but either
way I'm not firing my weapon. No shrinking violet, just no opportunity and
yes there are people who "chomp at the bit" for that opportunity. Maybe
they like the taste when they get it, but maybe they don't. Firing of weapons
when the opportunity presents itself again and again becomes another matter
entirely which we're not going to get into here in any short order. It goes
into that whole "psychology of killing" thing.

Again, I can't speak for the past. It'd be great from some of THR's Vn vets
to chime in on this topic. It would've been great to discuss this topic with
my grandfather who faught in the Battle of the Bulge, but he passed away
years ago. I suspect though, he would've cared less about it as his life
philosophy was something to the effect of "people will do what they need
to do." You would also find that people who did the most, talk the least
about what they did.

So what did the legions do who manned Hadrians Wall? How many of them
actually went north and fought? Probably depends on their place in a
particular time in history.

 

[geekWithA.45]

I'm not convinced it's knowable, in any sort of reliable data kind of way. (ie: the plural of anecdote is not data)

You start with the set of all soldiers. Then you identify the set of soldiers actually in a combat zone. Then the set actually exposed to the enemy, then those who have the opportunity to discharge their weapons, those who actually discharge in the general direction of the enemy, those who intentionally put an enemy in the sight picture before firing, those who do that and actually hit, and finally, those who are willing to actually admit to it. Toss into the mix those who say they've done that, but come back with all their ammo.

Short of gunsight cams, I'm not sure it's knowable.

 

[spwenger]

Speaking Of...

He [Dave Grossman] has a PhD in KILLOLOGY

Grossman states that he has "an advanced degree in psychology," giving most folks the impression that he has a Ph.D.

For those of us who do hold advanced degrees, this statement waves a little red flag. If you dig down two levels on Grossman's website, the most advanced degree he lists is M.Ed., Counseling Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, TX, Phi Kappa Phi, Kappa Delta Pi, 1990.

Birds of a feather and all that...

 

[7677]

Was S.L.A Marshall Full Of B.S.?...Based on my experience I'd say...YES HE WAS!

When you look at the total military he may very well have a point because for every combat arms soldier there are 10 in support roles.

However, those that are out there doing the actual fighting those numbers are pure BS. As a platoon leader or SGT it would be your job to weed out all of the non-hackers and replace them with those that will fight.

As far as not shooting at enemy soldiers when void of enemy, I think some have forgotten about the purpose of cover fire. When you cannot see the enemy or you know where the enemy is but cannot get them with direct fire you pin them down with suppressive fire and other soldiers from your platoon move to a position where they can take them out.

The other thing about combat that isn't noted, combat is not like hunting season as there are no deer tags and several soldiers are usually shooting at the same target at any given time. Just because the enemy goes down does not mean you were the one that scored a hit or kill.

 

[Deanimator]

There was an article recently on Marshall in "Military History Quarterly", I believe. It was NOT complimentary.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

SLA Marshall has been proven to be full of sh*t.

1. His story changed after the war. For example, right after he originally claimed to have interviewed in depth 400 companies. Later it changed to 600 companies.

2. People who were with him say he never discussed his key issues with the troops.

3. His field notes (archived at the Center for Military History at Carlisle Barracks) don't bear out his "findings."

4. His findings don't match actual combat experience in wars where he didn't interview troops. (For example, there are plenty of Ordnance reports of muskets found on Civil War battlefields with 2 to 10 charges in the barrel -- indicating that men under stress will try to shoot, even if they don't succeed.)

5. He lies about many things including being "the youngest Lieutenant in WWI." When called on that, he would back down, wait a while, and make the claim again.

 

[Thin Black Line]

So has anyone else here actually read Grossman and been in a combat zone?

 

[Vern Humphrey]

So has anyone else here actually read Grossman and been in a combat zone?

Yes and yes. And got the bullet holes to prove it.

 

[7677]

So has anyone else here actually read Grossman and been in a combat zone?

Affirmative on both counts and I do not agree with a lot of what Grossman said and I was one of the first people asked to review Grossman's book "On Killing". I wish I still had my write up of it to share with you.

My Grandfather which saw extensive combat to include Pearl Harbor and numerous island landings with the Marine Raiders also read his book and didn't agree with a lot of what was said.

 

[another okie]

On #4 about the multiple charges in black powder rifles, I think it's in John Keegan's "Face of Battle" that he mentions that the fact of multiple charges could be explained several ways.

One would be, as the poster above suggested, that the guy was desperate to fire his rifle. The other is that he didn't want to fire, and got out of it "looking busy" in reloading over and over.

In "Doing Battle" Paul Fussell mentions that one of his soldiers, the BAR man in his platoon, always seemed to be tearing down the BAR to fix a jam whenever Fusselll asked him to get up front and lay down some fire.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

On #4 about the multiple charges in black powder rifles, I think it's in John Keegan's "Face of Battle" that he mentions that the fact of multiple charges could be explained several ways.

Do you have a page number?

One would be, as the poster above suggested, that the guy was desperate to fire his rifle. The other is that he didn't want to fire, and got out of it "looking busy" in reloading over and over.

There are other ways to "look busy" than disabling your rifle in such a way as to make it a suicide machine should you have to fire it!

In "Doing Battle" Paul Fussell mentions that one of his soldiers, the BAR man in his platoon, always seemed to be tearing down the BAR to fix a jam whenever Fusselll asked him to get up front and lay down some fire.

There are goldbricks in every army -- but this flys in the face of Marshall's "study." He claims men with BARs were more likely to fire, not less.

The fact is, Marshall's "study" is not borne out in other wars -- troops in other wars were far more likely to shoot up all their ammunition than to not fire at all.

In addition, Marshall's claims changed after the war. He added 200 companies to his claim after the war was over. Did he have a Wayback machine?

Next, the people who accompanied Marshall and were present at many of his interviews say he never asked the key questioons.

And finally, Marshall's notes, which are archived at Carlisle Barracks, don't bear out his claims.

Marshall was a phony.

 

[BigG]

Quote:

On #4 about the multiple charges in black powder rifles, I think it's in John Keegan's "Face of Battle" that he mentions that the fact of multiple charges could be explained several ways.

Do you have a page number?

I have the book at home it would be in the Napoleonic section. If I think of it I'll flip thru and post it, but I've read that info that some soldiers literally filled the bbl with one charge atop another. Civil War battlefields yielded a number of such trophies.

Quote:
One would be, as the poster above suggested, that the guy was desperate to fire his rifle. The other is that he didn't want to fire, and got out of it "looking busy" in reloading over and over.

There are other ways to "look busy" than disabling your rifle in such a way as to make it a suicide machine should you have to fire it!

The guy could be loading on top of a dry charge, i.e., no powder in the first loading, and thinking the gun is going off due to the noise and confusion of the battle.