SLA Marshall vs. Reality

[Vern Humphrey]

Um, I 'm aware that they've found many LOADED rifles on the battlefields, not that they found many loaded multiple times without being fired.

That part is well-documented. It was not uncommon to find abandoned rifle-muskets on Civil War battlefields with multiple charges. In the stress of combat there were men who would load and snap, load and snap, and fail to put a cap on the nipple.

Of course, this also proves these men were TRYING to fire, regardless of the stress they were under.

 

[NMshooter]

In all seriousness how should we be doing things?

I am not trying to defend Marshall, or attack him, just trying to figure out what the right way is.

Any research recommendations would be appreciated.

Remember, I served in the Air Force, not the Army, so I am approaching this from a layman's perspective.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

In all seriousness how should we be doing things?

1. Train men to shoot. This was the failing of Train Fire -- men shot under "combat conditions" before they mastered the basics (the "combat conditions" weren't very realistic, either.)

2. Train men who have mastered the basics to shoot under combat conditions. We now do a very good job of this, using unit firing, combat theaters, and so on.

(Note -- this is how the Marines did it. They never adopted Train Fire, and were always better shots than the Army.)

3. Manage replacement fill for the convenience of the tactical commanders, not for the personnel managers.

a. Do not keep all units at the same percentage of fill. Allow units to fall BELOW average fill, then pull them off line, fill them with a draft of replacements.

b. Move replacements directly to their combat units -- don't waste time elsewhere.

c. Assign replacements to experienced combat NCOs or senior men. Stress to the old timers that the new guys are their responsibility.

d. Base all training on the unit officers and NCOs, and on the unit's actual missions.

e. Conduct combat operations in a relatively safe area before returning the unit to full combat duties.

4. Stress multi-echelon traning. Don't neglect the NCOs and Officers.

5. Develop leader training to remedy deficiencies that show up in the field and to keep leaders abrest of changing situations, enemy tactics, and so on.

6. Thoroughly analyze enemy actions, and base combat training scenarios on actual enemy actions.

7. Conduct detailed rehearsals before major combat -- at the least, conduct "rock drills" for leaders.

 

[NMshooter]

I thought the Army taught basic rifle marksmanship?

Everything you list makes sense to me, is that the way things are currently done?

 

[Vern Humphrey]

I thought the Army taught basic rifle marksmanship?

Just cause we call something Motherhood and apple pie don't mean Mother baked it or there are any apples in it.

In times past, we trained on the Known Distance range. While this ISN'T combat conditions, it has one great advantage -- you can se the effect of each shot. If you hurry out to a pop-up target range, and you haven't mastered the basics, you'll do a lot of missing and never know why.

That was the problem with Train Fire -- without the basics, you can't get better shooting at targets that only tell you "hit" or "miss."

Everything you list makes sense to me, is that the way things are currently done?

We're moving in that direction -- but we haven't fully mastered some of those points.

 

[Jeff White]

Ok Vern, tell me where in any of Marshall's writings he advocated the individual replacement system. Are you going to blame him for the failure of the Commanche attack helicopter program and the ill fated SGT York Air Defense system too.

I think you are somehow tying Marshall's work to all that's wrong or has been wrong with the Army since 1946.

Marshall's work gave us humanoid shaped targets and they evolved into the trainfire range. I never read anything by Marshall that advocated not teaching the basics before shooting pop-up targets. We went to humaniod shaped targets that popped up and then went down after being hit to solve the problem of troops not firing.

I'm quite aware that the Army doesn't adopt books. But you're still skating around the question of why the seasoned combat veterans who were in charge of the Army in 1946 didn't cry BS when Men Against Fire was first published. Don't you think that those men who had commanded companies and battalions in combat of an intensity that we haven't seen since 1952 would have been the first to scream BS? Why didn't they dismiss Men Against Fire out of hand if it goes against what they would have personally experienced. Are you saying that GEN Taylor who was Chief of Staff in the 1950s when many of the changes were made was wrong, and worse that he was a fool?

Just what changes do you credit/blame Marshall's work with giving us? I'd be very interested to see where he recommended the individual replacement program. Can you refer me to the book and page where he advocated that?

Jeff

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Ok Vern, tell me where in any of Marshall's writings he advocated the individual replacement system.

I gather you are trying to make a point here, but I'm not sure what it is. Scroll back a few entries, and you can see where someone else pointed out that Marshall advocated 4-man packet replacements (which would be even worse than the individual replacement system.)

Marshall always regarded the individual soldier as a cog in a machine, something other good Armies had since stopped doing.

Marshall never understood small unit dynamics.

Marshall's work gave us humanoid shaped targets and they evolved into the trainfire range. I never read anything by Marshall that advocated not teaching the basics before shooting pop-up targets. We went to humaniod shaped targets that popped up and then went down after being hit to solve the problem of troops not firing.

"Troops not firing" was not the problem.

But not hitting was. The Marshall mentality, if I may call it so, placed the emphasis on shooting, just shooting. We wasted a lot of ammo on poor quality shooting.

But you're still skating around the question of why the seasoned combat veterans who were in charge of the Army in 1946 didn't cry BS when Men Against Fire was first published. Don't you think that those men who had commanded companies and battalions in combat of an intensity that we haven't seen since 1952 would have been the first to scream BS? Why didn't they dismiss Men Against Fire out of hand if it goes against what they would have personally experienced. Are you saying that GEN Taylor who was Chief of Staff in the 1950s when many of the changes were made was wrong, and worse that he was a fool?

Some did scream -- but no one paid attention. They were "old fogies" and "not with it." When you talk about how generals accepted it -- I point out that generals rarely engage in fire fights.

Look at Douglas Haig -- there's a brilliant general who adopted and kept pushing tactics that clearly weren't working. To say "it's good because the generals like it" is to ignore that sometimes the sergeants know better.

 

[Jeff White]

Vern, the point I've been trying to make is that your Army experience as well as mine, in which many of the problems that Marshall identified in his writings never existed for us. I say that it is because certain training methodolgies were adopted to solve those problems...You say the problems never existed. Who's right? I haven't got a clue.

I'm well aware that generals don't engage in firefights, but you can't deny that the Army leadership that looked at Marshall's work and decided that it had some validity was the most combat experienced leadership we've ever had.

I could go through my modest library and start posting excerpts that would show instances of soldiers not firing or freezing in combat, but that would all be anecdotal and wouldn't prove anything to either side.

We're going to have to agree to disagree here. I have seen some validity in what Marshall has written and what Grossman has expounded on in my 30 + years of working in the profession of arms (both in the Army and as a police officer, and in planning and conducting training for both groups).

You obviously didn't see any validity in it in your experience. Although neither of us served in an Army that wasn't influenced by Marshall's work.

Jeff

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Vern, the point I've been trying to make is that your Army experience as well as mine, in which many of the problems that Marshall identified in his writings never existed for us. I say that it is because certain training methodolgies were adopted to solve those problems...You say the problems never existed. Who's right? I haven't got a clue.

All the evidence is the problems didn't exist -- Marshall made up his reports out of very little evidence and a lot of imagination. The training we got was bad training, and didn't solve problems.

I'm well aware that generals don't engage in firefights, but you can't deny that the Army leadership that looked at Marshall's work and decided that it had some validity was the most combat experienced leadership we've ever had.

Actually not -- as James Dunnegan points out, a man who served a year in Viet Nam saw more combat than a man who served in WWII. Our generals did not then and do not now do sergeant's business -- they rely on others to find out what's actually going on down there. Marshall seemed plausible, and many people bit.

You obviously didn't see any validity in it in your experience. Although neither of us served in an Army that wasn't influenced by Marshall's work.

I served in the "Army Training Revolution" from the beginning -- we went through the whole thing. And we found that there was a whole lot of nothing behind much of our training.

 

[Cosmoline]

IIRC, Sgt. York commented that while the rest of his unit was also firing during his famous engagement, they were shooting, but were hitting primarily blue sky due to poor marksmanship. He had grown up with rifles and knew how to shoot before boot camp, so it wasn't a problem for him.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

IIRC, Sgt. York commented that while the rest of his unit was also firing during his famous engagement, they were shooting, but were hitting primarily blue sky due to poor marksmanship.

That, as I say, is the problem -- getting hits. Training aimed at "just get them to shoot" is simply compounding the problem.

 

[Cosmoline]

Isn't Grossman the idiot who included this bit of nonsense in his book:

"Most of the people in our society are sheep. They are kind, gentle, productive creatures who can only hurt one another by accident." This is true. Remember, the murder rate is six per 100,000 per year, and the aggravated assault rate is four per 1,000 per year. What this means is that the vast majority of Americans are not inclined to hurt one another. Some estimates say that two million Americans are victims of violent crimes every year, a tragic, staggering number, perhaps an all-time record rate of violent crime. But there are almost 300 million Americans, which means that the odds of being a victim of violent crime is considerably less than one in a hundred on any given year. Furthermore, since many violent crimes are committed by repeat offenders, the actual number of violent citizens is considerably less than two million.

I'm sorry, but this *IS* the thought process of an anti. This ideology dovetails perfectly into gun control, whether Grossman and his followers want to admit it or not. Because if the sheepdogs are there to protect from the wolves, they are the ones who really need the fangs. The sheep might be allowed some fangs, but really they won't have the will to use them in a pinch. The "wolves" will just take them away.

The reality, of course, is that cops and soldiers are just citizens like the rest of us. Their DNA is no different from ours, and they are no more or less prone to killing than anyone else. They may or may not actually end up having to kill someone, just as we may or may not actually end up having to kill someone.

The real instinct that soldiers need to overcome and control is the instinct to run away, and as was pointed out the factor that has always done this is unit cohesion. Men stay and fight not because they have "the hard heart of a killer" but because they are fighting as a group with men they know would fight and die for them. They fight because they love their brothers with a love that most vets will tell you they have never experienced before or since. It's certainly not some desire for blood that keeps a man in his spot on the line knowing he's probably going to die in the next few minutes. The will to kill is the easy part. We're all born with it hard-wired into our brains. The will that allows many to fight and die as one--THAT is the hard part.

I can tell you that if the need arose I could certainly shoot someone dead to defend myself or others. I have no doubt about it. Killing is easy. Very, very easy. But what I don't have is the willpower or knowledge to face imminent peril with a bunch of other people while fighting as a single unit. That's what cops and soldiers have that ordinary citizens do not.

Poorly trained or poorly motivated troops will high tail it because there is no such cohesion or it breaks down. They see others running and it becomes a race to avoid being the last one left on the field. There's no reason to assume these guys won't kill given the chance. The will to kill simply isn't the problem.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Grossman is another snake oil salesman -- there are a lot of them clustering around the Army.

I recall one who brought us the secret to teaching soldiers who couldn't read. He had a cartoon panel with a strip of magnetic tape pasted on it. He stuck it in a slot in a modified tape recorder, and the panel moved past your eyes while a voice read the captions to you.

There was a stunned silence in the room. Finally a little old lady from Mississippi, a Department of the Army Civilian said, "Oh, isn't that useless!"