What will be the arguments for/against Assault Weapons & High Capacity Magazines in a SCOTUS case

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Perhaps I'm dreaming, but I think there's a fair chance that the Supremes will slap this ruling down like they did the Massachusetts ruling on tasers and stun-guns. It flies almost directly in the face of Heller and McDonald. While the liberal 4 would probably like another chance to overturn Heller, the one thing they're even less inclined to accept is a lower court defying their rulings! :uhoh:
 
First it was a property right. Now it's a fundamental right. Now with the Fourth Circuit decision, will the flip floppin' ever stop? ....

What are you talking about?

The Court, neither in Heller nor McDonald, did not adopt the property right theory advanced by Chemerinsky and Winkler in the amicus brief they submitted in support of the District of Columbia (and thus in opposition to Heller). The property right theory was used to support "reasonable restrictions." But the District of Columbia lost.

In Heller the Court did say that the rights protected by the Second Amendment could be subject to regulation, but it did not do so by adopting the property right theory of Chemerinsky and Winkler. What the Court said in Heller was (554 U.S. 570, at 626 -- 627, footnotes omitted):
....Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students' Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession[128 S.Ct. 2817] of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposeing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U.S., at 179, 59 S.Ct. 816. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New–York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N.C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O'Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 288, 289 (1874)....

So the Court found bases in various authorities (not in the Chemerinsky and Winkler "property right" theory) to support the dicta acknowledging the proposition that the rights protected by the Second Amendment could be limited. And a fundamental right may be subject to limitations as illustrated by the various enforceable limitations on certain fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment.
 
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