I see the profiling fans still aren't reading the Carnival Booth paper, which addresses their arguments. I'll summarize and grossly oversimplify:
Scenario 1:
There are 10 terrorists in a cell. They successively go through security checkpoints, with no suspicious items at all, to test whether they are selected for heightened checks. 5 of the terrorists fit a profile and are checked every time. Five others them do not fit a profile and are not checked. The first 5 terrorists prepare the bombs and then leave the target nation.
The remaining five enter the target area. Because they don't fit a profile, they have a 0% chance of being thoroughly checked. They successfully set off the bombs.
Scenario 2:
Again, 10 terrorists. They probe the checkpoints but find no pattern. They prepare the bombs, and try to pass the checkpoints to set them off. If every third person is randomly checked, there is a 98% chance that at least one of the bombers will be caught. The target zone is shut down and secured by police. Some of them set off their bombs at the checkpoints, others are caught, but assuming reasonably well designed checkpoints, little loss of life will occur.
In other words, profiling never works against terrorist cells who test security beforehand. It is a well established fact that Al-Qaeda's MO is to extensively test security, so profiling systems are completely useless.
Scenario 1:
There are 10 terrorists in a cell. They successively go through security checkpoints, with no suspicious items at all, to test whether they are selected for heightened checks. 5 of the terrorists fit a profile and are checked every time. Five others them do not fit a profile and are not checked. The first 5 terrorists prepare the bombs and then leave the target nation.
The remaining five enter the target area. Because they don't fit a profile, they have a 0% chance of being thoroughly checked. They successfully set off the bombs.
Scenario 2:
Again, 10 terrorists. They probe the checkpoints but find no pattern. They prepare the bombs, and try to pass the checkpoints to set them off. If every third person is randomly checked, there is a 98% chance that at least one of the bombers will be caught. The target zone is shut down and secured by police. Some of them set off their bombs at the checkpoints, others are caught, but assuming reasonably well designed checkpoints, little loss of life will occur.
In other words, profiling never works against terrorist cells who test security beforehand. It is a well established fact that Al-Qaeda's MO is to extensively test security, so profiling systems are completely useless.