With Custer at the Little Big Horn

[Powderman]

Custer was defeated before he even hit the battlefield. His defeat was not one only of superior numbers, but of meeting a better prepared and acclimated enemy.

Consider the average Cavalry soldier of Custer's unit: Most were from different ethnic backgrounds, and quite a few had trouble even making themselves understood in English.

The soldier was about 5'7"--5'9". Their rations consisted primarily of a bit of side meat, (not much), flour, coffee, salt and some hardtack.

On one of the hottest days of the year, they rode into battle wearing the blue woolen uniform, over long johns and other accoutrements that they were required to wear by regulation.

When they dismounted, they left one soldier in four to stay behind and tend the horses--cutting their dismounted forces by one quarter.

As was mentioned before, Custer fielded about 500 troops in total. That's about a battalion.

Now, consider the adversary, the Native American warrior.

Average height, from 5'10" to 6'2".
Wore minimal clothing and accoutrements, stripped down for speed.
Fighting on their home land--geographical advantage.
Diet-meat. Red meat. Lots of it, with fiber and some vegetables.

As was mentioned before, Custer fielded about a battalion.
The Indian Nations present included the Brule, Hunkpapa, Rosebud and Lakota, all of which we now know and mention as Sioux--incidentally, a slang term.

Together, they fielded an army of at least 4,000 warriors--almost a DIVISION.

Custer's men went through the grass--almost chest high--looking for things to shoot.

The Indians would advance to within bow range, then raise up just enough to put two or three arrows into the air and move before they hit.

Also, the grass was thick enough to hide a kneeling man LESS THAN TEN FEET AWAY. Plenty of soldiers probably died without knowing what hit them.

What killed Custer was tombstone courage, failure to prepare and poor tactics.

 

[telewinz]

Since the Army was well aware of the high volume of fire the Spencer delivered (many considered that to be a liability or waste) and the cartridge itself was more compact compared to the 45/70, it is very reasonable to assume that more Spencer ammo would have been issued than 100 rounds. Also the much higher volume the Spencer would have delivered may have run the Indians off. Change the mix/situation and maybe the outcome would have changed. Maybe the Battle of the Little Big Horn could have been the skirmish of the Little Big Horn and the Custer would have lived to fight another day. The Spencer (and it's ammo) was reliable and effective, it would have been a better "system" (and decisive?) than the Trap door Springfield at the Little Big Horn. The Indians quite possibly would have broken off their attack when faced with the high volume of fire IMHO.

 

[jondar]

Many years ago I spent a couple of hours visiting with the curator of the Fort Caspar (sic) Museum at Casper, Wyoming. If memory serves I think his name was Bill Judge. He told me how the Custer Battlefield National Monument had given permission to himself and several other historians to go over some parts of the battlefield with metal detectors. He particularly remembered the ford at the Indian camp, and said artifacts had been found which apparently had been thrown off to try to reduce the weight on the horses in an apparent rout back up to Custer Hill. He told me what some of the artifacts were, among them several harmonicas. He said there was no doubt in his mind that Custer's forces entered the village, saw what they were up against, and retreated in disarray.

 

[Tamara]

Three years after Little Big Horn, B Coy., 2nd/24th Regt. of Foot, would show that single shot rifles were no handicap at all, in the hands of well-led, well-trained troops with good unit cohesion.

They didn't need Spencers; they needed experience, training, marksmanship skills, discipline, and Colour Sergeant Bourne & Lieutenant Bromhead.

 

[cxm]

Biggest Liability

The 7th was slaughtered as a direct result of Lt. Col. Custer's arrogance.

In the late War he had shown his recklessness many time... he had little regard for the welfare of his troops, but a great regard for his image and public relations.

In the scheme of things and the politics of the yankee army George Custer was promoted to brevet Major General, (I believe the youngest in their army.)

With the end of that war, Custer's brevel lapsed and he reverted to Major and then Lt. Col.

Some history suggests Custer was a profoundly depressed man haunted by many ghosts from his past. That said his ambition seemed unlimited and he saw the command of the 7th as his chance to regain his former glory.

I'm convinced he was willing to die and kill his entire command in persuit of that glory... sort of a death or glory wish... this is particularly supported by the actions of his wife after his death.

It is a long story...but ultimately a lot of good troopers died as a result of Custer's rampant ambitions...

V/r

Xhuck

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Some Indian reports of the battle state that initial contact was made when Custer and those under his direct command attempted to charge across the river into the camp.

The indian reports tend to be worm's-eye views and in considerable conflict with each other. What one indian in one part of the camp saw is not what another indian in a different part of the camp saw.

Some indian accounts say that Reno's detatchment after retreating across the river tried to cross again further down -- they mistake Custer's detatchment for Reno's and assume them all to be the same troops.

You can take the USGS map of the battlefield and work out that Reno had to be in action first -- Custer had a long way to ride before reaching his crossing point after Reno had crossed.

 

[STW]

Of course I wasn't as clear as I needed to be, I meant initial contact by Custer's contingent. The scramble back from the upper ford towards Custer Hill still needs to be explained. One explanation is lots of Indians. A second would be fewer Indians, because so many were all over Reno, and the incapacity of senior command, ie. Custer.

Firearm note. In search of history tried to determine if Reno could have heard the battle going on at Custer Hill. Their conclusion was that they could. I noticed, however, that no modern person doing the listening had just spent a fair amount of time shooting a Sharps carbine without hearing protection. That sort of invalidates that particular historical search.

 

[Moondoggie]

In "Son of the Morning Star", the author believes that Custer may have been killed/seriously wounded in the opening moments of contact with the Indians at the river crossing. This would explain the hasty retreat and the lack of cohesion on the ridge. Custer gets hit, folks with more common sense and no quest for glory decide "This is stupid, we're outta here!" An examination of the piles and locations of spent ctg cases indicates that two of the companies on Last Stand Hill barely put up a defense before being over run while the other three fired quite a lot from fixed positions before the end came.

One of my Officer's gave me the book as a "going away present" back in '86. It's a great read and includes the interviews with the Indidans.

The book is still packed in a box from our last move, and I forget the author's name. Possibly Evan McConnell????

 

[MICHAEL T]

TAMARA Experience,discipline and markmanship wasn't much help for the main force,now was it. They suffered under the same arrogent type of leadership as Custers men did. With the same results.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

The scramble back from the upper ford towards Custer Hill still needs to be explained. One explanation is lots of Indians. A second would be fewer Indians, because so many were all over Reno, and the incapacity of senior command, ie. Custer.

A look at the USGS map gives some good clues. Custer apparently came down Medicine Tail Cooley. Smith, Yates, and T.W. Custer's companies lie in a prolongation of the upper part of that gulley. Keogh and Calhoon's companies, in contrast, lie in a U formation about a half mile to the east.

Amos Bad Heart Bull's pictograph ledger (he was a child at the time) shows the Sioux crossing the Little Bighorn and going up two gullies simultaneously. This would lead to a natural double envelopment of Custer's forces.

The simplest explanation is that the westernmost band of indians (who reached the high ground much closer to the upper Medicine Tail Cooley) coupled with direct frontal pressure caused Custer's force to move back up the cooley.

Custer actually handled his force fairly well at this point (much better than Reno's confused attempts to command) and formed a line protecting his command. When the second group of indians appeared, coming up the eastern gulley, Keogh and Calhoon formed a defensive line against that force.

Both lines were over-run -- the evidence is that Keogh and Calhoon were over-run first, with Calhoon's company collapsing first, and some survivors reaching Keogh's company. (This is shown by forensically identifying cartridge cases in both positions -- someone fired the same carbine first in Calhoon's company, then in Keogh's.)

With the eastern companies over-run, the other three companies were dead meat. The survivors first sought the high ground (where Custer may have already established a position for his headquarters) and when that was over-run a handfull of survivors made a break for a gulley to the southwest, but didn't make it.

Of course, this accounts for the actions of five of the twelve companies of the 7th Cavalry. Three more under Reno (M, A and G) were badly mauled. Benteen coming up with his three companies (D, K and H) plus the pack train and its escorting company (B), took command on Reno's Ridge, stabilized the position, and saved the remainder of the regiment.

 

[Bart Noir]

Tamara, I agree fully with you. But I'd also like mention that the British could keep up a higher rate-of-fire with the Martini-'enry since it cocked the internal hammer as it ejected the empty case. Less motions with the right hand, no hammer to cock, must mean the M-H could be loaded and back on target faster than the Trapdoor.

Then again, considering how powerful the M-H cartridge was and how it punished the shooter, maybe they slowed down real quick. Or flinched badly. Yeah, I agree that training and leadership makes a huge difference.

Bart Noir

 

[Hobie]

The Brits were in a prepared defensive position. They were infantry. They had good fields of fire. They engaged the enemy from the max effective range all the way into contact distance. They did not destroy their unit's cohesiveness in the defense by disorganized retreat. They did not split their force. ETC.

Custer's problems started way before the battle and he did nothing to mitigate those problems on the battlefield.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

The Brits were in a prepared defensive position. They were infantry. They had good fields of fire. They engaged the enemy from the max effective range all the way into contact distance. They did not destroy their unit's cohesiveness in the defense by disorganized retreat. They did not split their force. ETC.

I think we should point out that you are talking about the action at Roark's Drift, where a small British unit (A Coy, South Wales Borderers) defeated a much larger attacking force of Zulus.

In the earlier battle, Isandlewana Mountain, a much larger British force was overrun by the Zulus and wiped out. In fact, the British force at Isandlewana was much larger than Custer's 7th Cavalry, equipped with artillery, and facing an enemy on foot who had few firearms -- and they sustained a much higher percentage of casualties than Custer.

 

[Hobie]

Roger that. However, the Brits at Isandhlwana did what Custer did dividng their force permitting the Zulus an opportunity defeat them in detail AND they did not move to resupply ammo as expeditiously as they might have (within units, according to various accounts). It was only a portion of those Zulu troops that moved against Rorke's Drift (against orders!).

My point is that the Infantry is a bit more stolid (and I mean stolid) in defense and couldn't be distracted by the loss of their mounts. That must have been a terrible blow to unit confidence to see the horses loose, taken, or shot down eliminating all hope of escape in that manner.

On the other hand, both the Zulus at Isandhlwana and the NAs at Greasy Grass performed at their best given their particular circumstances. Both used terrain to mask movement and for cover (largely unavailable at Rorke's Drift).

Custer had all sorts of problems in his unit. Some of these were exacerbated by and during the march/movement to the battle site, some by his command decisions. He failed to properly interpret battlefield intel and so forth.

BTW, I doubt that the Bugler, commonly used as a courier, was as illiterate and lacking in English proficiency as he's been made out to be. I doubt that anyone including Custer would be so stupid as to use his least qualified communicators as message delivery systems!

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Roger that. However, the Brits at Isandhlwana did what Custer did dividng their force permitting the Zulus an opportunity defeat them in detail AND they did not move to resupply ammo as expeditiously as they might have (within units, according to various accounts). It was only a portion of those Zulu troops that moved against Rorke's Drift (against orders!).

The odds against the British at Roark's drift, in relative terms were greater than at Isandlewana.

The force at Isandlewana SHOULD have been more than adequate -- there was, however no good overall command, and a poorly trained and armed contigent (companies of the Natal Native Contigent) wound up at a critical point -- a "knuckle" where the line made a sharp bend. This allowed the Zulus into the defensive position.

My point is that the Infantry is a bit more stolid (and I mean stolid) in defense and couldn't be distracted by the loss of their mounts. That must have been a terrible blow to unit confidence to see the horses loose, taken, or shot down eliminating all hope of escape in that manner.

There are responsibilities for the led horses -- but in many another battle, the killing or loss of horses didn't result in defeat. In fact, in the weeks that followed the Little Bighorn battle Crook's column ran their horses into the ground pursuing the indians and wound up eating many of them. In Army history, this is called "The Horsemeat March."

On the other hand, both the Zulus at Isandhlwana and the NAs at Greasy Grass performed at their best given their particular circumstances. Both used terrain to mask movement and for cover (largely unavailable at Rorke's Drift).

True at the Little Bighorn, but not so true at Isandlewana. British cavlary picked up the approaching Zulus while they were a good hour from the battlefield. But the British failed to react to that news -- apparently assuming the Zulus would merely "shadow" them.

Custer had all sorts of problems in his unit. Some of these were exacerbated by and during the march/movement to the battle site, some by his command decisions. He failed to properly interpret battlefield intel and so forth.

All true. He also had an inadequate second in command in Reno.

BTW, I doubt that the Bugler, commonly used as a courier, was as illiterate and lacking in English proficiency as he's been made out to be. I doubt that anyone including Custer would be so stupid as to use his least qualified communicators as message delivery systems!

The bugler (technically the trumpeter), John Martin (who remained in the Army and retired many years later) was truly almost totally deficient in English at that time. He was a trumpeter because of his musical ability, not because of his proficiency in English. He was with Custer as an orderly trumpeter -- assigned by a duty roster. He was actually a member of Company H (Benteen's company) and was with Custer that day by the luck of the draw.

He did not carry a verbal message -- Lieutenant W. W. Cook, the Acting Assistant Adjutant General, wrote the message down. It is possible that he was picked to carry the message because Custer (or Cook) thought that was all the service he could render in battle.

Benteen said that when Martin (or Martini) delivered the message, he tried to question him to get more information, but Martin couldn't understand his questions.

 

[telewinz]

Unlike the Indians against Custer, the Zulu warriors at Rorke's Drift were on foot and the British troops, barricaded. For the most part Custer's men were eventually on foot and out in the open. Totally different ballgame and comparison. The Spencer could have changed the day, something the Springfield or Martini Henry couldn't. At Isandhlwana a major cause for the Brits defeat was their quartermaster corp. Ammo supply was restricted to ONLY soldiers of that unit! It was a case where Pvt. Jones (needing more ammo) of the 2nd company was denied ammo from the supply sergeant of the 3rd company! British supply regulations were soon changed after the dead were buried.

 

[telewinz]

Texas Rangers vs Charging Indians 1844

In May of 1844, Captain John Coffee "Jack" Hays acquired Colt Paterson five-shot revolvers and revolving rifles from the stores of the decommissioned Republic of Texas Navy. In June of 1844, the Texas Rangers and the Comanche fought a pivotal battle that forever changed the history of Indian warfare in the West.
After drilling his men in marksmanship, Hays fielded a company of 15 men who patrolled the area around Walker Creek northwest of San Antonio. They encountered a large raiding party. Instead of dismounting and finding a defensible location, the Rangers rode toward into the Comanches, attacking them on their flank. Wave after wave of Comanche warriors attacked the Rangers. Each time the warriors were repulsed, suffering heavy casualties. The war chief was perplexed by the Rangers' ability to continue firing without reloading after each shot. The five-shot revolver allowed the Rangers to fight an offensive war against the Comanche, increasing the firepower of each man by 300%. For the first time, a small detachment could successfully oppose a larger force.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

In June of 1844, the Texas Rangers and the Comanche fought a pivotal battle that forever changed the history of Indian warfare in the West.

This action, also called "Hays' Big Fight" revolutionized American cavalry tactics. When the Texas Rangers were absorbed into the US Army after Texas became a state in December, 1845, the demand for revolvers resulted in the "Walker Colts" (Named for Sam Walker, who collaborated with Colt.) The use of these revolvers in combat made a lasting impression on the US Army.

At a time when European Armies often fielded cavalry units armed ONLY with lances or sabres (giving them firearms might tempt them to misuse them) American cavalry had already realized the Arm Blanche was outclassed by gunpowder.

 

[telewinz]

The Battle of Beecher Island & the Spencer

The Battle of Beecher Island

On the 17th of September, 1869, was fought the hardest battle between the white men and the plains Indians in the annals of the West. It was fought on the Arickaree fork of the Republican River, a few miles from the southwest corner of Nebraska and not far from the present town of Wray, Colorado, on the Denver line of the Burlington road. Fifty-one scouts and frontiersmen under the command of Lieutenant George A. Forsyth stood off, on a little sandbar in the river, the combined forces of the Northern Cheyennes, Arapahos and Oglala Sioux for nine days. The scouts were armed with a new gun, the Spencer Seven-shooter Carbine. As daylight broke, Grover, the head scout, exclaimed, "Look at the Indians!" The hills on both sides of the little valley swarmed with them. None of the scouts had ever before seen so many hostile Indians in one body. General Custer said that the Arickaree fight was the greatest battle on the plains.

Wagon teamsters in Indian country after the Civil War preferred the Spencer. They needed rapid fire self defense as they were all too frequently traveling alone. And they had the wagon to carry all the ammunition they wanted.The Spencer was the most advanced shoulder fired longarm of its time. In action, the firepower could be devastating. A cartridge box was invented by Blakeslee to carry Spencer ammunition and hasten reloading. It held seven tubes of seven cartridges each to quickly slide one tube at a time into the gun. The Blakeslee box looks good in theory but was bulky. It bounced around and got in the way when in action or while running as they hadn’t then figured out how to hold such containers firmly to the soldier’s body. The soldiers could shoot out all the ammunition they could carry nearly as quickly when carrying ammunition as issued in bulk without the hassle of preloading the tubes of the unwieldy Blakeslee cartridge box. The Spencer used the first self-contained metallic cartridge powerful enough for regular military use. The standard Spencer cartridge is called the 56-56 being named for having the same size at the front end and back end of the copper cartridge case. It fired a 52 caliber bullet with a muzzle energy of 1125 foot pounds. An experienced man could shoot all seven shots in about fifteen seconds.
The 50 caliber Spencer went on to develop an enviable reputation on the frontier. This in spite of the fact that the round was under powered for the wide open west, even when it was first introduced. Spencers were the standard issue weapon of mounted troops for a decade after 1865, with few exceptions. Their firepower saved the day in many actions. When it came to a close fight, such as Beecher's Island in eastern Colorado, the repeaters were hard to beat. In a cost cutting move, they were finally superseded by the single shot Model 1873 Springfield carbine. The changeover started late in 1874, five years after the Spencer company went out of business. Some units were equipped with Spencers well into 1876. They continued to be issued to teamsters and settlers well after their departure from front line service. Westerners prized them as a handy saddle gun. Many were in use as late as the turn of the century. Their cartridges were loaded commercially at least through 1919. The best advantage of a Spencer is the outstanding accuracy of these arms. The author's M-1868 carbine has produced 1 1/4 " groups at 100 yards. One particular M-1865 rifle shot a 2 1/4 " group the first time it was fired this century, and using the magazine, which tends to dent the bullet noses.

 

[Malamute]

I'd like to throw out a thought.

I've also been to the Custer battelfield several times. In listening to the information that was offered by the guide, and looking at the country, it occured to me that the outcome would have been much different had Reno and Benteen actually followed orders and engaged the village in a coordinated attack from 3 sides. This was was the original plan, but Reno DISMOUNTED at the edge of the village when he encountered light resistance, rather than riding through it in a cavalry attack, and Benteen claimed to be unable to reach his side (south side of the village) to attack, because of rough country. The Indians, after stopping Reno, were able to marshall forces to help repel Custer as he attempted to cross the river, and the whole village was then alerted to what was going on. My thought upon seeing the battlefield, and understanding the original plan, was that the plan was actually workable, had all parties followed through with their part. Outnumbered? Yes. But a cavalry attack on a village that was not expecting it had worked before. I understood this was one reason they pushed so hard to get to the village over such a long distance, they were not expected, and wanted to keep the advantage.

Not to prop up Custer's character, but standing on the ground, I felt that the plan was realistic.

I also found it to be an eerie expeience to be there and see all the grave markers strung up the hills.

 

[Jim K]

I don't want to belabor the point about the Spencer carbine, but in my limited experience, they weren't all that reliable. A main problem was extraction and ejection if the lever wasn't worked smartly and consistently. In limited firing with a Civil War carbine in near-new condition, and fairly late ammo (1880's), I was seldom able to fire a full magazine without some kind of hangup (not counting some mis-fires). Also, the Spencer is not as fast as the Henry or Winchester. The shooter needs to work the action to load, then cock the hammer manually. A good man with a trapdoor can be almost as fast. I do think there is little doubt that the Martini-Henry was the best and fastest rifle of the single shot era. Its main problem in the early days was ammunition; even the copper Benet primed U.S. ammo was superior to the coiled brass of the Boxer ammo used in the M-H.

In a large engagement, some weapon failures are expected and pose no significant problem. In addition, many Spencer users undoubtedly accepted some problems in order to have the extra firepower over single shot arms. The Henry was more reliable, but the cartridge was so weak as to be almost a joke, while the Spencer round was reasonably powerful (though not as powerful as the .45-55 and .45-70 ammunition used by the army).

Jim

 

[Vern Humphrey]

it occured to me that the outcome would have been much different had Reno and Benteen actually followed orders and engaged the village in a coordinated attack from 3 sides. This was was the original plan,

Reno was ordered to attack, but Benteen was not. He was send out to the left (South) flank with orders to "pitch into anything he might find." He was not given orders that limited his march, nor told what to do if he found nothing. If Benteen had simply continued on, he would have been going AWAY from the Sioux village, not toward it. Benteen on his own initiative gave up that march, and "right obliqued" as he put it, to reach the regiment's trail. Had he not done that, he would never have arrived at Reno's Ridge in time to consolidate that position.

At the court of enquiry, Benteen testified that if there was a plan, he was not told of it. "When I received my orders from Custer to separate myself from the command, I had no instructions to unite with Reno or anyone else. There ws no plan at all . . ."

"If there had been a plan of battle, enough of that plan would have been communicated to me so that I would have known what to do under certain circumstances. Not having done that, I do not believe there was any plan. In General Custer's mind there was a belief that there were no Indians and no village. I do not know, except that I was sent off to hunt up some Indians. I was to pitch into them and let him know. And if I had found them, the distance was so great that we would have been wiped out before he could get to us."

Other officers backed him up -- Reno testified "There was no plan communicated to us." Lieutenant Wallace testified "When we crossed, Custer must have been to our right and rear; Benteen to our left and rear, but we knew nothing about his orders and expected no assistance from him" (Luckily, they got assistance from Benteen.)

but Reno DISMOUNTED at the edge of the village when he encountered light resistance, rather than riding through it in a cavalry attack, and Benteen claimed to be unable to reach his side (south side of the village) to attack, because of rough country.

The first part is true, the second part is not -- as I pointed out, Benteen had no orders to attack THAT village. Had he continued going in the direction Custer sent him, he would have been far away from the actual village.

The "Bring Pacs" message is the only evidence we have of Custer intending Benteen to join in -- and that message simply says:

"Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. (signed W.W. Cooke, AAAJ) P.S. Bring pacs."

The Indians, after stopping Reno, were able to marshall forces to help repel Custer as he attempted to cross the river, and the whole village was then alerted to what was going on.

That is true -- but so far as we can tell, there was no possibility of Reno and Custer cooperating. Reno's action came too early, Custer's too late. Very likely, if Reno had charged the village, it would simply have swallowed him, and dealt with Custer in turn.

 

[Malamute]

I'm basing my comments on the information from the Battlefield tour and museum. It is different from what you have said, but I am not necesarily saying one or the other version is correct. I simply haven't researched it in depth. The tour guide stated Reno had orders to charge the village, and Benteen was supposed to take some action from the south, tho perhaps it was not as well defined of an "action" as I recall. They did say that Reno denied having any particular orders, tho that seems odd.

Interesting discussion in any event.

 

[dpesec]

Malamute

I've been following this thread. I've never been to the site. But I know I'd feel spooked. Bad vibes etc.
I know there have been several scientific expeditations to the site. From what I remember these tend to back up the account that there was total chaos at the site. There was no command and control which lead some individuals to believe that Custer was wounded or killed early on.

Either way let's face it, without additional ammo, the outcome would have been the same, just taken a bit longer. Custer engaged a clearly numerically superior force.

just my 2 cents

 

[Vern Humphrey]

I'm basing my comments on the information from the Battlefield tour and museum. It is different from what you have said, but I am not necesarily saying one or the other version is correct. I simply haven't researched it in depth. The tour guide stated Reno had orders to charge the village, and Benteen was supposed to take some action from the south, tho perhaps it was not as well defined of an "action" as I recall. They did say that Reno denied having any particular orders, tho that seems odd.

An excellent source book on the battle is "The Story of the Little Bighorn" by Col. W. A. Graham, The Century Company, New York, 1926. Graham personally knew some of the survivors, and he reproduces many critical documents -- including testimony before the Board of Inquiry.

Custer was in the habit of NOT communicating his plans to his subordinate. One officer who served as his AAAG testified that it was Custer's custom to tell him to send orders to company commanders, without explaining them.

A simple look at a good topographic map will show that Benteen could not have been ordered to attack the South side of the village -- he was marching away from the village, and only turned back toward the regiment's trail on his own initiative.

In addition, if he already had orders to attack, why the "Bring Pacs" message? He is emphatically told to bring the pack train -- hardly what a hard charging cavalry attack would require!