155mm question

[M109A6 Paladin]

Actually, the 10th MT Div, 82nd and 101st use the M119A1/A2 Towed Howitzers.

The 18th Airborne Corps uses the M198's. I was in the first Army unit to get them (Oct 78) before I got back to Bragg in Feb 79. I just came from 4 years on the M110A1 in Augsburg, Germany.

The M198s replaced the M114s, which I was on at Bragg before my tour in Germany.

I was the TACOM Armament LAR for the 82nd from '97-'99 before PCSing back to Germany in Feb 99. I met up with the 82nd guys again when I deployed to Kosovo in June 99.

I'm back at Rock Island as the Equipment Specialist for the M109A6 Paladin right now.

To answer the question on the 175mm tube splitting like a banana, no, that does not happen often. The tube was probably already cracked at the muzzle and through the counterbore to allow that to happen. Unless there was an in-bore explosion.

 

[M109A6 Paladin]

DB: Yeah I remember the imbiss at Graf. I participated in 18 field exercises there as well as 2 REFORGERs.

I think you're thinking Curry Wurst (on a bun), not Curry Schnitzel (that would be messy).

Oleg: A bore evecuator works a lot like a one way valve and sucks (most of) the gasses out of the tube as the breech opens.

 

[Langenator]

I could swear that the TOE for a light/airborne/air assault division has a battalion of 155mms in general support. Heavy divisions have the MLRS in the same role. Usually under the direct control of the division commander or used in the counterbattery role. The three battalions of 105mms (Paladin 155s in the heavies) in the light divisions are direct support, and are usually OPCON to one of the maneuver brigades.

I forgot about the XVIIIth Corps artillery units.

 

[M109A6 Paladin]

The 82nd has only M119s. There are no (active) Paladins at Bragg, (unless you count the NG).

The unit I used to belong to at Bragg (1973-74) was 1/82nd FA was M114s, but now they are at Hood and have Paladins.

Correct, the General Support would come from Corps, not Division (they like to be self-sufficient).

 

[Preacherman]

I still can't figure out why the USA has never bothered to develop truly long-range 155mm. artillery, as has been done by many other countries (Austria, China, South Africa, etc.). In South African service, I frequently encountered G5 and G6 artillery (mostly the towed G5 - the self-propelled G6 only came into service in the late 1980's, at the end of our "wars" with Cubans, etc. in Angola, but the first three pre-production G6's were used in action). These guns had 45-caliber barrels, used base-bleed and (more recently) rocket-assisted projectiles, and significantly outranged anything used against us. With the base-bleed shell, the effective range was over 44,000 yards, and the RAP's extend this by another 11,000 yards or so. Even at such long ranges, the guns were very, very accurate: one could call in 25-meter corrections in windage and elevation. It was the G5's that kept the Cuban airfield at Cuito Cuanavale out of action for months during the 1987/88 engagements, from over 25 miles away.

An even longer-ranged system has been developed recently, with a 52-caliber barrel, with effective range claimed to be in excess of 54,000 yards.

For those interested, information on the G5 can be found here.

The G6 uses the same gun on a 6-wheeled highly mobile platform.

 

[M109A6 Paladin]

The USMCs requirement for a 155mm towed has to be somewhere under/around 8000-9500 lbs (I forget the exact requirement) so it can be transported by a Blackhawk.

How much do the other guns weigh?

 

[Preacherman]

Yes, the G5 is waaaay heavier than that specification... over 30,000 pounds! However, that's with a really heavy chassis (designed to travel thousands of miles over African bush terrain, not just on roads), with an auxiliary power unit, and a bunch of other stuff. There's no reason in theory why the cannon part couldn't be mated to a much lighter chassis, without the bells and whistles, and come close to the US weight specification - although you'd lose a lot of the cross-country mobility and overall "toughness" of the system.

 

[Trebor]

Some people don't like to live near the firing point....

Better to live near the firing point than the impact zone.

 

[M109A6 Paladin]

"Better to live near the firing point than the impact zone".

Nice quote....

 

[IZinterrogator]

Better to live near the firing point than the impact zone.

Just ask the family in Gatesville, TX that one of our howitzer batteries shelled for about an hour back in 1999. They didn't seem too thrilled about it, especially since Fort Hood range control didn't believe them and therefore did not call for a check fire.

 

[Jeff White]

Langenator,
The light divisions have always had 105s in the DS role. 18th Airborne Corps has a Battalion of M198s (155mm Towed) in the GS role. When I retired, they had a battery at Bragg (GS to 82d), a battery at Campbell (GS to 101st) and a battery at Drum (GS to 10th Mountain). There were also several Corps level 198 battalions in the ARNG. Most of the ARNG battalions have been converted on paper to provisional MP units and their artillerymen are fighting on the ground in Iraq or guarding bases in CONUS and overseas.

Preacherman,
Crusader was to be our long range artillery. However the powers that be decided to cancel Crusader and cede the long range battle to the enemy. The last MOTE I saw showed many of the M198 unites being switched over to the truck mounted MLRS for long range fires.

IMHO one of the reasons the Apache helo battalions did so poorly in the mid intensity phase of OIF1 was because the powers that be refused to deploy sufficient GS and GS reinforcing artillery into theater (had to prove transfromation worked, what were a few American lives when it meant we could ultimately cut military jobs and transfer that money directly to United Defense Techonolgies, Boeing etc?...) and the Apaches were forced to fly into an ADA environment they were never designed to operate in. One of the main missions of those GS battalions was to shape the battlefield with long range fires, especially SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) missions.

Jeff

 

[Langenator]

Jeff-

I could swear the briefing the Redleg guys gave us at Benning back in 1996 had a GS battalion of 155s in each light division. That made DIVARTY 4 battalions-1 GS, 3 DS. Light divisions had towed 155s in GS with towed 105s in DS. Heavy divisions had MLRS as GS with Paladins for DS.

Looking around at various Army division sites, it looks to me like the heavies have kept their GS MLRS battalions, but the light guys haven't. Either that, or they became the arty battalions for the new BCTs.

 

[mons meg]

and jealous of Mons meg - I was HQ FDC in 5/14, stuck in the States, while he was bustin' caps in GW1.

Bustin' caps is right....to address the original question: IIRC our battery fired around 900 rounds total during the 3 day "push". WIth our 8 gun configuration, that's better than 100 rounds per gun in less than 72 hours, and almost all of those were 8 "red bag". Kinda makes you wonder about those "recommended limits". I mean, it's not like we had different "shifts" on the gun line....we were over TO on manpower, so they added more guns...

 

[mons meg]

Just ask the family in Gatesville, TX that one of our howitzer batteries shelled for about an hour back in 1999. They didn't seem too thrilled about it, especially since Fort Hood range control didn't believe them and therefore did not call for a check fire.

Is this an Army thing? In our unit (USMCR) the CO made it very clear that *anyone* can call a check fire, and if *anyone* did, *everyone* was to, well, CHECK FIRE. If you called the check fire in error, you were safe from any repercussions since we're not talking about MILES gear, you kinda have to train with the real thing in artillery.

 

[Jeff White]

The incident at Ft Hood involved an M109A6 unit that laid digitally 3200 mils out. They were firing HE under ILLUM. Somehow they fired 12 rounds (don't remember how many were HE) that impacted near a ranch house off post. When the property owners called Ft Hood and were put through to range control, they were told that they would "look into it".

I never was in a Paladin unit and I guess they didn't have triple safety checks. It seems the Chief of Firing Battery or even the section chief could have disnounted and checked the azimuth of fire with an M2 compass and caught the error before they ever fired one round....Of course we all know that digital is better

Jeff

 

[mons meg]

The incident at Ft Hood involved an M109A6 unit that laid digitally 3200 mils out

Ah, I see. Im MY day... (hack, spit) we didn't have your fancy "digital" whatamadoo... we used an aiming circle. You know, survey equipment and a compass?

ok, ok....I did run the BCS (battery computer system) but everyone who came out of my FDC school spent more time on manual gunnery (protractor/slide rule) and survey than we did on the computerized fire control.


Did I ever mention that Ft. Sill had civilian accessible roads that cut between firing points and impact areas?

 

[pdt203]

We spent a lot of time on charts and darts, but I came out with BCS training.


Johnny Smith
"Advance Party UP!"

 

[Antjo]

As long as I can have one, I don't care.

 

[mons meg]

Johnny, you have a reply-PM!

 

[Langenator]

Did I ever mention that Ft. Sill had civilian accessible roads that cut between firing points and impact areas?

Ft Lewis had some of those as well. Not sure if that's still the case though...a lot of those roads were closed after 9/11.

 

[Dannyboy]

Did I ever mention that Ft. Sill had civilian accessible roads that cut between firing points and impact areas?

We were shooting RRPR rounds from Quanah Range into the West Range impact zone and we had a school bus drive down the highway splitting the two. Since it was a civilian road, we couldn't actually stop traffic. We could only advise motorists that we were shooting over the road. Some parents found out about the bus and FLIPPED!

 

[mons meg]

The reason I mentioned the civvie roads was that USMC regs at the time prohibited overhead fire of personnel even during a CAX (combined arms exercise). This was at 29 Palms, no less. We had to shoot on a parallel offset grid. So the whole school bus incident you mentioned just makes me shudder, knowing what can happen when someone gets lazy and doesn't cut the powder right.

 

[Bulldozer]

Preacherman -- those G5 and G6 guns were incredible to see!

The Renostir (G6 SP-155) has got to be one of the most intimidating mobile fire platforms out there.

 

[7677]

M109A6 Paladin,
Grafenwohr, Germany...those words bring back a lot of memories and nightmares about mud.

Jeff ,
My friend that is the Drill Sgt at Sill personally knew the guys who shot out and told me my about over a couple of cold ones while I was visiting him at Hood. He said section chief had no business being a section chief and the gun was pointed almost opposite direction (almost to the rear of the gun) as the rest of the gun line and they still fired. From what he told me the cause of the incident was because the section chief did not update the fire control computer after they left the previous firing point. My knowledge of the Paladin is limited as they were coming on line as I was getting out.

Antjo,
That howitzer is a one shot deal!

 

[Smoke Rizen]

175s

I can't believe there's no one else here from the 108th Gp. I served with the 8th & 4th. F.A. on several fire bases along the DMZ and Laosan border. All batterys were made up of 175 and 8" M-107 Tracked Howitzers. The 175 was an awsome gun! We had a Battery firing direct fire, over our heads by about a hundred yards, and impacting 2 kl m out. Best show I ever saw,and heard. I think that was the 1st.&39th. guys, never got a chance to thank them. If you listening.....Thanks. A good sight to see some history on these guns is at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/8-4-arty/