Open Carry, TX. style

Status
Not open for further replies.
Refering back to my last post and to steve4102's, whrn the dust settles and time comes to OC I will defer to TX/US Law Sheild regarding the property SOP for dealing with LE stops just to jaw with you concerning your open carry. I belive that having your CHL and DL on one side with operative statutes on the other side will go along way to defusing law enforcement interest in your existence...that and a Go-Pro or Shade-Cam.
 
Wrong answer, glock1978. U.S. Courts have held for years that the owners rights are absolute and until just recently, the bakery case, that was it. And even then, that was a case about sales vice trespassing.

They still side with the property owner in the right to carry. I may not agree with it but your argument holds no water.
 
Gonna be real interesting in Jan. when all the bottled up exhibitionism of the Texans can be released. I bet there will be plenty of people with their hair on fire over all the hardware that gets shown on the public streets. With 6 months for LEO to realize that TX is far from the first OC allowed state I doubt there will be much trouble from them, they should have it figured out by then.
Holster makers are going to be busy up until then though, gotta have them Barbecue Rigs by Christmas.
 
Glock1978 said:
very odd phenomenon indeed... Seems some want their 2A rights yet don't give a squat about property owners rights...


Well it depends. Does the property owner have it in writing on the deed that no crime shall happen on their premises or in transit to one's vehicle? If not then yes, my 2A and right to what is n my pants does trump property rights.
gun_with_a_view said:
CA being regarded as the legal trendsetter for the other forty-nine states, the Unruh Act bears some relevancy here:

http://www.pagunblog.com/2010/05/26/public-accommodation-laws-in-california/


A plethora of grass roots opinions on firearms in public accommodations:
http://www.reddit.com/r/progun/comments/1z9v8i/why_doesnt_the_public_accommodation_reasoning/
More of the usual blather and uninformed, uneducated opinions.

  1. Rights protected by the Constitution are essentially irrelevant when dealing with a non-governmental actor. As explained by the United States Supreme Court (Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc, 500 U.S. 614 (U. S. Supreme Court, 1991), emphasis added):
    ....The Constitution structures the National Government, confines its actions, and, in regard to certain individual liberties and other specified matters, confines the actions of the States. With a few exceptions, such as the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply to the actions of private entities. Tarkanian, supra, 488 U.S., at 191, 109 S.Ct., at 461; Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law" and "avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). One great object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law. ....

  2. In general, discrimination is not illegal. You do it all the time. Every time you decide to shop in this store rather than that, you have discriminated. Every time you decide to buy this rather than that, you have discriminated.

  3. Businesses discriminate all the time too, and legally. Apple stores discriminate against people who want to buy a PC by only selling Apple computers. Many restaurant discriminate against Orthodox Jews or Muslims by not strictly following the dietary laws of those religions. Many restaurants also discriminate against persons not wearing shirts and/or shoes by not admitting them. Tiffany discriminates against poor people in the prices they charge. Businesses also discriminate whenever they hire one person instead of another who has applied for the job.

  4. Discrimination is merely choosing one thing over another or rejecting a possible choice. Discrimination is the very essence of freedom and private property. It is the right to choose. It is the right to exclude. It is the right to decide how you want to use your property.

  5. Discrimination is perfectly legal, unless some law makes it illegal. There are laws that make discrimination illegal on various, specifically identified and defined bases, illegal -- at least if you're a business open to the public or an employer or in some other specified category. In general, gun owners aren't a protected class, nor is having a gun generally an impermissible basis upon which a private business might discriminate.

  6. So in general a person or business may lawfully bar persons carrying guns from the premises.
 
Last edited:
Unfortunately, the next fact was conveniently excluded:

10. To implement these principles, courts must consider from time to time where the governmental sphere ends and the private sphere begins. Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints. This is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the "essential dichotomy" between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant constitutional obligations. Moose Lodge, supra, 407 U.S., at 172, 92 S.Ct., at 1971.
http://openjurist.org/500/us/614/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-company-inc
 
gun_with_a_view said:
Unfortunately, the next fact was conveniently excluded:

10. To implement these principles, courts must consider from time to time where the governmental sphere ends and the private sphere begins. Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints. This is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the "essential dichotomy" between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant constitutional obligations. Moose Lodge, supra, 407 U.S., at 172, 92 S.Ct., at 1971.
http://openjurist.org/500/us/614/edmonson-v-leesville-concrete-company-inc
However, your reliance on that quote illustrates the old adage, "A little knowledge is a dangerous thing." You don't understand the case or the context in which this issue arises, or, indeed, what is actually going on. You don't understand how to read and apply a court decision.

As the Court stated in Edmonson (500 U. S. 614, at 616):
We must decide in the case before us whether a private litigant in a civil case may use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race....
So the issue being framed by the Court is where private conduct (outside the purview of the Constitution) ends and governmental conduct (subject to the Constitution) begins. And the question arises in the context of the selection of persons who will serve as jurors in a civil trial.

So the Court in Edmonson begins to look at the established framework for a state action analysis (Edmonson, at 620):
...We begin our discussion within the framework for state action analysis set forth in Lugar, supra, 457 U.S., at 937, 102 S.Ct., at 2753-54. There we considered the state action question in the context of a due process challenge to a State's procedure allowing private parties to obtain prejudgment attachments. We asked first whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority, 457 U.S., at 939-941, 102 S.Ct., at 2754-2756; and second, whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor, id., at 941-942, 102 S.Ct., at 2755-2756.

There can be no question that the first part of the Lugar inquiry is satisfied here. By their very nature, peremptory challenges have no significance outside a court of law. Their sole purpose is to permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact. While we have recognized the value of peremptory challenges in this regard, particularly in the criminal context, see Batson, 476 U.S., at 98-99, 106 S.Ct., at 1723-1724, there is no constitutional obligation to allow them. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586, 40 S.Ct. 28, 29-30, 63 L.Ed. 1154 (1919). Peremptory challenges are permitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury. ....

That is only the beginning of the analysis. If you wish to contend that a private business excluding persons carrying guns is "state action", you would need to be able to successfully apply the entire "state action" framework to those essentially private actions. Good luck. Indeed state actions is a rare result.

Let's look at some cases to get a sense of how a “state action” analysis plays out:

  • Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946)

    • The result in Marsh is clearly attributable to the unique public character of the "private" property.

    • As described by the Court (326 U.S. 501, at 502 to 503):
      ...The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that it has all the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the business block and the United States uses one of the places as a post office from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area. The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can not be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and according to all indications the residents use the business block as their regular shopping center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company-owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business block and upon arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there. In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation. ...

    • And as later noted by the Court, the private corporation was assuming a quasi government role (326 U.S. 501, at 509, emphasis added):
      ...the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute....

    • And in any case, the issue in Marsh was not the liability of a private actor. It was the power of the State of Alabama. As the Court describes the issue (326 U.S. 501, at 502):
      ... In this case we are asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town's management....

  • Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc, 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968)

    • A major factor in Logan Valley was the quasi public character of the the property, a large shopping center filling the social role of a municipal business district. As the Court put it (391 U. S. 308, at 317 – 318, footnotes omitted):
      ...The perimeter of Logan Valley Mall is a little less than 1.1 miles. Inside the mall were situated, at the time of trial, two substantial commercial enterprises with numerous others soon to follow. Immediately adjacent to the mall are two roads, one of which is a heavily traveled state highway and from both of which lead entrances directly into the mall. Adjoining the buildings in the middle of the mall are sidewalks for the use of pedestrians going to and from their cars and from building to building. In the parking areas, roadways for the use of vehicular traffic entering and leaving the mall are clearly marked out. The general public has unrestricted access to the mall property. The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the business district...

    • But a further factor in Logan Valley is that the picketing (which the defendants asserted constituted the trespass) related to one particular store in the shopping center (391 U. S. 308, at 321 - 322):
      ...Petitioners' picketing was directed solely at one establishment within the shopping center. The berms surrounding the center are from 350 to 500 feet away from the Weis store....

      1. Clearly the fact that the picketing was directly related to a business in the shopping center was material. Subsequent to Logan Valley, in Lloyd Corporation, Ltd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972) the Court upheld the right of a large, privately owned shopping center to prohibit the distribution of handbills. In Lloyd, the Court distinguished Marsh and Logan Valley thusly (407 U.S. 551, at 551):
        ...The facts in this case are significantly different from those in Marsh, supra, which involved a company town with 'all the attributes' of a municipality, and Logan Valley, supra, which involved labor picketing designed to convey a message to patrons of a particular store, so located in the center of a large private enclave as to preclude other reasonable access to store patrons. Under the circumstances present in this case, where the handbilling was unrelated to any activity within the center and where respondents had adequate alternative means of communication, the courts below erred in holding those decisions controlling. ...

        • The Court further noted in Lloyd (407 U.S. 551, at 561 - 562, footnotes omitted):
          ...Logan Valley was decided on the basis of this factual situation, and the facts in this case are significantly different. II The courts below considered the critical inquiry to be whether Lloyd Center was 'the functional equivalent of a public business district. This phrase was first used in Logan Valley, but its genesis was in Marsh. It is well to consider what Marsh actually decided. As noted above, it involved an economic anomaly of the past, 'the company town.' One must have seen such towns to understand that 'functionally' they were no different from municipalities of comparable size. They developed primarily in the Deep South to meet economic conditions, especially those which existed following the Civil War. Impoverished States, and especially backward areas thereof, needed an influx of industry and capital. Corporations attracted to the area by natural resources and abundant labor were willing to assume the role of local government. Quite literally, towns were built and operated by private capital with all of the customary services and utilities normally afforded by a municipal or state government:...

        • And so, as the Court ruled in Lloyd (407 U.S. 551, at 570):
          ...We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights....

      2. The Court then later, following Lloyd, further narrowed, Logan Valley in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 47 L.Ed.2d 196, 96 S.Ct. 1029 (1976) finding (424 U.S. 507, at 520 - 521):
        ...It conversely follows, therefore, that if the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment right to enter that shopping center distribute handbills concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a First Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe Co. ...

  • Let's look at Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966). The Court describes the circumstances as follows (382 U.S. 296, at 297, footnotes omitted):
    ...In 1911 United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, Georgia, a tract of land which, ... was to be used as 'a park and pleasure ground' for white people only, ...The will provided that the park should be under the control of a Board of Managers of seven persons, all of whom were to be white. The city kept the park segregated for some years but in time let Negroes use it, taking the position that the park was a public facility which it could not constitutionally manage and maintain on a segregated basis. Thereupon, individual members of the Board of Managers of the park brought this suit in a state court against the City of Macon and the trustees of certain residuary beneficiaries of Senator Bacon's estate, asking that the city be removed as trustee...

    Ultimately, the City resigned as trustee, and private individuals were substituted. But nonetheless the Court ruled that the park could not be operated on a segregated basis. In support of the conclusion the Court noted (382 U.S. 296, at 301):
    ...For years it was an integral part of the City of Macon's activities. From the pleadings we assume it was swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained by the city as a public facility for whites only, as well as granted tax exemption under Ga.Code Ann. § 92—201. The momentum it acquired as a public facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of 'private' trustees. So far as this record shows, there has been no change in municipal maintenance and concern over this facility. Whether these public characteristics will in time be dissipated is wholly conjectural. If the municipality remains entwined in the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment just as the private utility in Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068, remained subject to the Fifth Amendment because of the surveillance which federal agencies had over its affairs. We only hold that where the tradition of municipal control had become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector. ...

  • In Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). There were particular reasons that the Athletic Association was treated as a state actor. As the Court described the situation (emphasis added):
    ...The association in question here includes most public schools located within the State, acts through their representatives, draws its officers from them, is largely funded by their dues and income received in their stead, and has historically been seen to regulate in lieu of the State Board of Education's exercise of its own authority. We hold that the association's regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association, there being no offsetting reason to see the association's acts in any other way....

These cases don't really involve a private party being subject to constitutional strictures as much as they involve the unique character or circumstance being such that one is no longer purely a private party. Fred's Shoe Repair putting up a "no guns" sign (or, in Texas, a 30.06 sign) just doesn't fit.
 
"Discrimination is perfectly legal, unless some law makes it illegal."

If you think about it, the nature of intelligence is itself discrimination, and the purpose of these laws and social pressures is to shut off certain thought paths assumed to be inherently destructive. Not too hard to see how the concept can be both abused and highly addicting to the users.

TCB
 
calaverasslim said:
Thanks, Frank. Clear as mud...
Well the path and back-story is complicated. But maybe I can simplify the bottom line.

The Constitution does not regulate private conduct. However, there are rare situations in which, because of complicated characteristics, private conduct crosses a line and becomes governmental or quasi-governmental and subject to the Constitution. For this to happen is extraordinary. The only way to know it this exception to the general rules applies is to thoroughly analyze the situation under applicable case law.

Those exception situations seldom happen, and it's best not to count on getting around the usual rule.
 
Frank
You forgot to include the "lol" from my original post.Maybe I should have specifically put in a disclaimer that my comment was tongue in cheek.

In actuality, I was making a blind reference to the Open Carry Texas folks actually showing up enmass during the busy South by Southwest music festival carrying their longarms, much to the consternation of the local law enforcement. While I don't think that "poking the bear" is the best technique to support OC, their actions are a harbinger of things to come, especially here in Austin, given Chief Acevedo's opinion on the subject. After all he was recruited from California. LOL, wink wink
 
Last edited:
So much angst!

We poor ignorant folk in Erath County hardly notice all the hooraw. Pretty certain there'll be no parades here and don't envision a convoy heading down to Austin either.
 
Several of the OCT members are unable to obtain a CHL due to misdemeanor convictions, so they probably won't be taking advantage of the law change anytime soon.
 
Not to change the direction of this thread, but how long before the gov signs off on this bill? I won't consider it a done deal until that happens.
 
Signing is supposedly scheduled for June 11, but unless it is vetoed (not likely) the bill becomes law with or without his signature, 10 days after passage.
 
Anybody wanna buy a belt buckle that will cc a GLOCK 21?:D

Maybe an open carry day at an inviting restaurant around the first of the year would be fun.

It would probably be a big revenue day for such a restaurant.:cool:
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top