aimed rifle fire by infantry?

[Zigokubasi]

Thanks Chieftan, I don't think you're rambling at all. I've never heard that anecdote about Korea, but I'm looking for a mention of it on the 'net. I wouldn't be suprised, as that seems to be the result you'd see given the conditions in Korea. From what I've seen, the terrain was very open and mountainous. Accurate, long range rifle marksmanship should pay off in that situation. However, on the flip side of that coin, there is some evidence that the Germans undertook a study in Stalingrad where an entire unit was equipped with StG-44's, and their effectiveness was compared to a normal unit equipped with Kar-98's and two MG-42's. Traditional German small unit doctrine breaks down in built-up areas, and rather than acting as support for the MGs, those bolt-action rifle armed soldiers found themselves doing as much of the fighting as the machinegunners. In that kind of situation, the fluid dynamics of the Stg-44 armed unit, as well as the shock value of that much close-in firepower, showed that unit to be much more capable in urban combat. But that's all from some vague story I read somewhere on the history of the Mp43/44, so it may or may not be true as well...

Still, even with an StG-44 I'd rather aim than not - barring only those few exceptions mentioned so far (assault, close-in, breaking contact)....

 

[Distant Observer]

I have thought about this topic and most of these posts confirm my thoughts. I would love to hear from someone with real experience if my thoughts below are accurate.

Aimed fire is ideal. Accuracy of aimed fire is inversely proportional to stress of the firer. Thus the most accurate fire is from a sniper who is initiating the contact and can take his time and calmly aim and fire. Suppression fire is specifically designed to increase the stress of the enemy and reduce his ability to return with aimed fire. Suppression fire is generally not aimed and can vary from just firing so the noise lets the enemy know they are being fired at to targeting known enemy positions even if their cover might conceal them. The effectiveness of suppressive fire will vary based on the experience of the target and how accurate the fire is. The more experienced soldier will understand the danger of effective suppressive fire by seeing the rounds hit the nearby ground or sound of the bullets passing through the air.

My assumption is that aimed fire occurs rarely on the battle field because it is so lethal. Any soldier who is being fired at by an enemy that has clear non-moving target and is not being distracted by opposing fire, that soldier will have a very short life span.

I hear accounts from Iraq of fire fights that take hours. These must consist of lots of low accuracy fire at long ranges while each side tries to maneuver for an attack from an unopposed direction and probably end when supporting fire such as air or artillery make it too dangerous to stay.
Let be clear I have no actual experience and thoughts above are based on reading and watching documentaries on TV. I would love to hear someone with real experience validate or contradict the thoughts above.

 

[GunTech]

The average rifleman cannot engage targets beyound 500 meters. This is
primarily due to the fact that he cannot see the target because of
intervening terrain, camouflage, etc. Even if the soldier is capable of
shooting at longer ranges in formal marksmanship training. But it gets
even worse.

The majority of rifle fire is at 300 meters or less. 70% is at 100
meters or less, irrespective of terrain. This has been borne out in
Iraq, where most infantry rifle fire is in urban environments.

Firther, targets typically expose themselves for very short times. This
is the very reason the German army first adopted high cyclic rate MGs
and later the assault rifle.

The analysis in the Hitchman report ("Operational Requirements for an
Infantry Hand Weapon") contains some even more interesting material.
Contrary to legent, aimed fire has almost no effect on the production of
casualties. It is worth remenbering that Hitchman's data was from
actual combat, not armchair commandos.


"...rifle fire and its effects were deficient in some military
respects...in combat, hits from bullets are incurred by the body at
random:..the same as for fragment missiles which..are not 'aimed.

..Exposure was the chief factor...aimed or directed fire does not
influence the manner in which hts are sustained...[Despite] evidence of
prodigious rifle fire ammunition expenditure per hit,..the comparison of
hits from bullets with those of fragments shows that the rifle bullet is
not actually better directed towards vulnerable parts of the body."

Further, during the ACR trials of the 1980s, soldiers were exposed to scenarios as much like combat conditions as possible. Soldiers fired at moving, partially exposed targets at unknown distances while being exposed to distractions such as artillery simulators, whistles and the like, and were given intermitted periods of exercise to simulate movement during combat.

Not surprisingly, the ability to engage targets effectively dropped to nearly nil, even for 'expert riflemen'.

The good news is that the increase of the use of suppressive fire has lead to a decrease in friendly casualties. Fire suppression works.

 

[RedLion]

I think the most important thing to remember is that in either case, long range or close range firepower, the enemy is as smart as you are and will try to negate your advantages and enhance their own. If you have long range capabilities, the enemy will sit and wait for you like the VC did in Vietnam. if you have close range capabilities the enemy will sit a long way off and engage you from distance like the Afghans in the soviet Afghan war.

 

[everallm]

The good news is that the increase of the use of suppressive fire has lead to a decrease in friendly casualties. Fire suppression works.

It has also led to an increase in Blue on Blue casualties and Blue on Civ deaths. There have been an ever increasing number of "friendly fire" (which aint) as this methodology leads to a mentality of "recce by firepower"

Oh and before we get the usual questions as to veracity, the attached are the results from a simple Google search.

http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5jWGCubkdkMM3y8hTVh.R9oPKXkERQ
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/may/28/tillman-son-was-political-pawn/
http://www.bournemouthecho.co.uk/di...ed_security_after_friendly_fire_cd_leaked.php
http://www.pjstar.com/news/x1192324038/HONORING-THE-FALLEN

Fire suppression does not work, EFFECTIVE fire suppression works but is generally and sadly lacking.

Unless the grunt on the ground has been trained to be effective, accurate and aimed the end result is the immediate escalation to massive overkill.

This may have been perfectly appropriate if we were still fighting the Cold War scenarios of the ravening "Red Horde" pouring through the Fulda Gap but is doomed to failure in the current urban warfare environments.

As has been seen with the current move in theater to the M14 and 50 cal sniper issuance, effective, aimed fire leads to greater effectiveness.

 

[Limeyfellow]

Actually, it was carrier based aviation that allowed the withdrawal to happen.

MacArthur was flat-out told that the only hope American troops had was for the weather to hold well enough to allow flight operations. If the weather closed in and flying was impossible, it was very likely that the Chinese would complete the encirclement of the American units.

My uncle was with an Army Signal Corps unit that was pulling back at the same time. He said the sweetest sound in the morning were the Corsairs coming in with rockets and Napalm to hit the Chinese on the hills alongside the route south.

That about describes it. My wife's uncle was in the Marines and was part of the fight and he admit claims that it was the aircraft support that allowed any of them to get out. Unfortantly he passed away this weekend, and he never did like to talk about it much, as such combat leaves many a man scarred.

 

[GunTech]

Again, more accurate weapons, or longer ranged ones, don't address issues of time and exposure of targets. You can't hit what you can't see, or what is obscured by cover.

And what was addressed generic infantry combat, which is quite different from counter insurgency operations where legitimate targets cannot be distinguished from civilians.

No weapon system is going to fix that problem.

Certainly, friendly fire casualties happen. But the cited stories in no way link the use of fire suppression with friendly fire.

The point in suppressive fire is to both render the enemies fire less effective, and to fix their location so that they can be engaged.

Hitchman's data was based on the evaluation of mass numbers of casualties and engagements, and further validated by reports collected during Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli was and other modern operations, as well as being confirmed during the ACR evaluations.

Aimed fire is a dearly held concept within the American shooting community that isn't borne out in actual combat, according to data collected. The SPIW, ACR and OICW programs were built around this very fact. The Army is not trying to build more accurate rifles. It is looking at systems that compensate for the failure of the man-rifle interface, starting with salvo fire and now looking at computer controlled airbursting ammunition.

BTW, the M-14 is an intrinsically less accurate system than the M16. US military acceptance standards for the M-14 was 5.5 inches at 100 yards - an many contract rifles could not meet this standard. DMR rifles are typically more accurate, but they cannot compete with the M-16 platform, which is why the latter rifle dominates service rifle competitions.

7.62x51 does have better range and barrier penetration, and all rifles benefit from the use of optical sights - probably the biggest upgrade to military small arms in the last 25 years. Typical engagement ranges in current CI operations are such that the extended range capabilities of 7.62x51 systems are not even necessary in the vast majority of actions.

Finally, it is illuminating to look at the ammunition usage stats for current ME operations. Vast numbers of rounds are being expended in relatively minor operations, with hit probabilities well under 1%. However Friendly casualties, while never welcome, remain quite low.

 

[For Freedom]

BTW, the M-14 is an intrinsically less accurate system than the M16. US military acceptance standards for the M-14 was 5.5 inches at 100 yards - an many contract rifles could not meet this standard. DMR rifles are typically more accurate, but they cannot compete with the M-16 platform, which is why the latter rifle dominates service rifle competitions.

"While a five shot group of 5.6 " at 100 yards may not seem terribly accurate, this includes
the inaccuracy of the M80 ball ammunition factored in. The Boston Ordnance District was
responsible for final acceptance of M14 rifles manufactured by Harrington & Richardson
and Winchester. By Fiscal Year 1962, it had conducted a study into the factory accuracy
testing rejection rate of M14 rifles. 2 The Boston Ordnance District discovered that the
M80 ball ammunition of itself had an average spread of 3.57 " at 100 yards within every
ninety rounds fired. Ammunition inconsistency aside, a rack grade M14 type rifle is
accurate for a battle rifle when properly assembled."

-Lee Emerson

 

[chieftain]

Again, more accurate weapons, or longer ranged ones, don't address issues of time and exposure of targets. You can't hit what you can't see, or what is obscured by cover.

Unless your weapon can penetrate that cover. Then you increase the exposure and time to hit the target. These are the types of "real combat" facts that these eggheads don't include in their studies.

And what was addressed generic infantry combat, which is quite different from counter insurgency operations where legitimate targets cannot be distinguished from civilians.

No weapon system is going to fix that problem.

Certainly, friendly fire casualties happen. But the cited stories in no way link the use of fire suppression with friendly fire.

Certainly don't. That is the problem. When your dogma is suppressive fire without the benefit of aimed fire, you shoot first not time taken to 'aim' to decide if you have a blue on blue situation. But because suppressive fire is about tactics, it is tactics that must reduce and attempt to limit blue on blue incidents. Aimed fire in fact reduces those type incidents. It's amazing what happens when your riflemen actually look at and ID the target.

Like the Marines in Fallujah, they start making a large number of head shots. Now I have a lot of combat experience, and I don't call that suppressive fire, that is aimed fire. For one example.

The point in suppressive fire is to both render the enemies fire less effective, and to fix their location so that they can be engaged.

Yup, it is one tactic of many available to the infantry commander.

Hitchman's data was based on the evaluation of mass numbers of casualties and engagements, and further validated by reports collected during Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli was and other modern operations, as well as being confirmed during the ACR evaluations.

And he made many wrong assessments and conclusions.

Aimed fire is a dearly held concept within the American shooting community that isn't borne out in actual combat, according to data collected. The SPIW, ACR and OICW programs were built around this very fact. The Army is not trying to build more accurate rifles. It is looking at systems that compensate for the failure of the man-rifle interface, starting with salvo fire and now looking at computer controlled airbursting ammunition.

BTW, the M-14 is an intrinsically less accurate system than the M16. US military acceptance standards for the M-14 was 5.5 inches at 100 yards - an many contract rifles could not meet this standard. DMR rifles are typically more accurate, but they cannot compete with the M-16 platform, which is why the latter rifle dominates service rifle competitions.

7.62x51 does have better range and barrier penetration, and all rifles benefit from the use of optical sights - probably the biggest upgrade to military small arms in the last 25 years. Typical engagement ranges in current CI operations are such that the extended range capabilities of 7.62x51 systems are not even necessary in the vast majority of actions.

Okay, I have let you ramble. Now your own statements defeat your argument. If aimed fire is so ineffective, and unnecessary, why is the use of "optics" brought about such a big improvement? If aiming the weapon is not important anymore, why do we need all our new fangled optics to be effective. BIG disconnect, wouldn't you say?????

OPTICS ARE PRIMARILY USED FOR AIMED FIRE

Go figure.

Finally, it is illuminating to look at the ammunition usage stats for current ME operations. Vast numbers of rounds are being expended in relatively minor operations, with hit probabilities well under 1%. However Friendly casualties, while never welcome, remain quite low.

The reduction of Friendly fire can be attributed to the 'INCREASE' of the use of aimed fire by our troops. Sheesh!

Finally it is funny how none of these examples seem to be able to transfer to the Afghanistan theater of operations. Where aimed fire is even more effective, not less.

Once more go figure.

Fred

 

[PercyShelley]

Indeed, isn't Afghanistan another one of those environments, like San Juan Hill and the South African veldt that tends to reward a modicum of long-range small arms use? In addition, all those mountains and crummy roads can't be friendly to getting artillery and air support in the right place on time.

 

[dogngun]

In WWII, the US Army was in transition-going from the bolt action to the auto loading rifle, just beginning to understand ground support aircraft and modern troop mobility and movement.
In Vietnam, it was learning air mobility, small combat unit movement, and ,still,
close air support. We Vietnam-era soldiers were taught in basic to fire accurately up to 300 meters using the then new M-16.
In basic, we never even got to fire it in full auto.

IMO, everyone, infantryman, clerk, mechanic, cook, should be a skilled rifleman-you never know when you might need the skill.
My God, the Marines got it right!

mark
(Former 504 PIR Sp4)

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Studies done by the US Army after WW2 found that high percentages of troops never fired their weapons in combat.

That was SLA Marshall's "study," published as "Men Against Fire." He did a followup in Korea.

It has since been proven that he made his data up out of whole cloth.

 

[rdoggsilva]

We drilled with and fired the M1 in boot in the Coast Guard in the 60's. When I was sent to Nam, I boarded junks carrying a Thompson or a 1911. Most of the time both. And I qualified expert with both M1 and 1911. Still glad I was taught aim fire.

 

[GunTech]

One should keep in mind that there will be exceptions to any general case, and that studies like Hitchman's are general extractions from the analysis of millions of casualties.

Chieftain, you make allusions to errors by Hitchman, and yet you provide no cites. Please quote specific errors in "Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon" and cites for refutations.

I've seen lots of on-line criticism of the Hitchman report, but have yet to see one single specific refutation where an 'error' was quoted, and contradictory data was provided.

Is there a role for aimed fire? Certainly, particularly in specific situations. Hitchman was addressing wholesale ground combat, and noting that statistically speaking the effectiveness of of so called 'precision marksmanship' was not a significant factor in infantry ground combat.

The fact of the matter is that small arms in generally account for less that 1% of casualties on a modern mechanized battlefield, and it is precisely for this reason that little or no effort has been placed on small arms development in the last 50 years aside from generic projects like ACR and OICW which are little more than test bed projects with no goal of actually replacing small arms in the current inventory in any immediate time frame.

Projects like Salvo, SPIW, ACR and OICW have all validated Hitchman in that weapons that addressed the realities of modern infantry combat do lead to an increase in hit probability by introducing systems with multiple projectiles, or high rates of fire combined with intentional nutation of projectiles. ACR did partly achieve the goals of increased hit probability per target engagement. It just failed to produce the 100% improvement the Army was interested in. This was not a result of improved accuracy, but rather by using systems that compensated for the inability of the infantryman to accurately engage point targets while under the stress of combat.

Unfortunately, too many people who have done nothing more than shoot at known distance ranges assume that scenario is valid in infantry combat. There certainly are situations where that occurs, but they are highly limited. Shooting at unknown distances at people who are shooting back at you, while moving, in difficult terrain, where both the shooter and target are utilizing terrain and concealment, is a very, very different matter.

 

[GunTech]

SLAMs 'studies' are probably a combination of collected and fabricated material, and several knowledgeable sources have supported his contention, while many continue to oppose then - exactly what makes 'Men against fire' controversial.

Regardless of the veracity of SLAM, the it was the catalyst for the Army's adoption of operant conditioning for small arms training, and careful follow ups of the change in training method show that over 95% of infantrymen in engagements in Vietnam fired their weapons.

 

[GunTech]

Okay, I have let you ramble. Now your own statements defeat your argument. If aimed fire is so ineffective, and unnecessary, why is the use of "optics" brought about such a big improvement? If aiming the weapon is not important anymore, why do we need all our new fangled optics to be effective. BIG disconnect, wouldn't you say?????

OPTICS ARE PRIMARILY USED FOR AIMED FIRE

The primary reason cited by soldiers for not firing quoted in Hichman is that they couldn't see anything - i.e. identify a target. Optical sights make it easier to identify target and reduce the complexity of 'pointing'.

In highly asymmetric engagements, like sniping, Hitchman obviously does not apply. He was addressing mass infantry combat.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

SLAMs 'studies' are probably a combination of collected and fabricated material, and several knowledgeable sources have supported his contention, while many continue to oppose then - exactly what makes 'Men against fire' controversial.

But doesn't make it accurate.

Regardless of the veracity of SLAM, the it was the catalyst for the Army's adoption of operant conditioning for small arms training, and careful follow ups of the change in training method show that over 95% of infantrymen in engagements in Vietnam fired their weapons.

Which is a refutation of Marshall's theories. Viet Nam should have been a war where few soldiers fired, if Marshall was right.

 

[GunTech]

As a final comment, I don't think that anyone is really arguing that we should discard aiming, only that the effectiveness of aimed fire is overstated. The Soviets certainly adopted the principle of volume of fire over precision marksmanship, and that is clearly embodied in the inherent accuracy of the AK.

US thinking is still very much linked to the idea of the single, long range rifleman dominating the battlefield - an ideal perpetuated since the war for independence. But any serious scholar will be aware that the effectiveness of rifleman in even that war was rather minimal, and America's important victories in that war were won with regulation muskets and European tactics.

In modern war, it is combined arms and logistics that wins, and small arms of all stripes ultimately have little or no impact on battles.

The infantryman will certainly have a different view on the importance of the rifle, however.

 

[GunTech]

Vern

My point with regard to Marshal and Vietnam is that Marshall's critiques cause the US Army to change it's training methodologies and to adopt operant conditioning as opposed to traditional known range target shooting, and if (this is a huge 'if') Marshalls numbers - only 1 in 5 men actually fired their weapons in combat - were correct, the change in training techniques had a huge impact. Given that Marshall's numbers are suspect, we can't know for sure. People like Grossman contend there is a natural reluctance among soldiers to shoot other people, and we know that operant conditioning can be used to make people do things that they are reluctant to do.

However, while very interesting, all of this has little or nothing to do with 'aimed fire'.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

The changes made based on Marshall's theories were in the wrong direction. For example, "Trainfire" had, as you said, soldiers shooting at unknown distances at pop-up targets. But with inadequate grounding in marksmanship -- so the standards were dramatically degraded. Nor was the training any more "realistic" than KD firing.

Another problem introduced by Marshall's bogus study was the emphasis on automatic fire. At Fort Polk in '67 and '68, when I was an AIT company commander, we actually "qualified" troops with full auto fire!!

As a rifle company commander, I had a devil of a time breaking troops of the spray-and-pray mindset and teaching them real combat shooting.

 

[1911 guy]

Very limited experience

I have somewhat limited personal experience and haven't compiled data from years of study, so these are nothing more than personal observations.

I found that I seldom was able to identify anything/anyone past about four or five hundred yards. Unless they started shooting first, we never fired. The possibility of blue/blue casualties was high on our minds, as well as civilian casualties.

By the time someone with binoculars was able to make an I.D., targets at longer ranges were gone.

Volley fire works, but I'd personally define it as "everybody aim at the other guy, someone's bound to hit him", rather than mag dumps in the general direction.

Now a funny story, only because it happened on a simulator, not on a deployment. Movement was seen on the screen (FATS) and everybody opened up. We "killed" a bunch of nuns.

Not only can't you (sometimes) shoot what you can't see, there are times you aught not shoot. The modern battlefield isn't populated solely by combatants. Dead non-combatants makes for bad P.R. and over-compensation by those in charge, saddling you with even more insane requirements.

Sometimes we are the best marksmen in the conflict. Depends on who we're fighting. Somali street gangs? Yep. Trained, organized and equipped forces? Maybe not. I never saw a recovered AK that didn't have the sights cranked "all the way to 11". Seems they thought it made the bullet shoot harder/faster/whatever. Thankfully, I never had to trade shots with anyone even remotely trained. Bad luck, though, can be a S.O.B.

 

[chieftain]

One should keep in mind that there will be exceptions to any general case, and that studies like Hitchman's are general extractions from the analysis of millions of casualties.

SIGH! I am not talking about exceptions. In fact much of Hitchman's hypothesis and incorrect conclusion are due to his example being the exception.

Chieftain, you make allusions to errors by Hitchman, and yet you provide no cites. Please quote specific errors in "Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon" and cites for refutations.

I don't need cites for me to say he is wrong. Something like the experts stating that the Titanic is unsinkable. His conclusion is wrong.

I've seen lots of on-line criticism of the Hitchman report, but have yet to see one single specific refutation where an 'error' was quoted, and contradictory data was provided.

His conclusions are wrong. The believe me, the Titanic can sink.

Is there a role for aimed fire? Certainly, particularly in specific situations. Hitchman was addressing wholesale ground combat, and noting that statistically speaking the effectiveness of of so called 'precision marksmanship' was not a significant factor in infantry ground combat.

When was the last time we had Wholesale ground combat? World War II. Of course in your first paragraph you correctly state that there are exceptions. Where has there has been wholesale ground combat in the last 50 years involving US troops? The last time was in Korea, The Chinese Thanksgiving offensive of 1950 which included the Corps Chosin fight.

This yahoo, Hitchman is trying to justify why we shouldn't have used aimed fire in major mechanized battles of WW II. And a few scattered others since. THEY ARE IN FACT THE EXCEPTION!

The fact of the matter is that small arms in generally account for less that 1% of casualties on a modern mechanized battlefield, and it is precisely for this reason that little or no effort has been placed on small arms development in the last 50 years aside from generic projects like ACR and OICW which are little more than test bed projects with no goal of actually replacing small arms in the current inventory in any immediate time frame.

The numbers are simply untrue. Weapons other than small arms do deliver and inflict the most casualties. But those numbers are in the 88-90% (10-12% small arms) range, not 99%/1%. If you want the cite look it up. I ain't your secretary. Frankly in some modern conflicts it has run as high as 20%.

Projects like Salvo, SPIW, ACR and OICW have all validated Hitchman in that weapons that addressed the realities of modern infantry combat do lead to an increase in hit probability by introducing systems with multiple projectiles, or high rates of fire combined with intentional nutation of projectiles. ACR did partly achieve the goals of increased hit probability per target engagement. It just failed to produce the 100% improvement the Army was interested in. This was not a result of improved accuracy, but rather by using systems that compensated for the inability of the infantryman to accurately engage point targets while under the stress of combat.

The projects you cite, used Hitchman's incorrect conclusions to justify their ridiculous costs. It was rationalizations, not substantiation.

Unfortunately, too many people who have done nothing more than shoot at known distance ranges assume that scenario is valid in infantry combat. There certainly are situations where that occurs, but they are highly limited. Shooting at unknown distances at people who are shooting back at you, while moving, in difficult terrain, where both the shooter and target are utilizing terrain and concealment, is a very, very different matter.

I have certainly shot a lot of known range courses. I also have substantial combat experience. So just what is your point with this last statement?

If aimed fire is not effective, according to Hitchman and apparently you, why are we finding our guys so effective with the new combat optics, lasers, RedDots..etc?????

Why, because aimed fire does work. It will not create the large number of casualties that crew served and heavy weapons can accomplish. It will get a few more of our guys home alive, and hurry some T's to their meeting with 72 virgins at last count.

I know the damage these modern machines of war can deliver and inflict. I was a FAC. I was instrumental in the delivery of some of the most devastating conventional weapons in our arsenal at our time.

There aren't many Americans alive today that have ever been on the receiving end of a heavy and continuous heavy artillery bombardment. Not over hours, days, or weeks, a couple months. I am one of them.

I still believe in Aimed small arm's fire. I don't know many guys that have been in infantry ground combat that don't. Of course you have Hitchman and his conclusions.

Go figure.

Fred

 

[telomerase]

I'm sure all the SWORD robots are trained in aimed fire. Of course their successors will be aiming at us, but you can bet they will aim.

 

[M1911]

The point is, that the AKM guys would never live to get 75 yd. away.

That all depends upon the terrain, weather and time of day.

I have shot 600 yard matches with iron sights. Yes, I can hit the 10 ring at 600 yards.

Of course, when I did it I was prone. With a national match sling. The grass was short enough that it didn't block my field of vision. And the target wasn't moving. The target was a high-contrast black-on-white bull. And I had a spotting scope. Someone in the butts was pulling my target and marking my hits. While I was using an AR15, my AR15 had a bull barrel, match-grade 4 1/2 lb, two-stage trigger, and match sights. It was in the middle of the day. I had plenty of sleep the night before. I was using Federal Gold Match 69 gr rounds, loaded one at a time through the ejection port. And no one was shooting at me.

I strongly suspect that hitting a soldier wearing camo at 600 yards with an M4 off the rack, after no sleep, at twilight, when they are moving, rounds are flying around me, I can't go prone because then the long grass would be in the way, etc, would be an entirely different ballgame.

 

[GunTech]

I don't need cites for me to say he is wrong. Something like the experts stating that the Titanic is unsinkable. His conclusion is wrong.

Sigh. One can't argue facts vs. opinions and gain anything useful. I've been an infantry officer myself and have my own opinion. Opinion without substantiating material is basically a 'religious' argument.

When someone says another person is wrong, but can't say specifically what it was that the said is wrong, or why, there is not point furthering the discussion.

Have you actually read Hitchman? Even the excerpts available in "The great rifle controversy", "The Black Rifle", "US rifle M-14", "SPIW", etc.

One the one hand, we have your opinion, backed up by no objective data or cites whatsoever. On the other hand we have we have Hitchman with his 3 million casualties worth of data, The Hall study, ALCLAD, SALVO, SPIW and ACR all confirming each other, and available for cite.

BTW, the point of crew served weapons is well made. They are far more deadly than rifle fire, and yet they tend to be directed - rather than aimed. According to the aimed fire theory, rifles should be far more effective, but it turns out that crew served weapons are far more effective in producing casualties - a fact identified by every major army.