aimed rifle fire by infantry?

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Vern

'Spray and pray' is something of an erroneous and pejorative term, and certainly not what was being promulgated by the proponents of Hitchman and having nothing to do with operant conditioning.

Operant conditioning was about developing combat reflexes - to shoot at a threat immediately - one that looked like a human shape, rather than to shoot at a bullseye target at known ranges, and then go into combat where the situation was completely unlike the firing range.

The conclusions draw from Hitchman relate to the concept of firing a swarm of missiles at a target to compensate for aiming errors on the part of the soldier, not pouring massed and random fore in no particular direction.

Development took two tracts. One was the submunition swarm, such as the shotgun firing flechettes or other improved projectiles to extend range to cover the typical combat envelope. The expanding cone of submunitions would compensate for aiming errors on the part of the soldier.

The second track was the serial rifle, where the infantry weapon would fire a short, high rate of fire burst with each projectile having a slightly divergent path (nutation) which would duplicate the 'swarm' concept.

Both concepts worked, but both have their limitations. The British experience in Malaysia validated the shotgun approach, as hits increased in the typical contact and ambush fighting with the introduction of semi-automatic shotguns. However, with the ammunition of the time, range was severely limited.

The serial projectile rifle also demonstrated increased effectiveness. Duplex ammo alone (where 2 bullets were fired from the same case) showed an increased hit probability of 67% over conventional ammunition over the simulated combat conditions of both SALVO and ACR. The G11, with its 2000 rpm burs showed similar improvements. Unfortunately, none met the Army's 100% improvement in hit probability criteria.

Focus now is one so called smart ammunition - computer controlled airbursting fragmentation ammo. The burst radius of the ammunition will compensate for aiming errors, as well as allow the engagement of targets that are protected from convention linear fire by terrain or structures.

You can hit a man behind a wall or in a DFP with a rifle, but you might be able to do with an airbursting munition.
 
It has also led to an increase in Blue on Blue casualties and Blue on Civ deaths. There have been an ever increasing number of "friendly fire" (which aint) as this methodology leads to a mentality of "recce by firepower"

Oh and before we get the usual questions as to veracity, the attached are the results from a simple Google search.

The links you provide don't actually prove there's been an increase in Own Goals/Blue on Blue/etc. And one of the links is about a misdirected air strike on an British AFV, which is not suppressive fire in a classical sense. Four anecdotes do not statistics make.
 
Unless your weapon can penetrate that cover. Then you increase the exposure and time to hit the target. These are the types of "real combat" facts that these eggheads don't include in their studies.

No you don't. Criticizing "spray and pray" with one breath and then praising blindly blasting rounds through walls that bad guys may or may not be behind in the next is . . . well, poorly conceived.

And he made many wrong assessments and conclusions.

No, he didn't. His findings are just about spot on for how combat shooting actually occurs. And his findings have driven just about all the advancements in training (pop-up/variable exposure ranges, for instance) and advancements in technology (optics like the ACOG and AimPoint, as well as faster handling, flatter shooting weapons and cartridges). It's hard to see how he can credibly be considered to have been wrong when all the fixes since his report have been driven by his findings.

OPTICS ARE PRIMARILY USED FOR AIMED FIRE

Actually, magnified optics are primarily used for target ID/discrimination in the real world. The format of the marines' RCO is actually not optimized for aimed fire at all. It was deliberately selected because, at typical real world combat ranges, it's reticle replicates a red dot sight for fast, poorly aimed shooting.

The reduction of Friendly fire can be attributed to the 'INCREASE' of the use of aimed fire by our troops. Sheesh!

Nope. Reduction in small arms Blue on Blue stems from positive ID of targets before engaging with either deliberate aimed fire or fully automatic suppressive fire.

Finally it is funny how none of these examples seem to be able to transfer to the Afghanistan theater of operations. Where aimed fire is even more effective, not less.

Successful engagement ranges in Afghanistan and Iraq are actually about the same.
 
Vern

'Spray and pray' is something of an erroneous and pejorative term, and certainly not what was being promulgated by the proponents of Hitchman and having nothing to do with operant conditioning.

Operant conditioning was about developing combat reflexes - to shoot at a threat immediately - one that looked like a human shape, rather than to shoot at a bullseye target at known ranges, and then go into combat where the situation was completely unlike the firing range.

I'm well aware of all that -- but teaching "shooting immediately" without teaching troops to shoot and hit first is a mistake. Adding full auto capability to the weapon (as was the case with the M16A1) was a worse mistake.
 
Nor was the training any more "realistic" than KD firing.

I'm not sure I understand this claim. The current generation pop up ranges have their issues, but I don't see how randomly appearing targets with limited target exposure times and varying in range out to 300 are not a more realistic training event than working a lane on the KD range. The KD range (or any other flat range shooting on paper) has utility for teaching marksmanship fundamentals, but the pop up ranges build muscle memory for scanning and quick shots at elusive and fleeting targets.
 
I'm not sure I understand this claim. The current generation pop up ranges have their issues, but I don't see how randomly appearing targets with limited target exposure times and varying in range out to 300 are not a more realistic training event than working a lane on the KD range.

For two reasons:

1. Combat does not consist of staying in a hole and watching dirt gouges on the ground where a pop-up (but stationary) target is bound to appear.

2. The basic shooting skills are not developed before using the pop-ups. Remember, practice doesn't make perfect, perfect practice makes perfect. Our system often reinforces bad shooting habits.
 
1. Combat does not consist of staying in a hole and watching dirt gouges on the ground where a pop-up (but stationary) target is bound to appear.

Some combat does -- the course of fire most of the time I've been in was half from a fighting position and half from the prone unsupported. While the format does kind of resemble a game of whack-a-mole with bullets, it teaches scanning and keeping eyes moving.

It would be much more preferable if the targets could appear most anywhere, if they appeared and then followed an approximate path using cover and concealment, etc . . . but today we augment the pop up range with computerized simulators like the EST that allow individual and fire team/squad level training against targets that move and act more realistically than pop ups.

Add in force on force with simunitions (better than MILES since sims add pain and better condition doing the right thing) and we're probably doing a better job of preparing guys to go in harms way today than we ever have in the history of the US military.

2. The basic shooting skills are not developed before using the pop-ups. Remember, practice doesn't make perfect, perfect practice makes perfect. Our system often reinforces bad shooting habits.

I was a pretty experienced shooter by the time I went through basic training, but I felt like the BRM we got did a pretty good job of building basic skills before we hit the qual range and started dealing with pop ups. But, I don't claim to know how what we got in the early 90s differed from what we being done in the late 60s as far as marksmanship training. I assume some kind of improvements had been made along the way. We definitely got almost zero training on auto fire (well, burst fire) beyond a mag or two of fam fire on a 25 meter range.
 
I hesitate before throwing in my two penn'orth.

From WW1 footage we have all gained an impression of the carnage resulting from going "over the top" in the face of fixed-line machine guns and aimed fire by massed rifles.

But many still got through and many objectives were taken despite the volume of enemy fire.

I am going to express this badly, but anyway - take a block of sky, say 1/4 of a mile on a side, and simultaneously fire a million .3" projectiles into it, the projectiles "cover" 10.5 million square inches. The area of the target is 250 million square inches.

The hit probability is therefore pretty low, given that the area of the human body is of the order of 1000 square inches.
 
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