M1 Garand...a missed opportunity.Why the .30-06 Garand was a mistake

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Nom that was also my understanding the way I understand it he designed the cartridge first and then started the rifle work.The FA 29 loading that was tested by the Pig Board and used in the rifle testing was 125gr spitzer boat tail loaded over 33 grains of of IMR 25
That is basically correct about the timeline of how the rifle and caliber was chosen.The .30 cal garand cracked its bolt in the testing and dropped out OCT 9 31.In Jan 32 the Semi-automatic Rifle Board recommended that the .276 Garnad be adopted and 125 rifles be produced in the interim Garand redesigned the .30 bolt and the T1E1 was retested and it passed. THEN it was announced that all further work on the .276 was to be abandoned in Feb 32

There were several versions of the cartridge and one of them used a 150gr bullet at approximately 2350fps. The 125gr bullet at approximately 2550 is probably more than sufficient for use. What we have here are loadings near the power of the 7x57 Mauser, 6.5x52 Mannlicher-Carcano, and 6.5x50 Arisaka cartridges; all of which killed many American soldiers. This power level in an infantry rifle was proven in combat to be sufficient in forest, desert, and jungle. All this discussion has now got me wanting a reproduction M1 Garand scaled down for .276 Pedersen just to demonstrate the validity of the concept. Will not happen, but a guy is allowed to dream. Better yet, a modernized MAS 49/56 in .276 Pedersen like I mentioned in another thread.
 
......Heck with all this body armor and Kevlar maybe we need to go back to 30-06 mixed with some assault rifles and smg's

Most of the body armor worn by U.S. soldiers is rated to defeat .30-06. The wealthier bad guy's armor is also going have that capability.
 
Wow, where can I find this amazing round? Who makes a rifle for it? The way you guys make it sound, I have to try it out!
Finding someone to chamber a barrel in .276 Pedersen should not be difficult.

I don't know of any commercial loadings.

Here is a link describing the resizing of 6.5x54 to make Pedersen ammunition.

http://archives.gunsandammo.com/content/276-pedersen

Have fun putting it all together on the action of your choice.:)
 
While the history resulting in .30 cal and Garand selection is known, all the decision drivers certainly are not understood, and as more time passes it becomes increasingly unlikely they will be.

Were in fact, the WWI stocks of ammo Mac A's real reason for pushing the .30, or was it a smokescreen to mask his personal belief in or preference for the .30? Certainly he and any other person involved in the selection process would have been aware of "shelf life" issues with surplus WWI ammo. Who knows?

From an end-user perspective would a .276 Garand that's smaller, lighter, held more rounds, etc., have been a better choice? Very likely so, arguments re penetration notwithstanding. Would it have been more effective rounds per hit? Somewhere I read a calculation that showed it would have been. From my own experience with .06, M-14 and M16 - I would think so.

From a cost and financial perspective, would it have made more sense? Depends how it's looked at and how impartial the analyst wants to be but I think so --especially in light of how much money we lavished on all sorts of things during the build up and conduct of WWII. Applying hind sight, we could have dumped all the .30 cal stocks and arms from WWI into Lend Lease (along with .276 tolling costs) and called it a wash.

Hindsight is imperfect and in arguments for and against, much is left out of the discussion. Some examples:
  • Marksmanship training can and did offset some of the "deficiencies" of 06 vs.276
  • Our logistics handled everything it did pretty well. It could easily have handled one new caliber and dropped two old ones (06 & .30M1).
  • Penetration and any other "deficiencies" identified with the .276 round would have been addressed with ongoing developments as we continue to do with 5.56 ammo.

But decisions get made and ppl press on, and that's what happened. Always good/bad, pluses/minuses. Always. Never perfect solutions - just solutions. The measure is whether or not they work and ours did. What's overlooked in this discussion is the impact of the times, the situation here in America and the mindset of the population.

We were at the end of a horrible depression. Ppl were thriftier by necessity and not of a wasteful mindset. The country was a shambles. Culturally there were sharply conflicting "movements" afoot. Internationally there were all sorts of agendas being played and pressures applied. The combined impact of these and other similar cultural/social issues and the approx 10 year timeline over which they and the development/acquisition of Garand and .30 vs .276 cannot be understood or appreciated.

I suggest that all things given, we handled it in a uniquely American way and it worked. Maybe dumb. Maybe a bit of a cluster. But we made it work and that's the bottom line. Same for the Russkys.

They made do with their Mosins and their 7.62. Rimmed? They made it work. Need less power? Shorten it to 39mm. Need a shorter weapon? Go SKS then AK. Like us, their decisions weren't always the best and were affected by a lot of cultural, economic and other decision drivers we cannot imagine. Bottom line - their approach worked and was uniquely Russian.

Lots of ways to skin a cat and lots of discussions to be had over what, why, and how we could have done better. At the end of the day, those ppl in the situation did their best and it worked out. IMHO, kind of heady not to acknowledge that as we discuss the theoretical and make second guesses. Not knocking anyone's comments, but just pointing out that there is a whole lot more that goes into such decisions and it's all colored by the times.
 
Very good wright up.

IMHO the US knew the virtues of the 6mm cartridge but they chose for whatever reason to ignore the lessons it showed us in China. It was the entire idea that bigger is better, and that really is not the case.

So many internet experts forget about the Lee Navy and how it served the US Marines in china at the start of the century. Extreme long range shots taken by marines using that rifle during that time.

I do admit that I did not read the entire thread there is quite a bit of chest pumping on just the first page so I blew past that.

I personally liked the 6mm in the lee navy and I think that was the road we should have gone down and not the 03 Springfield road.
 
Hindsight is 20/20. They made the best decision they could with what they knew at the time. 2 Billion rounds was an insane amount of ammo at that time and nothing to just ignore. No one could have predicted the scale of the next war. They still referred to the previous as "the war to end all wars". :rolleyes:

BTW, the Swiss have been very happy with the 7.5mm for over 100 years, till they finally went to the 5.6mm. Continuous use from 1889 - 1990. Many 7.5's still in service.

As a curious side note: according to an article on Cruffler.com. The Swiss GP11 bullet strongly influenced the design of the M1 .30-06 round. For more information, click here. http://www.cruffler.com/trivia-July99.html
http://www.swissrifles.com/ammo/#7.5
 
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With the adoption of the M1903 rifle, a new cartridge was also adopted. The cartridge designed for the rifle featured a rimless bottlenecked case, and a round nosed 220 grain bullet, advertised at 2,300 feet per second muzzle velocity.

In 1906, the United States adopted a lighter spitzer bullet of 150 grains and a muzzle velocity of 2,700 feet per second. The maximum range for the new cartridge, now designated the M1906, was found to be between 3,300 and 3,400 yards, with the muzzle of the rifle at an angle between 29 and 45 degrees.

In 1917, the United States declared war on Germany and entered World War One. At the outset of the war, the United States had virtually no machine guns, so troops in France were armed with British Vickers guns, and with French Hotchkiss guns. The Vickers gun fired the .303 Mk. VII round, a 174 grain flat based bullet, and the Hotchkiss used the 198 grain Balle D spitzer boat tailed bullet. It didn't take long for the US machine gun crews to realize that these rounds had extreme ranges nearly fifty percent greater than the M1906. When the US troops were finally issued American Browning machine guns, they were appalled to learn that they could no longer lay machine gun barrages at the same long range as before.

This failing of the M1906 cartridge led to a search for a new service bullet in the period immediately following the war. During the development process, the US Army Ordnance personnel tested the contemporary Swiss service bullet used in the Swiss Army's Schmidt-Rubin M1911 and M1896/11 rifles. This bullet was a 174 grain boat tailed design of the same diameter of the M1906 loading, that is .308 inch. The tests revealed that the Swiss bullet was immensely superior to the M1906 with respect to long range performance.

As a result of the tests, a 174 grain bullet with a 9 degree boat tail taper and an ogive of 7 calibers in radius was adopted as the .30 caliber M1 in 1925. Muzzle velocity of rounds loaded with the M1 bullet was 2,640 feet per second, giving an extreme range of 5,500 yards.

In 1925, when the new M1 round was standardized, there were two billion .30-06 rounds in store. The Army's policy at the time was to use the oldest ammunition first, keeping the newest supply for war reserve. These two billion rounds were finally expended in 1936, and only then was the M1 ammunition issued in bulk for training. Upon the issuance of the M1 ammunition, there was an alarming realization - the M1 ammunition had so much more range and momentum than the M1906 ammunition that it began to shoot beyond the impact zones of existing ranges! The National Guard Bureau (NGB) then asked the War Department to make up a batch of ten million rounds with the same characteristics as the old M1906 round.

The "new" short range ammunition was virtually a clone of the M1906 round. It used a 150 grain flat based bullet, but the ogive was shaped like that of the M1. By the late 1930's, this "new" ammunition had reached the service evaluation boards (by now minus all the old World War One machine gunners who had so keenly felt the lack of range in the original M1906 round). The new round had lower recoil than the M1, and more rounds could be carried for a given weight of ammunition, so in 1940, the new round (with a bullet weight of 152 grains owing to a slightly different lead alloy) was standardized as the Cartridge, Ball, Caliber .30, M2. The M2 cartridge boasted a muzzle velocity of 2,805 feet per second. The armor piercing analog to the M2, the Cartridge, Armor Piercing, Caliber .30, M2 fires a 168 grain bullet at 2,775 feet per second muzzle velocity.

The story did not end there, however. The 1936 - 1940 period, when the M2 cartridge was being standardized was the same time frame that the M1 Garand rifle was coming into service. The change in service ammunition led to unfounded and false accusations that the new rifle couldn't handle the M1 ammunition. This was, of course, totally false, the reasons for the change having to do with size of the then existing training ranges...

http://www.cruffler.com/trivia-July99.html
 
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Joe good read I was of course aware of the histories of the M1 and M2 rounds when writing my OP but chose not to go into that much minutiae to keep it at a reasonable read lol Assuming that whole 2B stockpile of ammo had been replaced with M1 ammo which is 2 years before we actually issued in any significant numbers switching to a .276 caliber round would not of proved any additional cost in fact even counting upgrading tooling for more production (some tooling was already available as FA already produced .276 ammo) would of probably saved some money going forward replacing issued training M1 ammo with an appropriate number of .276 as stocks of Garands for that caliber grew.

I know my whole OP is nothing more then a history lesson and speculation but as a student of history it amazes me how we can so often repeat it (most often the mistakes)
As was stated by another poster we tend to prepare for the last war and this is true less so now then was in the 1930s

I too would love to have a .276 Pedersen Garand Getting the Barrel would be very difficult the hard part in the conversion isnt the barrel however it would be the bolt as the .276 Pedersen used a smaller rimless casing then the .30-06 Up until a few years ago Fulton Armory produced .270 Winchester Garands but they no longer do. Finding one of these is as close as you are likely to get. If a 7mm barrel was found maybe you could alter the .280 Rem to .276 specs or 7mm-08 then .308 spacer blocks would work or you could get The Garand Guy or Shuff or someone like that to do a conversion on it for M-14 mags
 
Very good wright up.

IMHO the US knew the virtues of the 6mm cartridge but they chose for whatever reason to ignore the lessons it showed us in China. It was the entire idea that bigger is better, and that really is not the case.

So many internet experts forget about the Lee Navy and how it served the US Marines in china at the start of the century. Extreme long range shots taken by marines using that rifle during that time.

I do admit that I did not read the entire thread there is quite a bit of chest pumping on just the first page so I blew past that.

I personally liked the 6mm in the lee navy and I think that was the road we should have gone down and not the 03 Springfield road.


Sometimes it takes "quite a bit of chest pumping" to snap people out of the enchantment that something as iconic as the .30-06/Garand combination is before they engage their critical thinking skills and do a little research. The sad thing about the 6mm Lee was it was developed in the toddler years of smokeless powder and fired in a rifle that was far from optimal. Better propellants and a better rifle would have made a big difference in the history of the 6mm Lee.
 
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shootr and joeschmoe,

Great contributions to the thread. As far as history repeating itself after the .276 era, you only have to look at how the Ordinance Board behaved during the M14 development era. I recommend U.S. Rifle M14, from John Garand to the M21 for anyone wanting more insight to the convoluted and often irrational decision processes of U.S. Military rifle development and adoption. The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective provides more of the same. The only consolation is that our nation's allies and enemies behaved much the same way to lessor and greater amounts when choosing their rifles.
 
AH I agree the choice of firearm was crucial I agree my whole point of the post however was not was the Garand the right weapon was the caliber? Why? Because retaining the .30-06 caused us problems in the 50s and 60s and some say even to this day that we are still dealing with
We won because we got in after three years of the others fighting. Our country was untouched and we out produced bombed out Germany. Russia after losing 20 million wore down the Germans. The Germans did not even have fuel at the end. Production, our location, late entry into the war and the Russian effort won the war not a cartridge. That is like saying if the Germans and Japanese used different rounds they would have won
 
Thanks for the kind words Nom, and back at you. Thx for the references too.
 
As to assault rifles, early development in Germany was in 7mm. Did they go to 8mm so the could economize on barrel making equipment. Sounds reasonable. The Soviets most likely did so for 7.63x39 and probably would still have if we were in .276.

Just speculating...

There would never have been a .308/7.62NATO. And maybe not an M60. The MG42 would have worked in .276 without the 57mm vs 63mm case hassle. Bullet and powder improvements would have made the .276 adequate for the .308 mission. Hunters would be happy with .30-06. Varmint shooters would like the .22 Orphan. (.276 necked down). There would be a whole family of wildcats on the brass, some eventually to be standardized.

We still would have wanted the M1 Carbine as a pistol replacement. The cartridge might have looked a lot like a 7x33 Sako... which looks like a .30 Carbine (.32 WSL) necked down.

West Bloc assault rifles would likely maintain the .276" bullet on the shortest case that would keep it ahead of German and Soviet designs.

We should talk to Harry Turtledove about it.
 
7.5 French
303 British
7.5 Swiss
8mm Mauser
8mm Steyr
7.62x54R
I think the Japanese and Italians had one of these, too

The prevalence of so many essentially identical cartridges leading up to the conflict probably favored heavily in our thinking (and theirs :p). Doesn't it sound a bit audacious to suggest to a room of generals that bringing a different weapon than everyone else's (and a smaller one at that) to a fight is wise? Like saying "maybe we should rely less on diverse surveillance for ground-level operations and instead provide them tools to perform the function themselves" or something; simply won't go over well with the brass' current mindset regarding the 'integrated battlefield' (the preceding suggestion portion does not reflect my opinion of strategy; it is merely an example similar to what was posed to strategists after WWI)

TCB
 
On the eve of WWII (which some historians date to the Spanish Civil War and Japanese invasion of China in the mid-1930s), with huge investment in .30-06 rifles and machineguns, the US military was not in a position to rearm with .276 Garands. Ideally twoulda been a good idea, but not practical.

Italy and Japan had multiple rifle and machinegun cartridges in WWII and chaos in their logistics systems.
 
One thing people don't consider is that logistics has three fields:

Producer Logistics, which is all about funding and finding suppliers.

Transportation Logistics, which is all about getting stuff from the producer to the consumer.

Consumer Logistics, which is getting the stuff where it's actually used.

A classic example of a failure of Consumer Logistics is Pickett's Charge. The Confederate artillery bombarded the Union lines and fell silent. And then Pickett started forward.

Why didn't the Confederate artillery keep firing until it was about to endanger Pickett's command, then lift and shift the fire to Pickett's flanks?

Because they were out of ammunition. Now the Army of Northern Virginia wasn't out of ammo -- they had plenty on wagons in the trains area. But there was none left in the gun positions.

So when we discuss multiplying the types of cartridges, remember, it isn't so much about producing or transporting it, it's about getting the ammo from the unit trains to the firing line.
 
On the eve of WWII (which some historians date to the Spanish Civil War and Japanese invasion of China in the mid-1930s), with huge investment in .30-06 rifles and machineguns, the US military was not in a position to rearm with .276 Garands. Ideally twoulda been a good idea, but not practical.

Italy and Japan had multiple rifle and machinegun cartridges in WWII and chaos in their logistics systems.
Saying it wasn't practical totally overlooks 2 things....we developed the carbine AND its ammo after the war had already started going by the traditional date Sept. '39 and we also switched rifles when we were in the midst of the Vietnam conflict so saying it wasn't practical is an easy cop out.It could of very easily been done.

It is amazing how history repeats itself 20 years after the .30-06/.276 decision was made again this time by Col. Rene Studler with the 7.62/.280 Brit for a NATO standardization rifle round. The FN FAL was designed for the 7.92.33 Kurz round and the Brits asked FN to design some prototypes in .280 which they submitted to the US for competition against what turned out to be the M-14. Asking a rifle designed to use the Kurz instead use the 7.62 NATO took the design right to its limits
 
One thing people don't consider is that logistics has three fields:

Producer Logistics, which is all about funding and finding suppliers.

Transportation Logistics, which is all about getting stuff from the producer to the consumer.

Consumer Logistics, which is getting the stuff where it's actually used.

A classic example of a failure of Consumer Logistics is Pickett's Charge. The Confederate artillery bombarded the Union lines and fell silent. And then Pickett started forward.

Why didn't the Confederate artillery keep firing until it was about to endanger Pickett's command, then lift and shift the fire to Pickett's flanks?

Because they were out of ammunition. Now the Army of Northern Virginia wasn't out of ammo -- they had plenty on wagons in the trains area. But there was none left in the gun positions.

So when we discuss multiplying the types of cartridges, remember, it isn't so much about producing or transporting it, it's about getting the ammo from the unit trains to the firing line.
Hmmm Picketts charge huh? OK lets go there. For some background I suggest you read both of E Porter Alexanders excellent books Fighting for the Confederacy and Military Memoirs of a Confederate. He states that there wasn't that much ammo in the trains only enough for a decent defensive battle should one arise. Secondly the Reb's fuses were notoriously unreliable and for a third thing he was in the wrong position for the bombardment. As he splendidly illustrates in his books the Reb canon should of been lined up north of Cemetery Ridge and that way he would of had the whole ridge line in an enfilade fire and every round fired would of did damage to the enemies works and defenders,Reb fuses tended to burn slow which is why most of his artillery barrage overshot the ridge and did little harm to the defense.Logistics had nothing to do with Gettysburg it had everything to do with tactics.

As was known to happen Lee got his blood up and he had to strike a blow even though he was in a bad position stretch out and out manned.The army was to spread out for him to effectively command it all.

You can say many things about Pete Longstreet, he was stubborn and no grand strategist but he WAS the best Corp commander in either army. He was one of the very few high officers who understood how the rifled musket and artillery dictated new infantry tactics he was superb on the defense and when it was time to strike he STRUCK. His attack in dept at Chickamauga and flanking attacks in the Wilderness before he got wounded was some of the best generalship of the war standing up to anything Stonewall did.Also he was right at gettysbur no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle could of taken that position
 
Hmmm Picketts charge huh? OK lets go there. For some background I suggest you read both of E Porter Alexanders excellent books Fighting for the Confederacy and Military Memoirs of a Confederate. He states that there wasn't that much ammo in the trains only enough for a decent defensive battle should one arise.
Yes -- but this raises the question of should Lee have attacked at all? Having decided to attack, he failed because the guns ran out of ammunition -- despite the fact there was more in the trains.

And running out of ammo was not part of Lee's plan. He didn't make a conscious decision to starve Pickett of artillery support.
 
Yes -- but this raises the question of should Lee have attacked at all? Having decided to attack, he failed because the guns ran out of ammunition -- despite the fact there was more in the trains.

And running out of ammo was not part of Lee's plan. He didn't make a conscious decision to starve Pickett of artillery support.


Again the Reb's didn't have the ammo to begin with to resupply from the trains. Read Fighting for the Confederacy by E Porter Alexander p.246 I will quote. "Perhaps we had 200 rounds per gun. Now a gun in action will easily fire 30 aimed shots in an hour to 100 hurriedly aimed.During the previous afternoon we had 62 guns in action for from 1 to 4 hours,& had refilled our chests from the trains.Our reserve wagons,I knew,must be now very nearly empty of all but canister." I don't know why you keep saying he had more in the trains.

Expanding further Lee didn't plan the attack at all other then setting the objective "The Little Copse of Tree's" He initially wanted Longstreet's full Corps in the attack until Longstreet pointed out to him that Hood and McLaw's were in forward positions and holding the flank and had taken as much as 30% casualties the day before.After giving Longstreet 2 of Hill's Divisions to add to Pickett he left the entire thing in Longstreet's hands.Ewell's artillery who would of been in good position to put down enfilade fire on Cemetery Ridge did virtually nothing after Ewell's troops were driven from Culp's Hill in the early morning.
 
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"On the eve of WWII (which some historians date to the Spanish Civil War and Japanese invasion of China in the mid-1930s), with huge investment in .30-06 rifles and machineguns, the US military was not in a position to rearm with .276 Garands. Ideally twoulda been a good idea, but not practical."

I have to agree. The other part of strategic logistics is prediction; important people with knowledge of international politics understood that WWI was not the end, that conflict would erupt shortly thereafter due to the massive disruption of old power structures in Europe, the Balkans, the colonies (why do think our government was so insistent on The Great War being the end of large scale national conflict? ;) )

Predicting the coming conflagration, we were hesitant to invest heavily in retooling our arsenal all the way up to WWII. Even though we would have had time to reconfigure for 280 or something else, we were never confident enough in the situation to divert from existing capabilities. It'd be like us refitting all our nuclear bombs to Hydrogen bombs while the first prototype was being developed; in retrospect, we could have done this without losing a nuclear war (since it never happened), but had the need arisen, we'd have had badly reduced capabilities. Unable to justify such a strategic weakness, we built the new bombs and then spun down the old equipment. WWI was expensive and peacetime was supposedly here to stay, so the additional investment couldn't be justified in America.

TCB
 
And do not forget, until December, 1941, there was still a strong isolationist movement in the United States. Many folks had no desire to get involved in another huge foreign war.
 
And do not forget, until December, 1941, there was still a strong isolationist movement in the United States. Many folks had no desire to get involved in another huge foreign war.
Actually the May 1940 report to Congress by the War Dept on its state of readiness for war in a time when Hitler was over running the low countries caused much alarm in Congress and through out t the country appropriations starting in 1940 starting growing exponentially . Read this lots of into here like how the Army knew in 1939 that the Govt. Arsenals in existence would only supply 5% of the munitions needed in wartime the rest would have to come from private industry and Govt. owned contractor run facilities (Lake City established in Dec.40 and production starting in 1941 is an example of one of these that was run by Remington Arms until the 1980s and Olin since)


THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:pROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-10/CMH_Pub_10-10.pdf


THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:pLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-9/CMH_Pub_10-9.pdf

Not to be a smart ass here again but I really did try to do my research on the procurement and supply aspects to this topic and didn't just rely on history as I taught to me in high school lol
 
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What should be pointed out is back when the garand was being developed, the US did not have troops stationed all over the globe itching to inject themselves in every regional conflict. Also, the government did not yet embrace the concept of the military industrial complex where vast sums of money could be thrown at every project. Spending money on military equipment when the people did not want to get involved overseas did not make sense. With the US dollar still linked to gold, it was impossible to drum up massive amounts of money to make a different kind of ammo we didn't need. So when you look at it, economic played a part in this decision.
Where did you get the idea that there were troops all over the globe itching to inject themselves into every regional conflict??? I spent 21 years in the Army and only met one individual who thought war was, as he stated, "the greatest glory". He was a borderline psycho who had spent 5 consecutive tours in Viet Nam as combat engineer and was forced by the Army to leave the country. He was in Korea for 6 months when his enlistment ended and he re-enlisted to go back to Viet Nam. The most ardent anti-war people are those in uniform.
 
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