And another thing...
Some background on how the Marines first used Automatic Rifles, and why they are looking for a new one to fit between the M16/M4 rifle/carbine and the M249 light machine gun. These articles are long so I just copied the first part if the first article here. Please follow links for the rest of it (if you are into this kind of thing.)
http://web.archive.org/web/20040616124558/http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04eby1.html
http://web.archive.org/web/20040616124651/www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04eby2.html
Automatic Rifle Concept: Part I—History and Empirical Testing
by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby
(
Marine gunner, 7th Marine Regiment.)
‘Those German units fortunate enough to have officers who understood the effect of modern firepower went into battle in dispersed skirmish lines, with as many as six meters between each man and with each man granted the freedom to make use of whatever cover was available during his forward movement.’1
—Bruce Gudmundsson
Stormtroop Tactics
The relationship between the lethality of weapons and the dispersion of the troops found on the same battlefield has been a consideration for commanders since man first engaged in combat. From the Spartan phalanx to German stormtroop operations, combat leaders have been forced to adjust their tactics to the technology of the day. The dispersion of the troops has always been a critical aspect of the tactics employed. As the lethality of weapons has increased so has the dispersion necessary to preserve combat power.
History
Throughout history, advances in technology have driven tactical changes. As smaller units of combatants have gained greater firepower, dispersion has become a critical function of survivability on the battlefield. Dispersion is not merely a function of physical distance between elements but also incorporates the elements of mobility, command, and control. One end of the spectrum of dispersion is a massed armed force in physical contact, slow to move, and under the direct observation and control of its senior leader. The opposite end of the spectrum is a force of individual skirmishers moving quickly and guided only by a general intent. Commanders have continually adjusted the deployment of their forces in order to most effectively bring fire to bear on the enemy while simultaneously attempting to minimize the effects of enemy fire on their own forces.
The combatants of World War I learned a number of lessons as they attempted to resolve how to increase dispersion in the face of increased firepower, while still maintaining some type of control over their squads and platoons. By increasing the training standards of the individual soldier they hoped to enable themselves to decentralize command and increase dispersion.2 Better trained soldiers could operate more effectively without direct supervision.
Realizing that coordinated rushes drew fire, soldiers began advancing using stealth, microterrain, and individual rushes.3 The development of a light machinegun and trench mortar—fielded at the squad level—increased the unit’s firepower without having to resort to linear formations of riflemen.4 Without the need to “build up the skirmish line,” squads could maneuver freely, furthering dispersion while maintaining offensive momentum.5
By the beginning of World War II almost all combatants possessed squad organizations built around light machineguns and automatic rifles (ARs). Armies fielded units capable of the dispersion necessary to survive and operate on this new, more expansive battlefield in both offensive and defensive operations.
As World War II progressed, American Army and Marine Corps squads focused on gaining further firepower that improved their survivability and allowed for further dispersion and movement. Army experiences in the bocage country of Normandy and the woods of the Huertgen forest led to two and even three Browning ARs (BARs) at the squad level. The American “light” machinegun—a water-cooled, .30 caliber model—could not be used in the assault due to its weight.6
The Marine Corps developed the fire team concept. As early as the Corps’ Nicaragua experience, Marines recognized the need for a squad-level automatic weapon.7 Through World War I and into the Pacific campaigns of World War II, Marine Corps squad development continually evolved toward smaller maneuver elements, each armed with an AR. In keeping with the “triangle” concept, the Corps finished World War II with the 3 fire team, 13-man squad still utilized today.8
By Vietnam the Marine Corps rifle squad lost the BAR as an AR largely due to logistical, vice tactical, concerns.9 Attempts to replace the BAR with a modified M14, a never fielded M15, or the M60 medium machinegun proved to be failures.10
After the Vietnam War the Marine Corps led development of the M16A2 to replace the M16A1. However, with the loss of the M16A1’s full automatic capability, even the fiction of an AR at the fire team and squad level disappeared.11 As the M16A2 was fielded the Marine Corps searched for an available weapons system to fill in the AR void. While some testing apparently occurred, the vagaries of the contracting system and the urgency of fielding demands led to the selection of the FN Minimi light machinegun—the M249 squad automatic weapon (and the introduction of the term “SAW” to the Marine Corps lexicon).12
[Section deleted for brevity, please follow link for entire article]
2/7 believes that the next step in increasing the lethality of the rifle squad does not consist of replacing the M249 SAW. Rather, squad lethality, both quantitatively and qualitatively, can be greatly increased in two very cost-effective ways. First, the M249 SAW should be used in the LMG role for which it was designed, not the ad hoc AR role for which it was purchased. Second, to ensure that each rifle FT possesses the automatic weapon necessary for the close combat fight, a true AR should be acquired.
As threat forces match the firepower of the current rifle squad, the Marine Corps must maintain the innovative edge for which it is famous. While experimentation is still required, the evaluations undertaken by 2/7 definitively indicate that the Marine Corps should place the M249 into an LMG role and add a true AR to the squad’s inventory.
