Casual, intent is simply not required for all crimes in New York and other states. In NY, culpability is divided into four mental states: Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and criminal negligence." See PL 15.05
Further, the minimal requirement for criminal liability in NY is the performance of conduct which includes a "voluntary act." A voluntary act includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it. See PL 15.00, 15.10.
NY has crimes of "strict liablity." If such conduct is all that is required for the commission of an offense, or if the offense does not require a culpable mental state, the offense is one of strict liablity. See PL 15.10.
When a given offense requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily stated in the statute by using the terms intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or criminal negligence, or with terms like "with intent to defraud" or "knowing it to be false." See PL 15.15 (1).
However, if no culpable mental state is expressed in the statute, one may still be implied. If the statute does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose strict liability, it should be construed as defining a crime of mental culpability. See PL 15.15 (2).
The statute at issue (CPW-4) specifies levels of culpability for some offenses. For example, possession of a dangerous knife requires intent to use unlawfully against another to fall within the statute. Possession exploding ammo must be knowing. There is no stated culpability required for illegal possession of a handgun.
New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, has held that criminal possession of a weapon is a strict liability offense. See, e.g., People v. Saunders, 624 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1995) The only thing required to be proven is a voluntary, aware act of the possession of a weapon, with the additional feature of operability of the firearm. Intent need not be proven because it is not an element of the crime. See also People v. Davis, 1981, 112 Misc.2d 138, 446 N.Y.S.2d 159 (NYC Crim Court 1981) ("This section, providing that person is guilty of criminal possession of weapon in fourth degree when he possesses any firearm, etc., does not require mental culpability as element of offense.").
However, there is intermediate appellate authority holds that "although intent is not, by this section, a necessary ingredient of offense of possession of weapon and dangerous instruments and appliances, where there is evidence that defendant's possession of the weapon might have been innocent, the jury should be instructed that it might find that such possession was innocent." People v. Trucchio (2 Dept. 1975) 47 A.D.2d 934, 367 N.Y.S.2d 76.
If anybody can cite any relevant authority to the contrary, I would be grateful to learn of it.
