Yes, I know. That wasn't my point. One can't just shift from delicate interpretive analysis to "case law says" whenever one isn't getting one's way.
You appear - or appeared when I first noted that your analytical "conclusions" lead to a "under the 2nd, States can do mostly what they like, unmolested by the federal government"-type conclusion - to be ignoring the fact that as soon as one finishes such an argument, given the existence of the 14th, one must them start anew with a debate of what the correct effect of the 14th amendment would be on "libertarian enforcement" of the 2nd against the states.
You said you wanted to keep the discussion pure, I said okay and didn't press the issue - but you appear to keep coming to here & now
conclusions about the meaning of the 2nd. My contention is that you can't have it both ways: Either you have to keep the discussion on a "maybe the founders meant thus-and-such," level - precluding dragging the issue into the here & now,
or, you have to continue on and deal with the proper interpretation of the 14th.
The fact that the Supremes have avoided incorporating the 2nd says absolutely nothing about the
validity thereof. The Slaughter-House Cases nulifying the 14th's powers against the states were pathetic from a legal philosophy standpoint - right up there in intelligence with Dred Scott. And of course Dred Scott was one of the reasons the 14th was written in the first place. Corfield v. Coryell (the Article 4, Section 2, Priviliges and Immunities case) was a piece of work as well.
The legislative intent of the 14th was, at a minimum, to apply the first 8 amendments against the states. We know specifically that the authors of the 14th intended to protect 2nd amendment rights (at least of blacks in the South) against the States because that was one of the major issues that they debated.
I have nothing particularly against the Incorporation Doctrine, except that it is a prime example of our inability to get past the wonderful fiction that some SC decisions are just plain stupid, but even if we simply go with incorporation, there is no philosophical reason why the 2nd isn't as worthy for inclusion as any of the others that have been re-adopted piecemeal.
And then, there one is again with the Federal government protecting, in libertarian fashion, the citizens of states against state laws.
US v Miller is not really a very comfortable decision in terms of gun restrictions, if one actually reads the decision, as opposed to reading later interpretations of it. That is even assuming that one
should attempt to draw some valid philosophical conclusion about the doctrines raised in a case where one side was not represented, nor presented any arguments, and where the US Attorney, Clinton R. Barry, indirectly lied to the Supreme Court in presenting his argument.
As you likely recall, Barry argued that
"The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia." That was the
government's argument - as indeed it had to be, since Miller was not represented and no briefs were filed on Miller's side.
Then Barry argued that the
particular shotgun in question, serial number 76230 had never been used in a militia. Which is, of course, hardly the point, given the previous argument. Shotguns
in general are of course perfectly appropriate for use in an organized militia, as they've been used in every war in history since their developement.
There are things that are common enough for judges to take judicial notice of [stuff that judges can "take for granted" in a case to avoid needing testimony and proof in court to establish, for non-lawyers] and there are things that are not. The court ruled that the question of whether shotguns were an appropriate militia weapon was not one that it could take judicial notice of.
As a matter of legal philosophy, I don't really put much stock in cases where the government has to obscure the truth in order to win, when the other side isn't even there.
You might also want to remember the district court's decision in Miller was framed as a question of
federal police powers:
That's rather important, from a philosophical viewpoint, since the Supremes have made it rather clear of late that federal police powers are the one thing that they're willing to admit that the federal government
doesn't possess.
Miller, taken as written, merely establishes iron-clad protection of all military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.
Not a comfortable anti-gun-rights case either - from a legal philosophy viewpoint.
First, it's (at least theoretically) a "violation of rights by other citizens, not State action" case: As the Supremes point out, in 1875 there were no federal police powers, so it's a State venue when other citizens do things to you.
Somehow I doubt that if a white terror organization murdered 100 blacks today that the federal courts would fail to be involved, however.
Even if one buys the "In 1875 the federal government just couldn't do anything about the murder of 100 blacks, sorry," argument, one is still left with
Given that this was tried in 1875, two years after the Slaughterhouse cases, the question of the 14th didn't come up - as the Supremes were busy pretending that the 14th didn't exist. But of course that
still leaves the rather embarassing "The second amendment declares that [bearing arms for a lawful purpose] shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that shall not be infringed by Congress."
Oddly enough, if it means no more than "bearing arms for a lawful purpose shall not be infringed by Congress" it still
means that "bearing arms for a lawful purpose shall not be infringed by Congress."
Just for fun, if you put them together you get: "The Second Amendment protects...the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia, and this shall not be infringed by Congress."
Did you mean this?
I thought that was what Hawkeye had been telling you over and over.
Dex