The word "infringed" in the context of the Second Amendment

If you can't support your contentions with citation to relevant, directly applicable, primary legal authority:

there's nothing to discuss. What the Constitution means and how it applies is not your (or my) call.

In the Constitution itself the Founding Fathers authorized the federal courts (including the Supreme Court) to decide questions concerning the meaning and application of the Constitution (Constitution of the United States, Article III, Sections 1 and 2):

The exercise of judicial power and the deciding of cases arising under the Constitution necessarily involves interpreting and applying the Constitution to the circumstances of the matter in controversy in order to decide the dispute. Many of the Founding Fathers were lawyers and well understood what the exercise of judicial power meant and entailed. In fact, of the 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence, 25 were lawyers: and of the 55 framers of the Constitution, 32 were lawyers.

What our Constitution says and how it applies has been a matter for dispute almost as soon as the ink was dry. Hylton v. United States in 1796 appears to be the first major litigation involving a question of the interpretation and application of the Constitution. Then came Marbury v. Madison decided in 1803; and McCulloch v. Maryland was decided 10 years later, in 1813.

So, as the Founding Fathers provided in the Constitution, if there is disagreement about whether a law is constitutional, the matter is one within the province of the federal courts to decide. As the Supreme Court ruled back in 1803 (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), 1 Cranch at 177 -- 178):

See also Madison in Federalist No. 39:

And Hamilton in Federalist No. 78:

And indeed, it is a general principle in the United States that courts give deference to legislative acts and presume statutes valid and enforceable, unless unconstitutionality is determined:

[1] As the Supreme Court said in Brown v. State of Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827), at 437:

[2] And much more recently in U.S. v Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), at 605:

 

Ah, no. See post 5.

 

What an ignorant comment. Dred Scott reflected the law at the time. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments changed things.

 

See post 5.

 

Let me expand a bit on my response in post 16.

Regulation of Constitutionally Protected Rights.

• In the course of deciding Heller (District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (United States Supreme Court, 2008)) and McDonald (McDonald v. City of Chicago (Supreme Court, 2010, No. 08-1521)), the rulings made by the United States Supreme Court on matters of Constitutional Law, as necessary in making its decisions in those cases, are now binding precedent on all other courts. Now the Supreme Court has finally confirmed that (1) the Second Amendment describes an individual, and not a collective, right; and (2) that right is fundamental and applies against the States. This now lays the foundation for litigation to challenge other restrictions on the RKBA, and the rulings on matters of law necessarily made by the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald will need to be followed by other courts in those cases. The uncertainty here is that Second Amendment jurisprudence is at its formative stage, and therefore the constitutional limits to the regulation of the RKBA are not at present well defined.
  
  
• Even though the Second Amendment now is a limit on federal and state power to exercise its police powers with respect to the regulation of the RKBA, it's well settled law that under certain circumstance and to some extent a constitutionally protected right may be regulated. What those circumstance might be and the nature and extent of permissible regulation will be worked out by the courts. To do so, a court will consider, among other things, the nature of the right, the nature of the regulation, and the governmental purpose intended to be served.
  
  
• For the purposes of illustration, let's consider the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, assembly and religion against laws that abridge those rights we know there has been a history of certain regulation of speech, assembly and religion. A few examples are:
  
  1. Various laws (both state and federal) prohibiting such things as false advertising, fraud or misrepresentation. There are also state and federal laws requiring certain disclosures in connection with various transactions, which are valid and routinely enforced even though such laws do impinge on the freedom of speech.
     
     
  2. If you are offering securities or certain other types of investments to the public, your written solicitation materials will have to first be approved prior to use by one or more regulatory agencies. If you are selling medicines in interstate commerce, your labeling will have to be approved in advance by the FDA, and you will have to have demonstrated, through hard, scientific data, that any claims or representations made are true. These are also laws that abridge freedom of speech, and yet they are regularly enforced.
     
     
  3. Laws respecting the time, place and manner of speech or assembly have also survived Constitutional challenges. Thus a municipality may require that organizers obtain a permit in order to hold an assembly or a parade and may prohibit such activities during, for example, the very early morning hours. Such regulations would be permitted only to the extent necessary to serve the compelling state interest of protecting public health and safety. Any such regulations, to be constitutionally permissible, could not consider the content of the speech or assembly; and they would need to be applied in an even handed manner based on set guidelines and not subject to the discretion of a public official. See, for example:
     
     • Hill v Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), in which the Court, in upholding a Colorado law restricting protesting, educational or counseling activities within 100 feet of the entrance to a health facility, noted:
       
       • Cf. McCullen v. Coakley (U. S. Supreme Court, No. 12–1168, 2014)
         
         
         
       • In McCullen the Court struck down a new Massachusetts "buffer zone" law. As noted in the opinion the Court had previously sustained a different sort of buffer zone law in Colorado, and nothing in McCullen casts any doubt on the continued validity of the Colorado law (McCullen, slip opinion at 2):
         
       
       
     • Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir., 2006) in which the court upheld a Santa Monica ordinance requiring a permit for public assemblies. In fact in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs the court specifically acknowledges that the ordinance may burden the protected right, noting, at pg 1038:
       
     
     
  4. In the leading case on prior restraint (Near v. State of Minnesota, Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)) the Court in striking down a Minnesota statute allowing for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous and defamatory news analyzed in considerable detail and depth the scope and extent of the infringement of the freedom of press, the interests served and the availability of other and narrower remedies. And the Court then reached the conclusion that the statute went too far to be a permissible regulation.
     
     But nonetheless the Court also noted that certain interests, under certain circumstances would justify even prior restraint (Near, 283 U. S. 657, at 715 - 716):
     
     
     
  5. In the past, laws prohibiting polygamy have been upheld against challenges that they violate the right to free exercise of religion (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890)).
  
  
• So in fact the reality is that rights protected by the Constitution may nonetheless be subject to some limited regulation. The foregoing discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence serves the limited purpose of demonstrating that the courts do permit limited regulation of a constitutionally protected right. There are numerous examples of laws sustained by the courts which abridge freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. And First Amendment jurisprudence also offers some clues as to how such regulations will be evaluated by the courts.
  
  
• We can not expect, nor will we see, perfect correspondence between the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment and the regulation of rights protected by the Second Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is quite mature at this point, but Second Amendment jurisprudence, in the wake of Heller, is in its infancy. However, we can expect some regulation of Second Amendment rights to be upheld by the courts.

 

Ah, no. See posts 5 and 17.

 

But we do not discuss questions about such things as the Founders' original intent in the Legal Forum, This is not a place for philosophical discussion. This is place to discuss what the law, in real life in the real world, actually is. see the Legal Forum Guidelines:

So the discussion you apparently want to have is off-topic for the Legal Forum.

And feelings don't count. Again, see the Legal Forum Guidelines: