Despite the pandemonium that was sweeping the reminder of the Congo,
Katanga had remained relatively quiet. The province and its people had
enjoyed a close economic relationship with its Belgian community. The
Katangans had reaped the benefits of the wealth that was derived from the
Belgian owned mines. By Congolese standards, the province and many of
its people were fabulously well off. The provincial capital of Elisabeth-
ville was far removed from the passions of Congolese politics, and Moise
Tshombe recognized the stability and prosperity that close ties with
Belgium offered.
The serenity in Katanga was shattered on 9 July when ANC troops
stationed at Camp Massart in Elisabethville revolted. Acting quickly and
in defiance of the Central Government, Tshombe took what proved to be a
fateful step by asking for Belgian assistance. Two Belgian companies
under Major Guy Weber quickly restored order on 10 July when they stormed
the camp barracks and then routed and killed an estimated one hundred Con-
golese troops.
By 11 July, however, it had become obvious to the Belgian government
that the situation outside Katanga had deteriorated beyond Lumumba's con-
trol and that since Lumumba could not restore order, Belgian troops would
have to. With its nationals still streaming out of the country and those
that remained still under threat of violence, the Belgians moved to stabi-
lize the situation. In violation of existing treaties with the Congo
government, Belgian troops deployed to key military bases and into Leo-
poldville and quickly restored a resemblance of order in these areas. At
the same time, at Tshombe's request, Belgian troops occupied the mining
town of Jadotville in Katanga.
Aside from Katanga and those areas which were controlled by the Bel-
gian army, anarchy prevailed within the Congo. The only vestige of autho-
rity was provided by the Belgians who had occupied the country in violation
of existing treaties. Lumumba's authority extened no farther than the
sound of his voice and his only authoritarian force, the ANC, was completely
out of control. ****Consequently, on the evening of 10 July, the United States
Ambassador to the Congo designate, Clare H. Timberlake, quietly suggested
to Lumumba and Kasavubu that they request assistance from the United Na-
tions.3****
This proved to be a fateful step. However, if Lumumba had any reser-
vations about asking for U. N. assistance, they were perished by the events
of 11 July when three, unrelated incidents touched off a new and more severe
wave of violence. The first incident occurred in the port city of Matadi
which was shelled by a Belgian warship. The shelling caused considerable
damage and some loss of life. Meanwhile, Belgian paratroops quietly rein-
forced Belgian positions throughout the Congo. The Congolese army radio
network carried exaggerated, hysterical versions of the paratroops' ac-
tion. These broadcasts precipitated increased attacks on Europeans. On
the same day, Tshombe made his move and declared Katanga to be a free and
independent state.
Lumumba and Kasavubu promptly flew to Elisabethville in an attempt
to reconcile their differences with Tshombe; but when they arrived, Bel-
gian troops, under orders from Tshombe, had occupied the airport and re-
fused to let the plane land. When the plane returned to Leopoldville,
it was met by Belgian troops who were occupying the airport. An angry
exchange of words occurred between Lumumba and some Belgian soldiers,
and Lumumba was struck in the face. The break between Belgium and the
new Congo government was now complete.
....
****The Congolese Central Government tried to force the issue by request-
ing aid again on 13 July with the stipulation, this time, that assistance
be provided primarily by African states and not by the United States.**** The
Security Council responded the following day with an 8-0 vote to commit
U.N. technical and military assistance to the Congo. This response com-
mitted the United Nations to what columnist Walter Lippman described as
****"the most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international coopera-
tion ever attempted."7**** The United Nations was committed to the Congo, and
as troops rushed in from all directions, they brought the tensions of cold
war politics with them.
....
Ostensibly, the United Nations acquiesced to Lumumba's appeal for
assistance because the appeal consisted of a specific request for aid
from the legitimate government of a sovereign state.1 In reality, the
question of whether to acede to Lumumba's request was not nearly so
simple. The committment of United Nations troops is the prerogative of
the Security Council. Consequently, any response to Lumumba's request,
which would commit troops to the Congo, was subject to veto by one of the
permanent members of the Council. However, when the resolution to autho-
rize intervention in the Congo was introduced in the Council, neither
superpower, in a rare show of unanimity if not agreement on the Condo
question, felt compelled to veto the resolution. In 1960, the United
Nations was very conscious of emerging African nationalism and of the
problems that this was causing for the colonial European powers. Neither
the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to interfere unilat-
erally in the Congo if the price for hegemony in Central Africa was to
be labeled a colonialist.2 ****The Cold War was at its peak, and the United
States, fearing Soviet opportunism in Central Africa, saw the deployment
of a United Nations force as a means of interspersing the U.N. between
the super powers while, simultaneously, forestalling unilateral Soviet
intervention. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, supported U.N. inter-
vention because this support gave the Soviets the appearance of cham-
pioning the cause of anti-colonialism while decreasing American influence
in the region.3****
Although the super powers had reached a rare consensus, the United
Kingdom and France were lukewarm, at best, toward the proposal. Both
countries had serious reservations about United Nations interference in
what they both felt was essentially an internal problem for the Congolese
people to solve on their own. Both opposed the creation of the UNF in
principle, but neither country felt strongly enough to veto the resolu-
tion.
....
The initial force level in the Congo was approximately 20,000 troops
which were deployed throughout a primitive country the size of Western
Europe. Most of these troops came from small countries with relatively
poorly equipped military establishments. ****The logistics problems asso-
ciated with feeding, arming and transporting such a large multinational
force were enormous and, without the assistance of the United States,
would, most likely, have been insurmountable for the U.N. .****
When the UNF arrived, there was virtually no transportation avail-
able to the inner portions of the Congo. Modern highways were non-existant
and it was a torturous, eighteen hundred mile journey by river and rail
from the port city of Matadi to Elisabethville. Most of the rail trans-
portation that was available had been rendered unusable by the time U.N.
troops arrived.
Consequently, the only means to effectively move and supply troops
in the Congo's interior was by air. However, the United Nations had no
standing air force which forced it to charter some aircraft and to borrow
others from member states.19 ****The bulk of the airlift during the entire
operation, however, was provided by the United States Air Force.****
....
****Notwithstanding the UNF's occasional clashes with the Congolese
army and with various tribal groups, most of the drama during the Congo
crisis was played out in Katanga. It revolved around Moise Tshombe's
attempts to establish the province as a free and independent state.****
By mid 1961, Tshombe had built a well equipped, well armed and well
trained gendarmerie. The backbone of this force was a cadre of Belgian
officers and NCO's who had been seconded to Tshombe by the Belgian
government. For two and one half years, Tshombe's army frustrated
efforts by the Congolese Central Government and by the United Nations
to end Katanga's secession. Caught in the middle of what historian
Mugar Vuluhu called "the Katanga Circus", was the United Nations Peace-
keeping Force.
****Both the U.N. and the Peacekeeping Force played a controversial
role in Katanga. The UNF's role expanded from simple efforts, in the
beginning of the conflict, at preventing Tshombe's forces and those who
opposed him from committing wholesale murder, to active intervention, at
the end of the crisis, in support of the Central Government. Whereas
some authorities applauded the U.N. efforts in Katanga, others viewed
them as the U.N.'s "bloody war to suppress the establishment of Katanga
as a separate state".1****
The Peacekeeping Force entered Katanga in August 1960. Katanga's
secession ended in January 1963. During this time, as its role expanded,
the UNF participated in four military operations against the Katangese.
By contemporary standards, these were not major military actions. How-
ever, all military activity was directly influenced by the political cli-
mate at United Nations Headquarters in New York and by the restrictions
imposed on the Peacekeeping Force by the Security Council's mandate.
Once the UNF commenced military operations, all military activity was
closely scrutinized by both the press and by various national governments
to ensure that the UNF had not exceeded its mandate. With this is mind,
the UNF's operations in Katanga will be examined in detail.
Katanga was vital to the survival of the Congo. Tucked away in the
Southeastern corner of the country, Moise Tshombe's fabulously wealthy
little kingdom was the key to the Congo's economic viability. Profits
generated by Katanga's Belgian owned mines accounted for over half of the
Congo's revenues. The province supplied 10% of the World's copper 60%
of the cobalt, and half of the Western Bloc's material for lining jet
engines. ****Consequently, more was at stake in Katanga for the super powers
than the survival of a new African republic.****
....
Operation "Rumpunch" was the first significant U.N. military action
in Katanga. "Rumpunch" was significant because of the motives behind the
UNF's action and because the operation was the direct cause of a subse-
quent, larger clash between the UNF and Katangan troops. With its activ-
ities in "Rumpunch", the UNF abandoned its peacekeeping role and became
an active participant in the conflict.
"Rumpunch" was an effort by the UNF to capture and to expel the
foreign military personnel who formed the nucleus of Tshombe's gendarmerie.
Despite the passage of the Security Council's 21 February resolution calling
for the repatriation of all foreign military and para-military personnel
in the Congo who were not under U.N. command, by August 1961, Tshombe's
forces were still firmly led by a core of foreign officers. It was esti-
mated that this core consisted of 230 Belgian officers and NCO's and 200
soldiers of fortune of various other nationalities. Although most of the
Belgians were due to leave the Congo during September, Hammarskjold was
anxious to end Katanga's secession.4 He felt that elimination of the
foreign personnel from the Katangan army would eradicate its leadership
and that it would, thus, expedite Katanga's reintegration.
