Worst Military mistake involving guns

[Strings]

>In fact the AK is more versitile than the AR in terms of caliber. The AK action can be easily modified for any caliber while in the AR you are limited to the size of the magazine well. I really don't see the AR's ability to use the same lower as much of an advantage for anyone other than civilians.<

The advantage of using the same lower for multiple applications is simple: you issue the lower in basic (along with a rimfire upper), to teach basic marksmanship and manual of arms. That lower then "belongs" the that soldier: any modifications (within certain guidlines) are allowed, at the soldier's expense: grips, stocks, ambi or oversized controls, whatever. The upper is issued depending on the role of the soldier in his squad: a basic rifleman is issued an A2 or A4, a designated marksman a scoped target upper, SAW gunner a SHRIKE, a vehicle crewman a PDW. Everyone's using the same manual of arms, so there's no problem with grabbing someone else's weapon and not knowing how to use it, and everyone is using the same ammo and magazines. Should the soldier transfer, his lower goes with him. When he gets to his new duty station, he's issued whatever upper is appropriate. How is this NOT an advantage? It's the ultimate in standardization!

 

[rangerruck]

america, not starting with the 6mm lee navy , when it had the chance.

 

[Trebor]

Another post. Japanese lacking strategic lift capabilities. I'm skeptic.
They had enormous naval fleets. The largest battle ship afloat, and if it wasn't for, what I believe, was the "grace of God" we would have had a catastrophe at Midway. They certainly didn't invade at Midway, but they did manage to sneak another fleet; how many carriers? three? right up to Pearl Habour, and you know the rest. It's conjecture on my part; their plan was not for invasion, but if it was, they could have taken HI at that time..

The Japanese lacked the sea transport necessary to launch an invasion on Hawaii. There is a fundamental difference between naval warships and sealift capability. Don't confuse one with the other.

As part of the Origins War College two years ago we did a series of scenarios based on the idea of, "What if the Japanese invaded Hawaii." When the guys planning the scenarios researched Japanese capabilities they realized there was no way the scenario would actually work. They "fudged" it in the game by saying the Japanese would be willing to strip all their transports from civilian uses (these are the transports used to bring vital war supplies to the home islands) to transport troops AND would have to cancel their planned invasion of the Phillipines and send those transports to Hawaii. Even then, they just didn't have enough hulls to send a sizeable enough force to have a reasonable success to take the Islands.

This also completely discounts the fact that those transports were scattered all across the Pacific and ignores the time needed to organize and gather them together.

In the end, even with the "fudging" required that allowed the maximum number of hulls possible to support the invasion, and with very generous estimates of the number of troops that could be carried per ship, our theoritical Japanese force was only about half to 3/4 of what most military planners think would be required the take the Hawaiin Islands. (I can't remember the exact number of Divisions, but IIRC, it was about equal to the number o U.S. Divisions on the Islands, not counting the coastal batteries or Hawaiin Teritorial Guard).

Btw, the guys who planned the scenarios and did the research were a mixture of academic military historians, active duty and retired military analysts, and (old stye) war game designers. They know their stuff.

EDIT: The Origins War College is part of the program at the Origins Gaming Convention in Columbus, Ohio. In the War College, subject matter experts with real world experience give presentations on various military related topics.

 

[Mizzle187]

I believe that it would be the USA not taking the German STG44 and developing it for our troops use. They stuck with WW2 technology too long.

I think that is the one that hurt the most!

 

[Carl N. Brown]

The Reising Submachineguns M50 and M55 and Reising Carbine M60
have been considered bad military mistakes. All three were used by
the Marine Corps in 1942 at Gaudalcanal because US Army and Lend
Lease had first choice on the Thompson production.

The Reising was not a bad gun for police use, kept in an armory,
maintained by an armorer, and taken out once monthly for
qualification and very rarely for riot duty.

The disaster was issuing it for tropical jungle warfare without
testing it under those conditions. The Reising has a lightweight
bolt with a tipping delayed blowback action: there is no tolerance
for dirt, sand or even much powder fouling. And the blued steel
commercial finish would rust overnight for any hint of saltwater.
Marines work in saltwater and sand and need guns that can take it.

Issuing without realistic field testing was also part of the problem
with the magnetic exploders on US torpedoes. Calibrated in
test at Connecticut (40 plus degrees North latitude) they would not
explode in the South Pacific (different effect of magnetic
field near the equator).

-------------------------
edit to add: Reising M50 had a full rifle stock and the barrel had a
compensator. The M55 had a pistolgrip stock and folding wire shoulder
piece, no compensator. The M60 carbine had the full stock, 18" barrel
and no compensator. Magazines were double column, single feed,
in 20 and 12 round sizes. A 12 shot submachinegun?

 

[MechAg94]

I thought Hiram Maxim was just looking for a way to make money when he developed the Maxim gun without much idealism about making a gun so terrible that wars wouldn't be fought. Also, wasn't the Vicker's just a British version of the same? I thought it was a matter of who was licensed to produce the Maxim and the start of the WWI causing changes to be made.

I do remember reading that the reason Hiram Maxim went to England and developed that gun was because Thomas Edison paid him off to stop inventing electrical parts and leave the country. Maxim was not a weapons inventor in the US.

Also, how is it a blunder that the US did not adopt the Maxim gun? We had the potato digger. I am not sure it faired though I don't think it was bad. It seems to me that we were not doing a lot of large scale battles until WWI anyway.

I remember hearing that there were crates of Thompsons on the docks waiting to go to Europe when WWI ended. Had it gone on another 6 months or year, the Thompson might have seen action and stuck with the military much better.

 

[Carl N. Brown]

a gun so terrible it would end war

I have heard that said about Dr. Gatling's invention.

 

[Bart Noir]

stevekl, I told you that was mispelled....

My only reference at that time was the internet and I didn't want to bail out of THR to get the info. So, for the record, it was Mosin-Nagant. And my premise is still valid.

Don't be too hung up on spelling and gramur. After all, there are people on this forum from foreign lands. I mean, how well can you do in my native language.





Canadian.

Bart Noir

 

[Bart Noir]

Yes, the Vickers was an improved Maxim design. And I think that US troops did use it in WW1, as we had to borrow machine guns from GB and France, in their calibers and later in ours. For sure, we did use the Lewis in .303, the Hotchikiss in 8mm Lebel, and the Chauchaut in both 8mm Lebel and .30-06. I am not absolutely sure about the Vickers, but I think I've seen reference to it. In fact, I think Colt built them for the British during the war. Am I right?

Bart Noir

 

[Cellar Dweller]

Given that the Japanese had an inadequate supply train for:

1. China and Manchuria
2. Philippines, a collection of islands
3. Garrisons in the Marshalls, Carolines, etc.
4. Indonesia, yet more islands
5. Burma
6. Adak and Kiska in the Aleutians
7. inadequate shipping for raw materials back to the Home Islands
8. inadequate SUPPLIES for the Solomons (rafts, subs and destroyers were ultimately used)

how the heck can anyone continue to believe, 60+ years later, that the non-invasion of the Hawaiian Islands and the West Coast were "only by the grace of <favorite deity>?"

Forsaking ALL operations in Philippines/Guam and Indonesia/Indochina, Japan could have invaded and held Hawaii...so what? They couldn't go any further (and YES, even the most optimistic staffers knew that), so it was never an option. In 1941-42, it was a possibility that had to be considered, even though the U.S. was "reading the mail." Australia was never viable for the same reason, yet would have been easier than the West Coast.

 

[Thain]

An invasion of Hawai'i or the West Coast was, as you said, impossible. But the threat of Japan bombing Los Angeles in much the same way that we would hammer Berlin and Tokyo was a credible threat, in both my opinion and that of our commanding brass in the 40's.

Had the right team of eningeers had the right idea at the right moment... any war would be very different. For the want of a nail, as they say.

For want of a nail
the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe
the horse was lost.
For want of a horse
the rider was lost.
For want of a rider
the battle was lost.
For want of a battle
the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want
of a horseshoe nail.

 

[roscoe]

But the threat of Japan bombing Los Angeles in much the same way that we would hammer Berlin and Tokyo was a credible threat

Bombers landing and taking off from where? Maybe a one-time Jimmy Doolittle style raid from a carrier, but otherwise, how exactly?

 

[Thain]

Agian, I said it was a "credible threat" at the time, not something that they actually could have done. In 1942 we didn't know squat about the capabilities of the Japanese Imperial Navy compared to what we do know now.

Our military planners had to take what they knew the Japanese had, combine that with what we thought they might have, and add a healthly dose of what they might eventually come up with.

It's possible to fly from Tokyo to Los Angeles on a nonstop passenger airliner using planes built in the 1970's... Which could have been built in the 1940's. Now... you and I both know the Japanese didn't have such designs, or even the resources to build one had they had the designs... But our military had to consider the idea.

Now, it was not a likly scenario, which is why we stopped at blackout curtains and increased police patrols, but it was a threat we prepared for.

 

[Cellar Dweller]

There was good reason to worry about attacks and harassment.

Japanese pilot shot down, "holds" a small island in Hawaii briefly 12/7/41.
Submarine I-17 shelled California 2/23/42.
Submarine I-25 shelled Oregon 6/21/42.
Floatplanes launched from subs dropped small bombs 9/9 and 9/29/42.
Plans to bomb and mine the Panama Canal and West Coast ports, never completed.

~9000 "balloon bombs" launched in 1944-45, ~300 reached the U.S. Total of six killed when they found one on the ground.

Had the right team of eningeers had the right idea at the right moment... any war would be very different. For the want of a nail, as they say.

Had Rochefort, THE reason for the victory at Midway, not been kicked to the curb by King, the war could've been shortened. The man deserved some medal and promotion, if not the CMOH...but got "awarded" command of a drydock instead.

Back on-topic. A smart commander finds ways to make effective use of what he's got, a bad commander blames the tools. New tools (not necessarily "better") require new tactics, sometimes only realized through harsh lessons. It'd be hard to find a war (not just a battle) that was won or lost based solely on weapon superiority or inferiority...usually there's a combination of sheer numbers, logistics and bonehead decision-makers playing a factor as well.

The "bestest evar" M1 Garand and "JMB is Gawd" M1911 fought to a draw versus the "vastly inferior commie" Noisy Magnets and SKSs and Tokarevs.

Pearl Harbor would never had happened if the U.S. had M1/1911 in widespread service by 12/7/41

 

[KIDGLOCK]

The lack of Rifle training (read not enough) for our troops.

The M-16 poodle shooter
The M-9 small poodle wounder
Getting some POS from Wop country for our troops.
Getting involved in NATO.

 

[Vex]

The lack of Rifle training (read not enough) for our troops.

The M-16 poodle shooter
The M-9 small poodle wounder
Getting some POS from Wop country for our troops.
Getting involved in NATO.

Lack of rifle training? You mean like teaching new marines to shoot at 500 yards with iron sights on an M-16?

That's almost as intelligent as your usage racial terminology to refer to Italians.

 

[Hutch]

Had Rochefort, THE reason for the victory at Midway, not been kicked to the curb by King, the war could've been shortened. The man deserved some medal and promotion, if not the CMOH...but got "awarded" command of a drydock instead.

Cellar Dweller, could you elaborate on that? I've never heard of Rochefort (outside of culinary delights), and I am at least somewhat familiar with the battle of Midway. Did he have something to do with breaking the Japanese ciphers? Cracking the code, Spruance's instincts, the bravery of the pilots, and the bad luck of the Japanese all combined to ruin the IJN there.

Never forget TB8 squadron. God rest their brave souls....

 

[Tory]

How is that possible?

"I've never heard of Rochefort (outside of culinary delights), and I am at least somewhat familiar with the battle of Midway."

Excuse me, but no-one who has "never heard of Rochefort" can possibly be "somewhat familiar with the battle of Midway."

"Did he have something to do with breaking the Japanese ciphers?"

Yes. Specifically, he is the one responsible for "cracking the code." The movie "Midway" covers this in some detail; he is portrayed by Hal Holbrook.

"Spruance's instincts, the bravery of the pilots, and the bad luck of the Japanese all combined to ruin the IJN there."

And without Rochefort and his team identifying Midway as the primary target, NONE of that would have happened.

Wasn't Adm. King the tactical luminary who let our merchant marine fleet be destroyed in its home waters by U-boats through his utter refusal to order black-outs along the East coast?


Oh - what "culinary delights" are you talking about? If you mean blue cheese, that's ROQUEFORT.

 

[iapetus]

My offering - worst military mistake involving guns: I submit this error of tactics.


July 1, 1916: Battle of the Somme

In broad daylight, after days of artillery bombardment, the British marched in parade fashion toward the German lines.

Despite the heavy bombardment, many of the German defenders had survived. The advance artillery bombardment failed to destroy either the German front line barbed wire or the heavily-built concrete bunkers.

The British were cut down like autumn wheat in the face of German machine guns.

The casualties sustained by the British army in the opening day of the Battle of Somme totalled 57,470, of which 19,240 were fatal - the bloodiest day in the history of the British Army.

Of course, the General in charge (Sir Douglas Haig ) later was promoted.

Apparently, the main problem with the Somme tactics was not properly coordinating support, and being too inflexible.

The basic strategy was:
hh:00 hours: Commence rolling barrage.
hh:aa: hours: infantry go over the top, advancing towards German trenches, screened by barrage.
hh:bb: barrage stops with troops almost on top of Germans. Troops attack and clear first trench.
hh:cc: new barrage commences, rolling towards next trench. Troops advance and capture it. Repeat.
xx:dd: cavalry advances to support infantry.

In some parts of the battlefield, everything worked according to plan: the barrages successfully suppressed the German defenders (and damaged, but not destroyed the defences), allowing the infantry to advance in near-safely, before overwhelming the German lines.

In other places, though, the advancing infantry were held up for one reason or another, but the barrage started and stopped exactly as scheduled, leaving them to advance unprotected into the German machineguns.

Or alternatively, the second or third barrages commenced before the troops had time to recover from their first assault.


The French on the other hand, used smaller squads, equipped with field telephones, allowing them to call in artillery support as and when needed, and so had much more success.


However, the overwhelming failure of the British was not, apparently, in the barrage/infantry assault itself, which successfully captured many German trenches. It was the failure (due to lack of communication between the front lines and the generals in overall command) to deploy the cavalry and additional infantry to support the initial gains and prevent the Germans retaking the trenches.

(According to a very interesting documentary I saw a few months ago. I was surprised to learn that cavalry was/should have been such an important asset at the Somme: I had always been lead to believe that trench warfare had rendered it obsolete).

 

[MechAg94]

"I've never heard of Rochefort (outside of culinary delights), and I am at least somewhat familiar with the battle of Midway."

Excuse me, but no-one who has "never heard of Rochefort" can possibly be "somewhat familiar with the battle of Midway."

"Did he have something to do with breaking the Japanese ciphers?"

Yes. Specifically, he is the one responsible for "cracking the code." The movie "Midway" covers this in some detail; he is portrayed by Hal Holbrook.

"Spruance's instincts, the bravery of the pilots, and the bad luck of the Japanese all combined to ruin the IJN there."

And without Rochefort and his team identifying Midway as the primary target, NONE of that would have happened.

Wasn't Adm. King the tactical luminary who let our merchant marine fleet be destroyed in its home waters by U-boats through his utter refusal to order black-outs along the East coast?


Oh - what "culinary delights" are you talking about? If you mean blue cheese, that's ROQUEFORT.

Don't take offense. Some of us are bad with remembering names. I have read about the battle of Midway and heard plenty about the code breaking, but I could not have told you the name and will likely still not be able to tell you the name an hour from now.

 

[Thain]

Getting involved in NATO.

This is almost as silly as cursing our involvment in the United Nations... or the IMF, the SALT treaty, or... well... the whole uniting of a bunch of states thing.

NATO was our idea. Kevetch about it as much as you like, but we're a founding member of the club... and not just any founding member, but the founding member.

Just like with that pesky UN so many THRers love to hate.

 

[Husker1911]

Tory, lay off the caffeine. Please.

 

[Cellar Dweller]

Joseph Rochefort

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Rochefort
Brilliant but unorthodox, "eccentric" is a good descriptor.

Rochefort had the idea for Midway's "water shortage." CINCUS (became COMINCH) King and his staff disagreed on where AF was supposed to be (they though the Aleutians were the real threat; Nimitz backed Rochefort and got reluctant agreement from King. King never forgot being upstaged by Rochefort so his career was buried. Awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1986, 10 years after he died...a little late.

Rochefort (and HYPO) basically figured out the Philippine invasion, Indonesian invasions in advance...were blind on the Pearl Harbor Striking Force due to radio silence (so was everyone else). If they knew the carriers weren't in home waters, they would've deduced something was up...basically they didn't know what they didn't know and were spot-on otherwise.

Rochefort's group broke the Port Moresby Invasion Force, leading to the Battle of the Coral Sea. Fletcher's inability to lead carriers made it a tactical loss and a strategic victory (losing one of his carriers).

Rochefort/HYPO deduced the Aleutians were a feint, otherwise the carriers would've been split up with VERY different results. Fletcher had a carrier shot out from under him...

Rochefort was reassigned, HYPO became ineffective. Fletcher retreated from Guadalcanal, leading to the debacle at Savo Island (which leads to minor victory at Cape Esperance and losses during Naval Battles of Guadalcanal and Tassafaronga). Four more heavy cruisers would've made a difference! Guadalcanal became a war of attrition, when it should have been over a lot sooner. Tactical draw at Eastern Solomons, replaced after Saratoga torpedoed and Wasp torpedoed and sunk.

Fletcher, more often than not, had numbers (Coral Sea and Eastern Solomons)and logistics (although he claimed otherwise), surprise (always) and (by the Eastern Solomons) airplane and ordnance equality/superiority (other than crappy torpedoes)...yet never won a battle. Spruance only was given a green light to launch because Fletcher was refuelling and recovering scouts (as usual)...Spruance was cautious/aggressive, Fletcher was overly-cautious/passive.

 

[Cellar Dweller]

Consider this too

MacArthur had boasted of defending the Philippines to the point that Plan Orange was revised from abandonment to the U.S. fleet rushing to it. He had JN-25 codebreakers, Purple codebreakers, most of the B-17s in service, a "War Warning," and a direct communique that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by Japan.

Eight or so hours later, he was caught with his planes on the ground; Gen. Brereton was blamed but had proof he tried repeatedly to get permission to attack. Adm. Hart was likewise blamed and "retired" from active duty.

As at Singapore, the greater number of defenders surrendered even though the attackers were nearing THEIR breaking point. Unlike Singapore (which ran out of potable water) the Philippines had PLENTY of supplies (Gen. Sutherland threatened to arrest anyone who touched them); ammo and artillery were placed via MacArthur's discretion and overrun early.

The man was criminally negligent (direct cause of the Bataan Death March). The public will never know what he did during those eight hours of indecision. The public will never know why he was not relieved of command in December 1941. Between the end of WWI and the surrender of Japan, his career was disgraceful (Bonus March, lies upon lies of the Philippines, boasted of invading Rabaul instead of Guadalcanal until offered troops/ships then suddenly couldn't, dishonorable treatment of Australian troops in New Guinea, divisive in demanding overall Allied command in the Pacific Hemisphere...just a few lowlights).

Inferior numbers, inferior logistics, basically equal equipment, no surprise - the Japanese took far fewer casualties and WON decisively. Japan did have the advantage of experience from the China/Manchuria expeditions.

 

[carebear]

Apparently, the main problem with the Somme tactics was not properly coordinating support, and being too inflexible.

The basic strategy was:
hh:00 hours: Commence rolling barrage.
hh:aa: hours: infantry go over the top, advancing towards German trenches, screened by barrage.
hh:bb: barrage stops with troops almost on top of Germans. Troops attack and clear first trench.
hh:cc: new barrage commences, rolling towards next trench. Troops advance and capture it. Repeat.
xx:dd: cavalry advances to support infantry.

In some parts of the battlefield, everything worked according to plan: the barrages successfully suppressed the German defenders (and damaged, but not destroyed the defences), allowing the infantry to advance in near-safely, before overwhelming the German lines.

In other places, though, the advancing infantry were held up for one reason or another, but the barrage started and stopped exactly as scheduled, leaving them to advance unprotected into the German machineguns.

Or alternatively, the second or third barrages commenced before the troops had time to recover from their first assault.


The French on the other hand, used smaller squads, equipped with field telephones, allowing them to call in artillery support as and when needed, and so had much more success.


However, the overwhelming failure of the British was not, apparently, in the barrage/infantry assault itself, which successfully captured many German trenches. It was the failure (due to lack of communication between the front lines and the generals in overall command) to deploy the cavalry and additional infantry to support the initial gains and prevent the Germans retaking the trenches.

(According to a very interesting documentary I saw a few months ago. I was surprised to learn that cavalry was/should have been such an important asset at the Somme: I had always been lead to believe that trench warfare had rendered it obsolete).

You should check out "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" by Corrigan. Most of what most people "know" about WWI is wrong.