WW2 Small arms and desert combat

[Slater]

I've read a lot about our current operations in Iraq and the adverse effects that the sand/dust has on small arms over there.

In North Africa during World War II, some of the principle infantry weapons would have been the SMLE (Lee-Enfield), Mauser K98k, M1 Garand, Thompson SMG, M1911A1, Luger and P38 pistols, and others.

I can imagine that the Mausers and Lee-Enfields probably tolerated the desert sand and dust, but how did the M1 Garand perform in that environment? It was obviously a success, but were any particular problems encountered with this weapon and desert operations?

 

[AirForceShooter]

I cannot imagine a Luger functioning in a desert enviorment.

AFS

 

[Jim K]

I have no direct experience with either area (just as well, says I) but I have been told the North African sand is less fine than that in Iraq, so might not have been that much of a problem. There are three ways to deal with dirt and sand in an action. They are:

1) keep it out (dust covers, etc.; doesn't work)
2) make the gun easy to clean
3) make the gun so it doesn't matter.

The Mausers and the M1 rifle are in category 2. The M3 "grease gun" is in category 3. The Germans provided holsters for the Luger and P.38 that were about as dirt and dust proof as possible and they worked OK. (The Germans laughed at our "cowboy" holster; they thought the idea of a "fast draw" in combat was ridiculous, and they were right.)

Jim

 

[Dr.Rob]

Shaving brushes were a handy item to keep a Thompson clean... you see it in war movies occasionally but I recall reading that in a cavalry scout's ww2 memoir. I'd imagine that is true for most any open-bolt gun.

Ever see leather and canvas "action covers" for Enfields and Mausers? It's to keep the action clean (when not 'in' action) in adverse conditions. As Jim pointed out, this practice is dubious--which is why you see unissued action covers for sale.

Dust gums up your lubricants... sand can jam an action completely, not to mention increase recoil, cause case seperation or worse.

 

[middy]

(The Germans laughed at our "cowboy" holster; they thought the idea of a "fast draw" in combat was ridiculous, and they were right.)

It seems to me that if one needed a pistol in combat (a rare occasion, I'm sure), one would probably need it pretty quickly...

 

[Vern Humphrey]

It seems to me that if one needed a pistol in combat (a rare occasion, I'm sure), one would probably need it pretty quickly...

It would also seem to me that the Germans -- given what they fielded --wouldn't be the ultimate authority.

The US Army has viewed pistols differently from Europeans going back to the War with Mexico and the Texas Rangers (who developed mounted pistol tactics emphasizing the revolver.) We used mounted pistol attacks in the Civil War and in the Indian Wars. We took our .45s into the trenches in WWI, and they were so successful that Persing wanted every infantryman issued a .45.

And at that time there were European cavalry units that were only issued sabers or lances -- for fear that giving them pistols would lead them to neglect "white weapons.":banghead:

 

[Vern Humphrey]

For the record, I lived in Egypt in the middle '50s and traveled all over the battlefields in the Western Desert (my dad was in the oil exploration business.) We had a helcopter company under contract, and one of the pilots found a BMW motorcycle abandoned in the desert -- complete with side-car and MG 34 Machinegun. He landed near it, lashed it to the skids and brought it into camp. The motorcycle was taken apart, cleaned up and reassembled by our mechanics and ran like it was new -- it had apparently been abandoned because of a flat tire by retreating Germans.

The MG 34 shot very nicely, too -- until the officer in charge of the Egyptian Army mine clearing team assigned to the camp heard us shooting it and confiscated it.

Later on, when we found a British dump near Siwa Oasis, I appropriated a Bren gun, and plenty of ammo -- and made sure no one was around when I shot it. Dad wouldn't let me bring it home though.

My assessment is that the Sahara is not as hostile as the deserts of Iraq.

 

[Thain]

Of course, we also decided to stick with horses after WWI gave us tanks, and we were convinced that air power was only useful for scouting and recon.

The German's may have had odd ideas about small arms, but the blitzkreig certainly showed us we were wrong about the other aspects of war.

"You can't say civilization don't advance... in every war they kill you in a new way." -Will Rogers

 

[bowfin]

/*(The Germans laughed at our "cowboy" holster; they thought the idea of a "fast draw" in combat was ridiculous, and they were right.)*/

If I remember correctly, both Alvin York and Douglas MacArthur owed their lives because they were able to quickly bring their sidearms into play and drop multiple adversaries.

I believe the Germans used their sidearms more for executions and to hand over during surrender than for combat, so a "quick draw" holster might have been a moot point for them.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Of course, we also decided to stick with horses after WWI gave us tanks, and we were convinced that air power was only useful for scouting and recon.

Not quite true -- we had and used horse cavalry because we had a huge border (the 2nd Cavalry Division patrolled the border during WWII.) At the same time, we were looking to a mechanized force (but couldn't afford it.) We had long ago (prior to our entry into WWI) realized what airpower was all about and were the lead proponents of strategic bombardment in WWII.

And, of course, we revolutionized artillery during the interwar period.

The German's may have had odd ideas about small arms, but the blitzkreig certainly showed us we were wrong about the other aspects of war.

What did they show us with blitzkreig? We entered WWII with a better-intergrated combined arms force than they had.

 

[Cosmoline]

Of course, we also decided to stick with horses after WWI gave us tanks, and we were convinced that air power was only useful for scouting and recon.

Be careful not to confuse the FILM image of the German military with REALITY. In reality, the German military's mechanization advantage was short-lived and long gone by the time we got to North Africa and Europe. Even at the height of their power only a small percentage of the total force was mechanized. Yes, THAT SMALL PORTION was well mechanized and excellent, but it never offered more than a minor delay to our invasion of Germany. We did in a matter of months what the WWII allies failed to do in many long years. The Alliance that invaded France in '44 was orders of magnitude more advanced and mechanized than the Germans had EVER been. Yes, their tanks were better but they had fewer and fewer of them while we had more and more and more of ours. Likewise, we had more and more and more and more and more and more and more trucks, jeeps, half-tracks, and mechanized transports of all kinds as our forces came ashore. We had more internal combustion than the Germans had ever dreamed of. A never-ending river of machines after D-Day.

We have this image of stern Prussian officers riding to war on tanks, thanks in large part to the post-war Hollywood films that only show us these images. If you watch too many movies, you'll end up concluding that the service of German officers consisted of riding proudly in tanks and dismounting from time to time to shoot David McCallum in the back on a railroad platform.

A more accurate image would show us Germans marching to war and, if they were lucky, riding on a horse-drawn wagon or getting a ride on a train or a bicycle. Right up to the end the German military remained far more wedded to horse power than any Alliance force.

Here's a good summary of the horse's role in the German military:

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/

 

[Thefabulousfink]

Not quite true -- we had and used horse cavalry because we had a huge border (the 2nd Cavalry Division patrolled the border during WWII.) At the same time, we were looking to a mechanized force (but couldn't afford it.) We had long ago (prior to our entry into WWI) realized what airpower was all about and were the lead proponents of strategic bombardment in WWII.

While the main pioneers of tank warfare were British and American, they were completely ignored by their governments and superior officers, however, they were well read and interviewed by German Army officers. Strategic bombing was pioneered by an Italian at the end of WW1, again the Germans paid close attention to him, but not the US or British.

When we saw what the new German war machine could do in the Spanish Civil War we realized how behind we were. The US and especially Britain began rushing to catch up just prior to WW2.

I can't remember the names, I'll have to go dig through my history notes.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

While the main pioneers of tank warfare were British and American, they were completely ignored by their governments and superior officers, however, they were well read and interviewed by German Army officers. Strategic bombing was pioneered by an Italian at the end of WW1, again the Germans paid close attention to him, but not the US or British.

When we saw what the new German war machine could do in the Spanish Civil War we realized how behind we were. The US and especially Britain began rushing to catch up just prior to WW2.

I can't remember the names, I'll have to go dig through my history notes.

Basil H. Liddel-Hart is the source of the legend that the Germans developed their doctrines from his writings. For those who are interested, read "Liddel-Hart and the Weight of History" which not only shows that Liddel-Hart lied, but that he bribed others (primarily the German generals after the war) to back him up.

The Italian you're thinking of is Douhet. His "The War of 19XX" portrayed a defeat of France with a mere 500 tons of bombs. Billy Mitchell developed and refined Douhet's ideas and went well beyond them. The idea that you can win a war with airpower alone is called the "Douhet-Mitchell Theory."

The United States was indeed behind in terms of equipment in the 1930s, but not in terms of doctrine or a professional officer corps that was prepared to wage war on terms the Germans didn't understand. When we managed to raise and equip our army, we had a much better integrated combined arms force than they had.

 

[Thefabulousfink]

Thankyou for the corrections, It had been a while since my military history classes and lately my mind has been occupied with other concerns. Those were the people that I had been thinking about.

As to how much influence Liddel-Hart had on the Germans, I am not sure, but I do know that they were aware of his work, and that he was generally ignored by the British high command.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Thankyou for the corrections, It had been a while since my military history classes and lately my mind has been occupied with other concerns. Those were the people that I had been thinking about.

As to how much influence Liddel-Hart had on the Germans, I am not sure, but I do know that they were aware of his work, and that he was generally ignored by the British high command.

Actually, the Germans were not aware of his work -- because he never produced the work he said he produced. You can read his pre-war writings all you want and come up with nothing like what the Germans did.

After the war, Liddel-Hart interviewed the German generals in prison and wrote a book called "The German Generals Speak." In this book, he exhonerated them from guilt for the Nazi crimes. Von Manstein, in "Lost Victories" quotes Liddel-Hart, "Had the German generals been philosophers, they would have seen what Hitler was about. But if they had become philosophers, they would have ceased to be soldiers."

Liddel-Hart also arrainged for Von Manstein's book (and books by other German generals) to be published and to be translated into English. He wrote about their books and as a result he gave the Germans two things they desperately needed -- their honor and a source of income.

Secondly, the British government did pay attention to Liddel-Hart. The great debate was the type of army Britain should have. One side argued for an army capable of fighting on the Continent. The other -- with Liddel-Hart in the vaguard -- argued for an "Imperial Defense" army. Liddel-Hart trumpeted "the Indirect Approach" where the British Navy would blockade the enemy, and the army merely hold the colonies.

In the upshot, the British had no choice but to fight on the continent, and thanks to Liddel-Hart and company, they were not ready.

 

[James T Thomas]

rotor wash

While the Vietnam jungles are far from a desert enviornment, I loaded aboard many helicopter missions that upon landing and take off practically sand blasted the men and equipment. First Air Cavalry Division; operations near the coast and even in the central highlands, where the red clay was blasted in our faces.
I had teeth full of the stuff many times, and had never straddled a Harley Davidson ever.

Only conjecture; but, I would think the open receiver guns, M1, M14, and the bolt action -open, again, would be easier to clean, but easier to get contaminated on the other hand. For a choice, I would take the open receiver action for my weapon under those, or any other harsh enviorment conditions.
The poster who stated 1. Actions designed to exclude dirt is correct in my opinion. They do not work as designed.

We too used the shaving brushes and a flash suppressor cover that looked like a full plastic shotgun shell. We would wrap our rifles with the OD terry towell, and if possible do a cursory cleaning the moment we could.
The M16 would jam with that grit, but stripped down easily for cleaning.
For the hard to dislodge grains, the best tool was a toothbrush.
And for me, the lighter the lubrication, the better.

I only had one tour of duty, but never had a jam. Though I did'nt enter into the firefights directly in many of the battles. I saw jams in other's rifles.

I'm supposing that major desert combat involves mechanised units, and combined arms; infantry, is seldom employed due to the rapid mobility of the forces. This precludes battle in "built up" areas.

Hello, Vern. Am I wrong on this?

 

[Vern Humphrey]

While the Vietnam jungles are far from a desert enviornment, I loaded aboard many helicopter missions that upon landing and take off practically sand blasted the men and equipment. First Air Cavalry Division; operations near the coast and even in the central highlands, where the red clay was blasted in our faces.
I had teeth full of the stuff many times, and had never straddled a Harley Davidson ever.

Only conjecture; but, I would think the open receiver guns, M1, M14, and the bolt action -open, again, would be easier to clean, but easier to get contaminated on the other hand. For a choice, I would take the open receiver action for my weapon under those, or any other harsh enviorment conditions.
The poster who stated 1. Actions designed to exclude dirt is correct in my opinion. They do not work as designed.

We too used the shaving brushes and a flash suppressor cover that looked like a full plastic shotgun shell. We would wrap our rifles with the OD terry towell, and if possible do a cursory cleaning the moment we could.
The M16 would jam with that grit, but stripped down easily for cleaning.
For the hard to dislodge grains, the best tool was a toothbrush.
And for me, the lighter the lubrication, the better.

I only had one tour of duty, but never had a jam. Though I did'nt enter into the firefights directly in many of the battles. I saw jams in other's rifles.

I'm supposing that major desert combat involves mechanised units, and combined arms; infantry, is seldom employed due to the rapid mobility of the forces. This precludes battle in "built up" areas.

Hello, Vern. Am I wrong on this?

Not a bit.

I would add that mechanized units are VERY dirty. We travel in a constant cloud of dust -- I've known units to wear protective masks because of all the dust.