Some amplification:
B) Wittman’s death is still pretty murky: Cross (1997) says tanks; d’Este (1983, 1994) seems to think tanks; Edwards (1989) is another believer in tanks; Kurowski (1992) asserts tanks while his editor mentions the Typhoon but doesn’t make a call; Reynolds’ (1997 again) next sentence after the earlier quote from Steel Inferno was “The only thing therefore which can be said with any certainty is that Wittman did not survive the 8th August fighting against the British, Canadians, and Poles,†while he also points out that most accounts rely heavily on “supposition and uncorroborated statements;†the 1944 belief in tanks started with the aforementioned Oberfuhrer Meyer’s interrogation of the Germans nearby; Tout (1998) flatly contradicts the Typhoon idea in detail and supports the tankers case at length albeit subjectively while pointing out that the remains-still in and around the tank-were in the hands of the British the next day; Hastings (1984) says tanks, and I don’t have it handy, but I believe Tiger Ace says tanks; Jentz’ Panzertruppen is annoyingly silent. I believe I’m on pretty firm ground when I say we simply do not know how Wittman died, and I’m gonna agree with Reynolds, while what little amount I would bet on this one still goes with the majority of the authors I can find on the subject who actually take a stand.
D) I guess we need heroes and Patton and Monty were the closest thing. I still think they were both very good, with some blemishes, and I’ll not argue either was exceptional and in Guderian or Manstein's class (or Lee or Wellington's), but winning has to count for something, doesn’t it?
G) Advantages of the Firefly over the T-34/85: Better armor, better gun, better radio, approx three times the operating time between failures. Advantages of the Firefly over the Panther: No torsion bar failures, no serious shot traps, engine doesn’t get rebuilt every 10 tanks of gas, Firefly needs external help to catch fire. Advantages of the Firefly over the Tiger: Recovery vehicles could actually pull a Sherman, ground loading permitted movement through mud, much faster turret traverse than any German tank, no major blind side (right for the Tiger) problems, replacing a road wheel didn’t require disassembling half the tank, five times the track life of any German tank. There is more to tank evaluation than gun+glacis, and on this forum more than any other, I expect reliability to count heavily in any weapons comparison, which the Firefly wins going away, as well as mobility. Also, I’d suggest that the German optics meant more on the Russian front than against the Anglo-Americans, since German tanks all alone in the middle of open country had this habit of blowing up on the western front, which tended to discourage sniping, as well as closing distances to the point where armor was less decisive. Don’t knock the M4A3E2, BTW. It did quite well as the designated target at the head of convoys. The fact that a 30 ton Sherman derivative needs 45 and 60 ton German tanks to get relative inferiority in any sphere ain't bad, though.
H) McNair was the fella who started the idea that high velocity tank rounds only result in destroying the rifling that much faster, and got American guns limited to those cheesy little rounds which were easy on the tubes. Yeah, he was an administrative type, and what later generations of G.I.s would call a REMF. Patton’s thoughts on the M26 are, in retrospect, a mistake, but in his defense, M4s did more in Korea than M26s, which seems to say something. What it says I’m not sure, but I’ll suggest that Korea supports my Firefly fetish as it illustrates the mobility and reliability of the chassis, as well as supporting the notion that it was better than the T-34/85. I’m trying to tie the Panthers that fell victim to up-gunned Shermans in Israeli hands into this, and I’m darned if I can pull it off.
J) The crash dive times of the VII are what made it able to handle its environment better than any contemporary boat. The U-bootwaffe was unique in that it remains the only submarine force ever to be involved in a real shooting war against a truly ticked-off first class opponent, let alone two at once or in multiple wars. Their casualty rates reflect that quality opposition, but there is every reason to believe that nobody else would have done half as well. If you were to switch U-47 and the USS Cavalla, I firmly believe the Cavalla would have done U-47’s job worse than the other way around, whichever way the crews go.
K) Let’s concentrate for a moment on why the Germans never even attempted to fight a battle of maneuver with the Anglo-Americans in Europe, preferring to dash from one line to the next: The 8th and 9th USAAFs together with the RAF had ~30,000 front line aircraft and the only source of either jets or high-octane fuel in Europe by VE day. Adding the 15th AF, whatever friendly Germans can be found, strategic bombers and this is not any better for the Red Air Force than it is for the Red Army’s logistical train, and both would last a matter of weeks at best facing the overwhelming air assets already in theater, although Soviet offensive operations become impossible immediately in the face of western aerial supremacy. The USAAF-induced “Deutsche Blick†would have become the Russian Look very quickly, and then the Russians would face the only completely motorized army in the world with their limited ability to supply an army at the front all but destroyed, with what was left of their air force operating on low-octane fuel, with a meaningful cut in their food supply, no replacements for trucks or locomotives (the USSR built precisely eight locomotives in 1945) destroyed by Anglo-American airpower, and without any meaningful source of boots or telephone wire. Remember those M4A3E8s and T-34/85s in Korea? Add in superior American artillery with VT fuses, vastly superior Anglo-American counter-battery fire, ridiculously superior Anglo-American radios and C3, those friendly Germans again, and I’m not going to cut the USSR much slack on the ground forces comparison, and the American mobility would be as rude a shock to the Soviets as the Anglo-American tactical airpower. The English-speakers don’t even need to convoy anymore and gain a 30% supply increase simply from shipping congestion disappearing, so logistics get even more lopsided. Add to the above second transportation plan the fact that by VJ day the US had 2,500 operational B-29s, and that the Soviets had absolutely no conceivable means of stopping them or conquering enough of Africa, Alaska, and all of Asia to trouble their bases, and little enough means of stopping B-17s or Lancasters, and Soviet war making capability goes downhill in a hurry. Make no mistake: It would have cost us much more than 100,000 casualties for no conceivable gain, but it could only have gone one way, and that was east. Oh, and take a look at the Olympic plans. Start with a half-dozen nukes….
When pulled over for speeding, try the following: "Actually officer, I'm a laboratory mouse engaged in the early stages of a plot to take over the world. Rest assured that my regime, when successful, will result in substantially increased funding for law enforcement."
Steve