In DC, Gillis v. U.S. 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979), is the ruling precedent. Quoted in Dawkins v U.S., 189 A.3d 223 (2018), "These means of disproving a self-defense claim are available to the government whether a defendant employs nondeadly force or deadly force. Supra note 14. But in the deadly force context, this court has acknowledged that a defendant's ability to retreat is a special consideration in assessing the viability of his self-defense claim.15 See Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979). In Gillis, this court acknowledged the existence of a common law rule that required an individual who was “threatened with death or serious bodily harm ... to retreat, if it could be done safely, before using such force.” Id. at 312.
The Court continues,
"We noted that this “retreat to the wall” rule had been adopted by some states, but others (“probably the majority”) had rejected it and had adopted the contrary “American” rule that an individual confronted with death or serious bodily injury “is not required to retreat but may stand his ground and defend himself.” Id. We sought a “middle ground between the two extremes,” balancing a recognition “that, when faced with a real or apparent threat of serious bodily harm or death itself, the average person lacks the ability to reason in a restrained manner how best to save himself and whether it is safe to retreat” with a “call[ ] for some degree of restraint before inflicting serious or mortal injury upon another.” Id. at 313; see also Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343-44, 41 S.Ct. 501, 65 L.Ed. 961 (1921) (explaining that the law of self-defense has evolved “in the direction of rules consistent with human nature” and that what “may seem to have been unnecessary when considered in cold blood,” may be reasonable “while the heat of the conflict was on, and if the defendant believed that he was fighting for his life”).
Accordingly, this court held in Gillis that a defendant's failure to retreat, instead using deadly force, is one factor the jury is “allow[ed]” to consider “together *233 with all the other circumstances” in determining if the government has disproved beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted in self-defense. Gillis, 400 A.2d at 313; see also Carter v. United States, 475 A.2d 1118, 1124 n.1 (D.C. 1984) (“In the District of Columbia, it is recognized that when an individual is faced with a real or apparent threat of serious bodily harm or even death itself, there is no mandatory duty to retreat.”); accord Brown, 256 U.S. at 343, 41 S.Ct. 501 (holding that in a federal murder prosecution there is no duty to retreat and, instead, that “[r]ationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt”).16
11Gillis itself indicates that the jury's consideration of a defendant's ability to retreat is limited to the time when deadly force was employed. In that case we said the District's “middle ground” rule regarding consideration of a defendant's ability to retreat instead of using deadly force “permits the jury to determine if the defendant acted too hastily, was too quick to pull the trigger.” See Gillis, 400 A.2d at 313. Thus we linked the consideration of retreat to the moment the defendant used deadly force. Our self-defense cases subsequent to Gillis likewise indicate that the fact-finder must focus on the defendant's assessment of his circumstances “at the time of the incident,” i.e., at the time deadly force was employed. See Ewell, 72 A.3d at 131;17 see also Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d at 187 (focusing on the time of the stabbing).
The language of Smith v. U.S., 686 A.2d 537 (1997), interprets the "castle doctrine" in obiter dictum (extraneous reasoning not relevant to the case at hand but useful in determining the court's thinking on the matter." Two other cases where appellants raised the castle doctrine issue in DC were decided on other grounds--one denied application to the castle doctrine for co-occupants, the other dealt with curtilege around the home which the DC court rejected.
You can read the pattern jury instructions (9503) from DC here
https://lawofselfdefense.com/jury-i...no-duty-to-retreat-before-using-deadly-force/
"The law does not require a person to retreat or consider retreating when s/he actually and reasonably believes that s/he is in danger of death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force is necessary to repel that danger. But the law does say that a person should take reasonable steps, such as stepping back or walking away, to avoid the necessity of taking a human life, so long as those steps are consistent with the person’s own safety. In deciding whether [name of defendant] acted reasonably, you should therefore consider whether s/he could have taken those steps, consistent with his/her own safety."
And a condensed version from the DC government's document for firearm permit trainers here,
https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/f...s/District Law Pertaining to Self Defense.pdf
The Court continues,
"We noted that this “retreat to the wall” rule had been adopted by some states, but others (“probably the majority”) had rejected it and had adopted the contrary “American” rule that an individual confronted with death or serious bodily injury “is not required to retreat but may stand his ground and defend himself.” Id. We sought a “middle ground between the two extremes,” balancing a recognition “that, when faced with a real or apparent threat of serious bodily harm or death itself, the average person lacks the ability to reason in a restrained manner how best to save himself and whether it is safe to retreat” with a “call[ ] for some degree of restraint before inflicting serious or mortal injury upon another.” Id. at 313; see also Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343-44, 41 S.Ct. 501, 65 L.Ed. 961 (1921) (explaining that the law of self-defense has evolved “in the direction of rules consistent with human nature” and that what “may seem to have been unnecessary when considered in cold blood,” may be reasonable “while the heat of the conflict was on, and if the defendant believed that he was fighting for his life”).
Accordingly, this court held in Gillis that a defendant's failure to retreat, instead using deadly force, is one factor the jury is “allow[ed]” to consider “together *233 with all the other circumstances” in determining if the government has disproved beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted in self-defense. Gillis, 400 A.2d at 313; see also Carter v. United States, 475 A.2d 1118, 1124 n.1 (D.C. 1984) (“In the District of Columbia, it is recognized that when an individual is faced with a real or apparent threat of serious bodily harm or even death itself, there is no mandatory duty to retreat.”); accord Brown, 256 U.S. at 343, 41 S.Ct. 501 (holding that in a federal murder prosecution there is no duty to retreat and, instead, that “[r]ationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt”).16
11Gillis itself indicates that the jury's consideration of a defendant's ability to retreat is limited to the time when deadly force was employed. In that case we said the District's “middle ground” rule regarding consideration of a defendant's ability to retreat instead of using deadly force “permits the jury to determine if the defendant acted too hastily, was too quick to pull the trigger.” See Gillis, 400 A.2d at 313. Thus we linked the consideration of retreat to the moment the defendant used deadly force. Our self-defense cases subsequent to Gillis likewise indicate that the fact-finder must focus on the defendant's assessment of his circumstances “at the time of the incident,” i.e., at the time deadly force was employed. See Ewell, 72 A.3d at 131;17 see also Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d at 187 (focusing on the time of the stabbing).
The language of Smith v. U.S., 686 A.2d 537 (1997), interprets the "castle doctrine" in obiter dictum (extraneous reasoning not relevant to the case at hand but useful in determining the court's thinking on the matter." Two other cases where appellants raised the castle doctrine issue in DC were decided on other grounds--one denied application to the castle doctrine for co-occupants, the other dealt with curtilege around the home which the DC court rejected.
You can read the pattern jury instructions (9503) from DC here
https://lawofselfdefense.com/jury-i...no-duty-to-retreat-before-using-deadly-force/
"The law does not require a person to retreat or consider retreating when s/he actually and reasonably believes that s/he is in danger of death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force is necessary to repel that danger. But the law does say that a person should take reasonable steps, such as stepping back or walking away, to avoid the necessity of taking a human life, so long as those steps are consistent with the person’s own safety. In deciding whether [name of defendant] acted reasonably, you should therefore consider whether s/he could have taken those steps, consistent with his/her own safety."
And a condensed version from the DC government's document for firearm permit trainers here,
https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/f...s/District Law Pertaining to Self Defense.pdf
Anyone who carried a gun in the shower yet doesn't lock the damn door is nuts!
