Rifle Combat at Less than 300 Meters

[Double Naught Spy]

Right, so in summary, most combat took place at less than 300 meters for most situatiions, but there were various situations where combat took place at greater distances and was sometimes even effective at greater distances. Soldiers may be capable of shooting and hitting targets at greater than 300 meters, but may not have the opportunity to do so because of terrain, operational parameters/strategy/supplies/etc.

Probably one of the classic examples of multiple range engagements is the Battle of the Bulge where fighting took place at distances ranging from contact to hundreds of meters distant. The GIs had the benefit, part of the time, of being dug in inside of a forest and fending off approaching Germans coming across open fields. It was in their best interest to take advantage of Germans out in the open and to drop them before they made it into the treeline with the US Troops.

 

[rangerruck]

having just read the bool 'the ak 47', it talks about studies going all the way back to the late 1800's , and developing carts for this. The first medium cart design was actually the japanese 6.5 x 50 Arisaka, even though it used a heavy bullet, it was considered effective, because it could be used in all their long or short rifles, and run their MG's. I think his name was Molotov, but as a russian cart designer , was totally stuck on the idea of a 6 or 6.5 intermediate cart, and designed many along the way, before the 8mm kurtz or the 7.62 came around

 

[gunnie]

ivan's ideas

perhaps we should look into the new commie designated squad marksman idea. they may have more data base to draw upon as they were the ones who came up with the doctrine of radio, suppressive fire until armor / artillery / air can engage.

their new drugunov equivalent scoped squad marksman rifle is back-up for the five mm AK when engaged with superior ballistic endowed weapons. by no means a sniper grade rifle, just able to keep shooters at bay beyond the varmint calibers effective range.

this way only one man per unit needs special training and more expensive weaponry, and the close range effective weapons are still most of the squad's armament. IMO, would perfer two marksmen per squad, in the event one gets hit.

perhaps these are due to lessons they learned in afganistan, as we are in the same nation / region.

gunnie

 

[junyo]

No way to get accurate data, but I wonder whether non-traditional forces (insurgents, partisans, civilian miltias engaged in combat as opposed to simple acts of terror) would tend to engage at longer distances, even now. Large combined arms forces have the capability of using infantry to pin an opponent and then call in artillery/air to destroy. But smaller, more limited forces would have a greater need to use infantry to directly destroy opposition forces, so you'd think they'd place a higher emphasis on being able to do so from the greatest practical range. Long range shooters seemed to be heavily utilized in Bosnia and increasingly in Iraq. of course that theory is contradicted by the fact that areas in Africa that have seen constant low to medium intensity combat for years yet haven't seemed to develop any love of markmanship, nor apparently did the Afghans.

 

[armoredman]

80% of all effective
rifle _and LMG_ fire occurred at 200 meters (yards) or less.

Hmm, don't feel so bad about my 2-3 MOA Mini-14 anymore...4-6 inches wide is still plenty of torso. Not that I will ever have to, or would want to, test that theory under actual wartime conditions, just speaking here as a member of the Chairborne Commandos.

 

[Evil Monkey]

But smaller, more limited forces would have a greater need to use infantry to directly destroy opposition forces, so you'd think they'd place a higher emphasis on being able to do so from the greatest practical range.

OK but when you look at Chechnya, the Chechens love to "hug" Russian forces so that their artillery and air support is ineffective. Almost all of their engagements are under 100 meters and revolve primarily around the RPG rocket launchers.

perhaps we should look into the new commie designated squad marksman idea

We already have that. We have the M14 DMR, SAMR, and SDMR. And for the most part, the SVD seems to be obsolete for squad use. Spetznas has been playing around with a bullpup SVD with a shorter, suppressed barrel. It has seen action in Chechnya in as early as 1995 I believe. There has been word that prototype 20 and 30rd magazines were developed but I've never seen any in action. In the US, an equivalent weapon would be something like a 16" barreled M14 with a 20rd mag. Works the same.

Long range shooters seemed to be heavily utilized in Bosnia and increasingly in Iraq.

I'm pretty sure in Iraq, any "long range" shooting being done is probably only 100-200meters maximum. Those "snipers" have used anything from bolt actions, SVD, and even AKM assault rifles with PSO scopes.

 

[JohnKSa]

there was an expectation that riflemen could engage at those sorts of ranges, and could also make hits on individuals at several hundred yards.

Those ladder sights marked out to 2000 meters were used for massed fire. The idea of massed fire is not based on the idea that riflemen could make "hits on individuals" but rather the idea that a LOT of people shooting in the same general direction at once were likely to hit a lot of people in that general direction. It's basically the same principle that machineguns use which is why their operators talk about cones of fire and not accuracy. And that's also why machineguns "obsoleted" massed fire and combat rifle sights with markings out to 2000 meters.

In other words, the idea that those soldiers were setting their sights to, say 1000 meters, and aiming at individuals is without merit. There may have been unrealistic expectations, but those ladder sights aren't proof of them, merely evidence of an outdated tactic.

Furthermore, riflemen today are trained to be able to make hits out to "several hundred yards". I think that training programs bear this out. The difference is that the expectation that it will happen in actual combat conditions is now more realistic.

 

[Bartholomew Roberts]

Large combined arms forces have the capability of using infantry to pin an opponent and then call in artillery/air to destroy.

I just wanted to isolate the two elements of this one long quote to make a point.

But smaller, more limited forces would have a greater need to use infantry to directly destroy opposition forces, so you'd think they'd place a higher emphasis on being able to do so from the greatest practical range.

If I only have long range rifle fire to engage the enemy, and the enemy has air and artillery, how is engaging him at the greatest practical range a good idea for me? You always want to be careful about pushing the maximum effective range of your weapon when your enemy has more effective and better ranged weapons. You get in a situation where you are doing minimal effectiveness; but he can hit back at you much harder.

 

[gunnie]

Much like the USMC's Squad Advanced Marksman Rifle (SAM-R), the SDM-R is an accurized AR-15/M16-type rifle (5.56x45mm NATO caliber) built in-house by the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU; this rifle is also known informally as "the AMU rifle"). SDM-R's have only been built for one major Army division and is

~~~not an Army program of record.~~~~

The SDM-R is designed to provide engagement capability at the squad level to 600 meters, similar to the needs expressed by members of USSOCOM that led to the development of weapons like the Mk 12 Mod 0/1 and the SEAL's Recon Rifle. Similar needs have also been identified by the USMC, which led to a similar development to the SDM-R in the USMC SAM-R.

the SVD uses a full power battle rifle load VS the 5.56. without getting this into yet another protracted caliber rant, i feel safe saying their answer to the problem seems better, even with the less than sniper grade accuracy of the platform.

resurection of the M-14 and L1A1 weapons were a step in the right direction. now if these were armory accurized, fitted with good optics, AND placed in the hands of a trained shooter in EACH squad it would be what ivan is trying to do. as it is, spec-ops are geting almost all of the M-14s.

gunnie

 

[Roswell 1847]

Well the Flying Tiger Ace who wrote "God is my Co-pilot" wrote that while straffing a Japanese column the escorting troops stood as if on a parade ground and fired volleys at his P-40 till he had killed them all.

He thought it was rather stupid to expect even massed rile fire would down a then modern fighter. When he returned to base he found his plane was shot to ribbons from just behind the cockpit to the tail surfaces. The Japanese anti-aircraft sight limbs attached to the rear ladder sight were calibrated for the slightly slower P-36 Hawk and similar aircraft.

US Naval personel reported that Japanese survivors of sunken troop ships would gather on floating hatch covers and other large debris and those that had held onto their rifles would fire volley after volley at passing US warships ships till all were killed.

Regardless of the average or expected ranges, battle rifle calibers will chew through cover that defeats assault rifle calibers.
The 7.62X54 machineguns and rifles are making a comeback among Jihadis precisely because that round can defeat almost any body armor at close combat ranges. The round will also defeat almost any executive vehicle armor especially bullet resistent windshields and windows.

 

[elmerfudd]

having just read the bool 'the ak 47', it talks about studies going all the way back to the late 1800's , and developing carts for this. The first medium cart design was actually the japanese 6.5 x 50 Arisaka, even though it used a heavy bullet, it was considered effective, because it could be used in all their long or short rifles, and run their MG's. I think his name was Molotov, but as a russian cart designer , was totally stuck on the idea of a 6 or 6.5 intermediate cart, and designed many along the way, before the 8mm kurtz or the 7.62 came around

I think that intermediate cartridges really were a bit of a disadvantage until the advent of semi-auto and full-auto rifles. With those old bolt action rifles rapid fire and bullet weight were practically non issues. Your rate of fire was determined by how fast you could work the bolt and stuff stripper clips into your 5 round magazine and 80 cartridges would have been a large combat load, so having a cartridge that punched through obstacles better and left a bigger hole in your enemy was much more of an advantage than having a lightweight cartridge with moderate recoil. Both the Japanese and the Italians adopted intermediate cartridges and they both dumped them in favor of full power cartridges after less than stellar reports of the smaller cartridges in combat. Self loading rifles changed all that and personally I think that the 6.5 Arisaka was really a great cartridge, but somewhat ahead of it's time.

 

[Evil Monkey]

Regardless of the average or expected ranges, battle rifle calibers will chew through cover that defeats assault rifle calibers
.

Modern militaries use explosives to deal with hard barriers, not bullets. That's just a waste of ammunition. We've already had this discussion before. In the middle east (both iraq and afghanistan), there are plenty of common barriers that not even 50cal and 25mm automatic cannon can get through with out wasting a bunch of ammo. And even then, the enemy would have probably escaped from that location. In such an environment, 5.56mm and 7.62 are the same.

The 7.62X54 machineguns and rifles are making a comeback among Jihadis precisely because that round can defeat almost any body armor at close combat ranges. The round will also defeat almost any executive vehicle armor especially bullet resistent windshields and windows.

First of ALL.....the only reason these Jihadis use the PKM is because that's the only extremely common belt fed weapon in the soviet arsenal. That's all they have. You mentioned it can defeat body armor? SO CAN THE 5.56. Neither of them can take out a hardened chest plate. I've seen a video of a US soldier being sniped in the chest with a 7.62x54R and he got right back up due to the chest plate stopping the bullet.

I'm also pretty sure that bullet resistant glass on an automobile is no match for even 5.56mm. Now sure, 7.62x54R is great against vehicles. But an RPG-7 or 40mm is too.

 

[HorseSoldier]

These pieces of equipment weren't used much when the Hall and Hitchman reports came out. Wouldn't these optical sights (especially the magnified ones) have increased the range of engagements today?

They help, yes. Target acquisition and identification is definitely boosted by ACOGs and similar sights. I think it is too soon to tell if we're seeing engagement ranges being pushed further out by their adoption, though, or if we're just seeing higher accuracy at the same sort of engagement ranges. An ACOG does make 0-600 on the range just simply easy with an M4, but it doesn't address the limitations of the shooter's psychology and physiology once you make it life and death. We have also tried to improve training to compensate for those issues, though, so it will be interesting to see if we do see an upturn in engagement ranges or kill ratios.

I knew an old marine (now gone on to his well-deserved reward) who was in the first group to land on Guadalcanal and faced many banzi charges while operating a 1903 springfield.

Some of the charges were across beach flats and river mouth delta flat places while the marines were dug in on elevated places. He reported that they begin shooting (using the standing-ladder volley sight notches) at around 1200 yards.

SO, there were, apparantly, times when long range engagements WERE used. Other times were in the mountains of the Korean war during the Chosin reservoir part of the campaign.

Like some other people have said -- a banzai charge (or a Zulu impi) is not a point target, it's an area target. If the bad guys are obliging enough to line up in a big mass and charge from 1000+ meters out, that's a whole different issue and an individual can likely make consistent hits on someone in the assembled mob at ranges where they'd never even be able to pick out an individual or small unit using the cover and concealment the terrain provides, etc.

 

[Bartholomew Roberts]

I'm also pretty sure that bullet resistant glass on an automobile is no match for even 5.56mm.

Actually, regular laminated safety glass on most cars will break up 5.56 FMJ fairly badly.

 

[armoredman]

The glass on my last armored truck was Level 5. 5.56mm wouldn't have fazed it. The newest "glass" is actually transparent armor.

 

[chieftain]

Like some other people have said -- a banzai charge (or a Zulu impi) is not a point target, it's an area target. If the bad guys are obliging enough to line up in a big mass and charge from 1000+ meters out, that's a whole different issue and an individual can likely make consistent hits on someone in the assembled mob at ranges where they'd never even be able to pick out an individual or small unit using the cover and concealment the terrain provides, etc.

The rifle is a point weapon. Poor discipline, training or leadership may lead to rifles used as area weapons. It doesn't change from a Zulu impi, Japanese Banzi, Chinese or North Vietnamese human wave attacks. If you use your rifles as area weapons you are missing the bad guys.

Choose a target and hit him. Keep hitting him until he is down. Pick another target. Repeat until, they go away, die, or over run you.

This from the Korean war.

"Do not attack the First Marine Division. Leave the yellowlegs alone. Strike the American Army."
--Orders given to Communist troops in the Korean War;
shortly afterward, the Marines were ordered to not wear their khaki leggings.

Why? The Army had a lot more supporting arms per unit/man than the Corps has ever had. True we have superior command and control. That was developed because we have a lot less supporting arms than most military units of our size and mission assignments and, to survive had to get real efficient in their deployment and utilization.

but once again the biggest reason was Marine Marksmanship on the battlefield.

In Fallujah, there was an investigation because of all the [non racial or ethnic pejorative for a Jihadist trying to kill American troops, per monitors] shot in the head. The brass thought the Marines were executing all these guys. They learned that the Marines with their new found optics where just making a hell of a lot of head shots. That's called marksmanship. Put that together with optics, and it gets nothing but better.

The fact is that Marine marksmanship has always been a major issue. The Corps expends money and manpower on marksmanship that no other service, world wide does. The difference is in combat. Now up close in CQB, the classic marksmanship usually doesn't make a difference. Different set of skills. (not talking about spooks in SPECOPS outfits either, Aint enough of them for a real fight anyway.)

When you are in positions that allow a little stand off or require the enemy to cover some open ground to close with your position, aimed rifle fire can be very effective, in conjunction with your area weapons and supporting arms.

Several folks have brought up several historical cases.

The British against the Boors. The Boors marksmanship with their superior rifle and caliber 7mm Mauser were their primary edge.

In WWI The old British Army (They were soon destroyed at the Somme, the following year) IIRC at Metz held off the German advance with just rifle fire. In fact the Germans thought they were being fired on by Machine guns.(This happened before the two sides dug in and were still maneuvering) The old pre WW1 British Army had a tactic called the crazy minute. The average trooper had to be able to hit out to 1000 yards, 15 Times in 1 minute a reasonably sized target.

Guadalcanal was mentioned, the Corps Used their '03's. Often at extended ranges. Not shooting into a crowd. Aiming at a specific enemy trooper in that crowd is what got you hits. Machine guns are area weapons, Rifles are point weapons.

Interesting story told by a reporter while in Afghanistan. (paraphrased) "At night I could tell the difference between the Taliban and our boys. The Taliban would empty a magazine, our boys would only shoot 2 or 3 shots."

Combat accuracy, the solution for the battlefield.

Yes Supporting arms does the yeoman work of dispatching our enemies. But put that together with accurate infantry fire, and now you have something. Makes the Communist tactic of "hugging the belt" rather futile. Oh and rifle fire for the infantry, is always there and ready to go.

Go figure.

Fred

 

[Timthinker]

Gentlemen, these discussions certainly raise some very interesting points. They are also very informative. In fact, I would say that we have some first rate military historians here. But let us remember that this thread is an inquiry into research done in the 1920s on the subject of rifle combat. Any citations from that time period would be welcomed. Thanks once again.


Timthinker

 

[daniel (australia)]

Those ladder sights marked out to 2000 meters were used for massed fire. The idea of massed fire is not based on the idea that riflemen could make "hits on individuals" but rather the idea that a LOT of people shooting in the same general direction at once were likely to hit a lot of people in that general direction. It's basically the same principle that machineguns use which is why their operators talk about cones of fire and not accuracy. And that's also why machineguns "obsoleted" massed fire and combat rifle sights with markings out to 2000 meters.

The British soldier of the period from the 1850s right up to WWI had to qualify on targets the size of a man out to 600 yards, and a target somewhat larger out to 900, as well as qualifying in range estimation out to 900 yards. That was to enable the individual to engage the enemy out to those sorts of ranges. Volley fire was also a part of the doctrine, but a separate part, for creating a beaten zone on, say, an attacking force or artillery piece at longer range, but soldiers were indeed expected to use their long-range sights to good effect on individual targets to what would now be considered extreme range. BTW volley fire was still part of military doctrine here as late as the 1990s, the difference being that with the L1A1 it was for ranges from 300m to the maximum marked on the sights, 600m. No-one would argue that the GPMG, or supporting arms when available, didn't do it better though.

In other words, the idea that those soldiers were setting their sights to, say 1000 meters, and aiming at individuals is without merit. There may have been unrealistic expectations, but those ladder sights aren't proof of them, merely evidence of an outdated tactic.

But there are numerous reports of it, right up to WWI. It is worth noting that long-range target shooting was very popular, and so a good number of soldiers had considerable practice at shooting with service rifles at ranges out to 1000 yards. In open terrain like say, South Africa's veldt they put that into practice.

Furthermore, riflemen today are trained to be able to make hits out to "several hundred yards". I think that training programs bear this out. The difference is that the expectation that it will happen in actual combat conditions is now more realistic.

I understand that the USMC is trained to 500 yards, but for a good while both service rifle design, doctrine and training has been predicated on the 300m maximum. That certainly was the case here post 1950s and I understand it still to be the case.

As for "actual combat conditions" that speaks of a wide range of factors. In New Guinea in WWII, and Malaya not long after, actual combat conditions - thick jungle - meant most firefights were at 20-30 yards, and the submachine gun became enormously popular with the soldiers as a result. If you were to take the jungle experience and apply that to service weapon doctrine generally you'd rather fall on your face though, wouldn't you? We've had wars in all sorts of conditions or terrain, cover etc against all sorts of enemies and it seems to me that the mistake is to limit our options based on the particular conditions of one war we've already fought.

Timthinker

Sorry mate. I didn't mean to get off topic. As far as I'm aware the studies of engagement ranges, such as they are, were post WWII. There certainly does not seem to have been much change in tactical doctrine or infantry small arms in the Post WWI period consistent with a view that engagement ranges would generally be short in any future war, at least on the Allied side. Witness the retention of full-power service rifles (after a brief flirtation with such ideas as the .276 Pedersen) with sights still graduated out to many hundreds of yards. A certain amount of infantry tactical doctrine was of course developed in Germany and Russia in the 1930's, and given a test run in Spain, so it might be worth looking for clues there.

 

[HorseSoldier]

The rifle is a point weapon. Poor discipline, training or leadership may lead to rifles used as area weapons. It doesn't change from a Zulu impi, Japanese Banzi, Chinese or North Vietnamese human wave attacks. If you use your rifles as area weapons you are missing the bad guys.

Choose a target and hit him. Keep hitting him until he is down. Pick another target. Repeat until, they go away, die, or over run you.

You're missing the main point -- the problems begin with target acquisition. A single guy or fire team at 1000 meters in drab clothes or camouflage is usually going to be simply invisible even before guys start trying to engage the target. A large formation of troops is first of all something you can acquire at all, and then secondly is a big enough target that even a miss of your actual target may still hit something/someone worth shooting.

The merits of trying to engage a point target at 600-1200 meters (to use some numbers used in this thread) are kind of dodgy on simple mechanical grounds when you have a 2-4 MOA service rifle that is going to be +/- one to four feet at those ranges (assuming you've estimated range correctly at all, and assuming your eyes can draw a bead on one guy with iron sights, and all the other problems).

The British soldier of the period from the 1850s right up to WWI had to qualify on targets the size of a man out to 600 yards, and a target somewhat larger out to 900, as well as qualifying in range estimation out to 900 yards. That was to enable the individual to engage the enemy out to those sorts of ranges.

That was the training. The whole point of the studies referenced in this thread is that on the battlefield the training did not work.

Put another way, the US Marine Corps still requires guys to shoot to 500 meters to qualify with their issue weapons. The US Army only shoots to 300 meters. The difference in actual combat engagement ranges? None.

 

[chieftain]

You're missing the main point -- the problems begin with target acquisition. A single guy or fire team at 1000 meters in drab clothes or camouflage is usually going to be simply invisible even before guys start trying to engage the target. A large formation of troops is first of all something you can acquire at all, and then secondly is a big enough target that even a miss of your actual target may still hit something/someone worth shooting.

The merits of trying to engage a point target at 600-1200 meters (to use some numbers used in this thread) are kind of dodgy on simple mechanical grounds when you have a 2-4 MOA service rifle that is going to be +/- one to four feet at those ranges (assuming you've estimated range correctly at all, and assuming your eyes can draw a bead on one guy with iron sights, and all the other problems).

Many of the troops do have the eyes to do this. Not all. BUT......

One reason the Marine Corps is big on the ACOG is magnification, that allows precise engagement at longer ranges. In fact if you use the 4 power that the Corps is using times the 300 yards that is the holy grail of combat today, you get 1200 yards. Amazing what coincidences pop up when studying this subject.

I agree, the 5.56 at 1200 yards may not pack enough ass to do any or much damage. Of course that was the equipment limitation you were talking about, wasn't it? Maybe the issue service M16/M4 isn't capable of functional accuracy to that range either. I simply don't know. I am not talking about special builds like the Mk 12 or M4's built for SPECOPS.

Maybe along with the reliability issue, we have discovered another 'old' reason to replace the platform and/or cartridge. Some things never change.

That was the training. The whole point of the studies referenced in this thread is that on the battlefield the training did not work.

Can you point out one example where that training 'did not work'? I have already pointed out one example where it did work. There are others.

I was trained and qualified to be expected to get a high percentage of hits at 500meters/600yards. I could. What many folks forget, that ability to see the front sight is much more important than the ability to clearly see that bad guy at 600 yards. Ad blurred vision is in many ways preferred.

Go figure.

Fred

 

[gunnie]

Timthinker

scoured my recources and couldn't find info you requested....

maybe the lack of response is due to skewed sources from the reports you mentioned. maybe it is due to the audience you request the info from being mostly "shooters" who see the need for the military to return to "shooter" training.

perhaps the info you seek is pointless now, even if located. military tactics of just after WWII and WW1 are largely non-effective in the "limited involvement conflict" {LIC} that has prevailed since the advent of nuclear weapons. no longer do the major powers want to commit to all out war, as the obvious outcome is now likely worse than trying to contain political problems to safely distant regions. the stats you seek are based on history of warfare where those involved were TOTALLY involved.

many of the major govt militaries around the world are now grappling with reworking LIC tactics to accomodate the insurgency and guerrilla enemy encountered by the new realities of warfare*. [see: chechnya, afganistan, viet nam, korea, falklands, iraq...etc] oddly, even the US, who won their independence by just such of an involvement, seem ill advised about how to prevail in such conflicts.

one man's rebel is another's freedom fighter. the key to winning an occupation is not obtained by military might.
it is obtained by proving to the indigenous people that they can have a better life than allowed by the previous govt. the very worst enemy one can encounter is one who has nothing to loose. they will die for their beliefs more readily than those who have something to live for.

modern military doctrine has created soldier-policemen. the two roles are not interchangeable. a soldier has to be able to take out an entrenched enemy with ordinance. a policeman can't because he can not function without the support of those who live next door to the house he just blew up to defeat the insurgents.

the current/future soldiers involved in above rules of limited engagement require weapons that are more selective than
explosives. hence the need for precision small arms fire that is able to hit the head that HAS TO rise above a barricade when utilizing the readily hand portable weapons of the guerilla force. from beyond the usable distances of RPGs, AKs, etc. this will force the enemy to engage by nonselective means, and loose the civilian backing required for continued existence.

this, to me is the NEED that has to be addressed in current US military small arms training and squad armament. [in ref to my posting #28, above]

REGAURDLESS OF FINDINGS FROM OUT DATED STATISTICS

gunnie

* see:

http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_52.html

http://adt.waikato.ac.nz/uploads/approved/adt-uow20070312.091218/public/03Chapter2.pdf

http://www.princeton72.org/sites/PU72/edithtml/Files/marshall-afgan-diary.pdf

 

[chieftain]

by the way, I earlier stated it was the Battle of Metz. Wrong war.

It was the first battle of Ypres.

The attacks began along a much narrower front on 31 October when German cavalry drove a smaller British cavalry unit from its position on the Messines Ridge at the southern end of the salient. Shortly thereafter, German forces engaged General Douglas Haig's First Corps further to the north, but a ferocious British counterattack repelled the Germans. Thanks to superior British rifle fire, they were able to hold this sector. The British rifles were so fast and deadly that the Germans mistakenly believed they were facing British machine guns.

Another version

Between 21 and 24 October, whilst the British 7th Division held off repeated German assaults to the east of Ypres, British I Corps to the north-east collided with strong advancing concentrations of German troops around Langemarck. A series of determined defensive actions, in which British rifle fire wreaked havoc against repeated German mass infantry attacks, prevented an enemy breakthrough. The German offensive faltered and on the evening of 24 October preparations were made for a separate great assault on Ypres further south. This new attack between Gheluvelt and Messines, began on 29 October, culminating in a crucial action on the 31st, when the British line was broken. The initiative of local commanders and a bold attack by the 2nd Worcesters restored the situation. A third major German assault on Ypres took place on 11 November when the Prussian Guard Division advanced along the Menin Road. This potentially decisive attack was checked by British field artillery and a hastily improvised rearguard force.

Fred

 

[44AMP]

A couple of other factors...

Sorry I don't have any stats or sources from the post WWI-pre WWII era to add, but I do have a couple of observations that ought to be comsidered as part of the reason we got to where we are today, and why some tings changed and others didn't.

First of all, following WWI, our military was downsized drastically, and with the shortage of funding (maximized by the Great Depression), virtually no new ideas were even considered for several years (if they cost any money), and when new equipment and concepts were finally introduced it was the result of long drawn out struggles by the innovators against the established bureaucracy. The M1 Garand was adopted in .30-06 instead of the .276 round because Gen MacAurthur insisted on being able to use the millions of rounds of .30-06 the military had stockpiled. It was an economy measure, not an effectiveness issue.

Another factor in the supposed irrelevance of long range marksmanship is the fact that from WW I through today, the individuals in uniform have, in general, less and less personal firearms experience prior to joining the service. When rifle shooting was a national pastime, the expected standards of marksmanship were higher. With team sports and the urban environment being the ordinary situation for modern recruits, the old standards are tougher to achieve, and in most cases, the military does not have the time or funds to invest turning the majority of troops into crack marksmen.

Yet another factor is that following WWI, the major conflicts prior to Desert Storm all had the same basic military to work with. A relatively small core of professional soldiers, and the majority of the rest being conscripts. And while individual draftees can be as good an any professional after training, the majority don't have the same underlying motivations. The small numbers of professionals that made up the rifle units back in WW I and before had serious interests in shooting, and in long range rifle shooting. From WWII on, the changing naturre of most combat (because of changing technology), coupled with the large numbers of non-professional citizen soldiers, and the varied terrains changed the results of studies that measured "what most soldiers do in combat".

What was once done by long range rifle fire is now done with machineguns, and artillery or air support whenever possible. The nature of current ops (no cohesive enemy units - not fighting uniformed enemy military, etc.) means that the longer engagement ranges of the past are seldom encountered. So, it becomes a matter or economics again. Is it worth it for the military to train (and equip) soldiers for long range shooting for those increasingly rare times when it is useful, and if so, what percentage of soldiers should be so trained/equipped?

As so many others have said (and justifiably so) that most will not engage at long range, because of tactical factors (lack of target id, giving away position, etc.), but should we not provide the equipment and training to give them the skills needed for long range shooting for those times when they can use it to advantage? I think we should.

 

[JohnKSa]

The British soldier of the period from the 1850s right up to WWI had to qualify on targets the size of a man out to 600 yards,

Which compares very well to what is required today. The larger targets used for the longer qualification requirements goes along with the idea of massed fire at long ranges. I can't see how using a larger than man-sized target would support the idea that they were supposed to be able to hit a man at those distances.

But there are numerous reports of it, right up to WWI. It is worth noting that long-range target shooting was very popular, and so a good number of soldiers had considerable practice at shooting with service rifles at ranges out to 1000 yards. In open terrain like say, South Africa's veldt they put that into practice.

However your information indicates that the soldiers, even under controlled conditions, were not required to demonstrate the ability to hit a man-sized target past 600 yards. What some soldiers chose to do and were capable of doing doesn't reflect on the general expectations of a rifleman's capability, which is how you stated your original assertion.

I certainly agree that level of accuracy is possible past 600 yards but I take issue with the idea that it was expected then or now.

 

[GunTech]

Just to bring the studies up to date, if you look at typical performance of troops during the ACR tests of the 1980s, even the addition of optical sights did not appreciably increase the hit probability of soldiers shooting in simulated combat conditions.

Performance on a target range has little or no relation to combat. The study that is usually quoted is by Norman Hitchman. SLA Marshall had nothing to say on the effectiveness of infantry fir in his work "Men against fire". That work only addressed the participation of soldiers in combat.

The factors that effect rifle fire in combat include intervening terrain. The use of cover and concealment and the sporadic and limited exposure of targets. So what if you can hit a man silhouette at 600 yards. Soldiers taking fire have a nasty tendency to use cover and concealment, and to move.

More quotes from Hitchman (with my own comments)


"Rifle fire and its effects were deficient in some important military respects...in combat, hits from bullets are incurred by the body at random:..the same as for fragment missiles..which are not 'aimed'...Exposure was the chief factor...aimed or directed fire does not influence the manner in which hits are sustained...[Despite] evidence of prodigious rifle ammunition expenditure per hit,..the comparison of hits from bullets with those of fragments shows that the rifle bullet is not actually better directed towards vulnerable parts of the body"

If time and degree of exposure was the chief factor in whether a hit was obtained, what was the point of long range shooting? *Further, analysis of actual combat in showed that 90% of all rifle fire occured at 300 yards or less and that 70% occurs at 100 yards or less. *Interveneing terrain, camouflage and an inability to adequately identify targets were cited. Indeed, the effectiveness of rifle fire drops rapidly to zero at ranges greater than 300 yards.

Hitchman continues:

"It is interesting..that at all common ranges weapons errors are without significance in the man-weapon system...the dispersion of the weapon could be more than double without materially affecting the probability of hitting the target...weapons-design standards which seek perfection by making the rifle more accurate (approach zero dispersion)..are not supported by this analysis as genuine military requirements. *Errors in aiming have been found to be the greatest single factor contributing to the lack of effectiveness of the man-rifle system...[in combat] men who are graded..as expert riflemen do not perform satisfactorily at common battle ranges."

"Either a simultaneous [salvo], or a high cyclic rate burst, with the number of rounds per burst automatically set rather than be dependant on the trigger release. *In the (single barrel burst) design, controlled nutation [nutate: to nod or droop] of the rifle muzzle would provide the desired shot dispersion or pattern; in the..(salvo), the scatter would be obtained and controlled by multiple barrels, a mother-daughter type of projectile, or projection of missiles in the manner of a shotgun."