Why Did America Win the Race for a Semi-Automatic Infantry Rifle?

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Neither submachine guns nor assault rifles existed in WWI -- they were all developed after the war.
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Besides the MP18 Subgun the Russians had the Federov though it didn't get much use. By standards of the old Russian 7.62 the 6.5 Japanese round they chambered the Federov in was an intermediate cartridge though of course the Japanese considered it a main battle round.

Some WW2 Japanese 6.5 light machineguns would fit the sort of specs they are pushing now for a squad auto fairly well. A few were fairly well designed and caused a lot of US casualties.

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The French had some semi-automatic rifles by 1917 and they were used in battle.

And they were such roaring successes that in WWII the French Army in WWII was fully equipped with them.
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Bannerman's Catalog listed these years ago, I think he had the ones that had been converted to straight pull after the system proved faulty in the field.
French autoloaders and LMG suffered more from undisreputable sub contractors than from basic design flaws. If the French had tried building Garands they'd have fallen apart as well.

The Lewis Gun was pretty much the deadliests man portable weapon on the WW1 battelfield. They even tried to build an autoloading rifle using Lewis gun design features at one time, a very awkward weapon.

The Mauser Autoloading Carbine built for German aircrew looked a lot like the M14 in profile but used locking flaps and waxed or greased cartridges. I figure cold air at altitude caused a lot of waxed shells to stick and the lube probably built up fast and gummed the action up as it concealed in the cold air.
The Germans then tried the Mondragon sometimes with experimental extended mags or drum feeds in place of the enbloc clip.


The Garand is a rather simple yet elegant design.


PS
The Johnson LMG had a few bad features like the overlong single row magazine.
There was work done on a belt fed version but it came too late.
 
What I'm curious about the Garand is why the EnBloc clip system? I don't think it's a huge disadvantage, but detachable box magazines for .30 caliber weapons had been around since the BAR was fielded.
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An enbloc clip has to be incredibly cheap to manufacture versus a detachable magazine, though a stamped detachable magazine would reduce the number of forged/milled parts in an M1.
 
As stated by many before, the reason why America became the first to have a semiautomatic as a standard issue rifle comes down to resources, manufacturing capacity, and the fact that our country wasn't being invaded or bombed.

The Germans and Russians had the GEW-41, GEW-43, and SVT-40, all of which are vastly inferior to the M1 garand, and neither country had the manufacturing infrastructure to make enough of them. The Germans certainly did, they had dozens of factories turning out K-98s but they also needed those rifles as fast as they were making them and couldn't afford to switch production to a much less reliable and much more expensive rifle. Manufacturers in the United states had a combined production average of roughly one M1 rifle every 35 seconds during the entire war.

The only semi-auto rifle that I can think of that was a contemporary of the M-1 and nearly as good was the Swedish AG-42, but it was far from a being the standard issue rifle and Sweden didn't have a big part in the war.
 
nearly as good was the Swedish AG-42
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Over long and awkward, to me anyway.

BTW
Someone mentioned the Brits and the FN. If the Brits had made a rifle on the available FN plans it would have been more like the FN49 rather than the FAL.
A good rifle but not as good as the Garand.
 
I think two factors need to be considered as to why Germany did not field a semi-auto rifle before World War Two. One factor, which I previously discussed, was Hitler's belief that the bolt-action Mauser was "good enough". Granted, the Germans used a slightly modified Mauser 98 in the Second World War, but it was the same gun essentially.

The second factor concerned how Germany intended to wage war. The Nazis never intended to fight protracted struggles; hence, the emphasis on Blitzkrieg (lightening war). The purpose of blitzkrieg was to deliver quick victories without extensive losses in men and equipment. In short, it was war on the cheap. This explains why the Germans not only failed to develop a standardized semi-auto rifle, but also neglected to build larger four-engined bombers such as the British and Americans did. Why go to additional costs if they are seen as unnecessary? There are other reasons, but these two provide a sufficient answer in my opinion.


Timthinker
 
A good rifle but not as good as the Garand.
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I beg to differ. The SAFN has a superior loading system, greater capacity, a fully adjustable gas system, it can fire a wider range of ammunition types and its design is simplier and easier to maintain. One of my proudest moments with my late lamented FN-49 was standing next to a fellow with his spanky fine Garand and beating the socks off him both in accuracy and reliability. The SAFN tore up brass something fierce, but it never jamed and it was dead on accurate. Awesome rifle.

Now you're making me cry though because I stupidly sold it off for some chump change. WHY!!!

The second factor concerned how Germany intended to wage war.
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This is a good point, and also helps explain why the allies didn't see a need for replacing their bolt actions with battle rifles. GB and France expected WWII to be like WWI, with even more extensive trenches and fortifications. They would be picking targets from behind many feet of concrete, so why bother with a few more rounds a minute? The French rifles, while better quality than conventional wisdom would suggest, were made as a backup weapon. Artillery and machine guns from within massive forts would win the war, not rifles.

The Russians, for their part, expected to win any potential conflict with the Germans through massed charges and the fabled bayonet. They used these tactics against the Finns with poor results though and had to start changing plans. They eventually modernized their tactics and by 44 and 45 were equipping millions with battle rifles and subguns.
 
I think if we define "blitzkrieg" as the Germans defined it, we see it is not "war on the cheap" but material- and technology-heavy warfare. And while it was intended to produce quick victories, it aimed to do so by overwhelming material superiority.
 
Vern, it is still war on the cheap in that the overall cost of the conflict is less than would be the case otherwise. Also, remember that Germany did not go into total war mobilization until 1943! Hitler did not seek to disrupt the German economy by declaring total mobilization in 1939, as strange as that may sound today. It is true that blitzkrieg was based on technological superiority, but the point was that victories could be had at affordable costs, hence my quip about war on the cheap. It is a colorful expression.:D

One author who examined this fascinating aspect of economic mobilization and warfare was Gordon Wright in his work entitled The Ordeal of Total War. Although first issued many years ago, it contains some interesting discussions about Allied and Axis economic strategies for waging war in the industrial age. A good read in my opinion.


Timthinker
 
Vern, it is still war on the cheap in that the overall cost of the conflict is less than would be the case otherwise. Also, remember that Germany did not go into total war mobilization until 1943! Hitler did not seek to disrupt the German economy by declaring total mobilization in 1939, as strange as that may sound today. It is true that blitzkrieg was based on technological superiority, but the point was that victories could be had at affordable costs, hence my quip about war on the cheap. It is a colorful expression.
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Soldiers from Clauzwitz and before have pointed out that winning quickly saves lives and treasure -- if you can do it. That's not unique to blitzkrieg.

Nor should anyone think the idea that winning at an affordable cost is a unique idea -- winning at an unaffordable cost is called "losing."

Germany did rearm in the '30s. They did replace their rifles with newer ones. There's no reason to suppose they could not have afforded something like the Garand -- the just didn't develop such a weapon.
 
Timthinker, that's a great point and one that gets missed. Great Britain actually switched to a total war economy far earlier than Germany did. Pretty much everyone on the isle was working for the war effort in one form or another as early as the Battle of Britain. The German leadership, in contrast, tried to keep the war distant from the population as long as possible. One reason Hitler remained popular was because he seemed to be keeping his promise of quick wars with sure victory. And the Nazi leadership tried to keep the myth alive even as the Ostfront turned. They even faked a front line Christmas broadcast from Stalingrad to show how they were turning the tide. The British leadership was a lot more up-front about the disasters, from the disaster in France to the total destruction of HMS Hood at 8 nautical miles by Bismark.
 
Cosmoline, thanks for the kind words. Many people are unaware of the economic policies pursued by the combatant nations of World War Two. This is unfortunate since those policies help to contribute to victory or defeat. Wright's book certainly opened my eyes to this fact.

Vern, the principles of successful warfare certainly predate blitzkrieg. Even today, successful commanders use tactics devised by their ancient predecessors, such as encirclement, to win battles. What I am discussing is warfare in the industrial age with all its complexities. The case of the semi-auto rifle is but one small example of that. In the instance of Germany, it seemed more "cost effective" to stay with a modified Mauser than to forge ahead with a new semi-auto rifle in the 1930s. This is one reason they did so.

But, Germany did break into new ground by installing FM radios into every battle tank so they could remain in constant contact with each other. This communications revolution is one reason why the Germans coordinated their panzer tactics so well. Failure to place radios in every Allied tank helped contribute to the French defeat in 1940. It is a question of emphasis. In the early days of the war, German emphasis on radio technology proved hughly important in making their armored warfare tactics the envy of the world. But I digress into the role of technology and industrialization on modern warfare. Maybe some poor college student will read our discussions and write a good research paper on the topics we have brought forth. I hope we get the proper citations if he does.;)


Timthinker
 
Vern, the principles of successful warfare certainly predate blitzkrieg. Even today, successful commanders use tactics devised by their ancient predecessors, such as encirclement, to win battles. What I am discussing is warfare in the industrial age with all its complexities. The case of the semi-auto rifle is but one small example of that. In the instance of Germany, it seemed more "cost effective" to stay with a modified Mauser than to forge ahead with a new semi-auto rifle in the 1930s. This is one reason they did so.
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But we don't know that for a fact -- I have never seen any source document where the decision not to pursue a semi-automatic rifle was discussed by the Germans.
 
In this particular instance, the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. What I mean is that the infantry rifle just did not receive any great degree of attention during the rearming of Germany in the 1930s. And why should it? Germany military attention was focused upon tanks, aircraft, radios and other equipment essential to industrialized, mechanized warfare. Given the German emphasis upon the machine gun, the MG 34 was fielded at this time, the standard rifle was viewed as a supportive weapon for it. Why go to the additional-and expensive-decision to reequip the infantry with a more costly rifle when the current one works well enough to support the new machine gun. In circumstances such as this, we take what we know and apply theories that seem to dovetail well with the evidence. The explanations I have offered seem to do so. I hope this helps.


Timthinker
 
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In this particular instance, the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.
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Oliver Stone can use that argument, but legitimate historians cannot.
What I mean is that the infantry rifle just did not receive any great degree of attention during the rearming of Germany in the 1930s. And why should it? Germany military attention was focused upon tanks, aircraft, radios and other equipment essential to industrialized, mechanized warfare. Given the German emphasis upon the machine gun, the MG 34 was fielded at this time, the standard rifle was viewed as a supportive weapon for it
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Which is a much better explanation for why the Germans did not pursue a semi-automatic rifle than the "war on the cheap" theory.
 
I am sorry you do not like that quote, but it comes from a respected Oxford historian who specializes in ancient Egypt. As a former historian, I can attest to its validity. If you have any doubts about historical research methods, may I suggest graduate school. You will learn more than you want about research methodology there. Trust me, I speak from direct experience.

I see no contradiction about "war on the cheap", by which I mean saving as much money as possible on war expenditures, and my discussion as to why the Germans did not choose to allocate money into a semi-auto rifle program in the 1930s. In fact, the decision not to fund a semi-auto rifle seems to dovetail nicely into my quip.


Timthinker
 
I am sorry you do not like that quote, but it comes from a respected Oxford historian who specializes in ancient Egypt. As a former historian, I can attest to its validity. If you have any doubts about historical research methods,
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Are you saying that reputable historians reject the concept that the burden of proof is on him who takes the affirmative position? That you can advance any position you like -- with no evidence at all -- and anyone who disagrees with you must disprove your position?

As a matter of fact, I do have a degree in History -- and it don't work that way.
 
Vern Humphrey

But we don't know that for a fact -- I have never seen any source document where the decision not to pursue a semi-automatic rifle was discussed by the Germans.
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Albert Speer's memoir, Inside the Third Reich, gives an account of the Heer's inability to adopt a semi automatic infantry rifle. IIRC, It notes that Adolf Hitler opposed such adoption on the basis, that in his military experience, they would be too fragile for handling by infantry.

Unfortunately, I have lent my copy out (to my Dad !) and cannot provide a page reference. However, it is in one of the chapters covering the closing stages of the war.

Aside from the lack of coverage on the holocaust, the book is well worth reading.
 
Vern, when I return from my evening out, I will explain how the "absence of evidence" quote fits with documentary history. Remember, we are discussing documents here. As a teaser, let me say that documents may omit some things for which there are other sources of evidence (proof). Think about that.


Timthinker
 
Josh, you are a mind reader. The lack of information Speer provides about the Holocaust is an example of how the absence of documentary evidence is not the evidence of absence. People tend to ignore or delete information injurious to them. This is why that quote from an Oxford Don is so good. Speer does not discuss the Holocaust because such a discussion would harm him. So, he ignores it in his documents. This is the point I was trying to make with Vern. Oh no! I just made it. Seriously, I will go into more detail on this matter when i return home.


Timthinker
 
Let me take "the high road" and explain my position clearly. What do historians mean when they claim the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence? This statement means that the lack of documentation about an event does not mean that an event did not occur. It is just that simple. Perhaps the most appropriate use of that statement during the twentieth century concerned the lack of documentation about Hitler's involvement in the Holocaust. Believe it or not, historians have not discovered specific documents by Hitler ordering the mass murder of Jews and others he detested. This does nor mean Hitler did not know of these murders, nor that he did not order them. Indeed, most people, myself included, believe Hitler is guilty of that atrocity. Historians realize that documents do not tell the complete story, so they caution us to examine them very carefully. The "absence of evidence" quote is just one way of expressing their caution. Certainly, the burden of proof is upon the one making assertions. But I fail to see how this quote undermines the need to provide strong support for one's viewpoint. In fact, it actually encourages us to be cautious in analyzing evidence for theories. I hope this clearifies the matter.

Regarding the lack of documentation about a German semi-auto rifle in the 1930s, I would posit that Hitler's views as a decorated veteran of World War One probably settled the matter. As the dictator of Germany, his wishes trumped all opinions, whether good or bad. Since he thought the bolt-action rifle served him well, that may have stopped the matter before the Second World War began. That is the position I would advance for research.


Timthinker
 
It has been my experience that when you try to shoot people in combat, they will hide behind things. You need to be able to shoot through logs, sandbags, concrete, earth berms, and so on. Often, it takes many shots to penetrate. Advantage to the most powerful rifle.
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My recollection is that Rommel, at least, thought that the rifle with one more round in the magazine was generally the superior option, based on his WW1 experiences.

In any case, using full-power rifle rounds in bolt action rifles to engage enemies behind cover was generally ineffective in World War One. How ineffective is pretty clearly demonstrated by the apocalyptic effects of entrenched machineguns and the various tactics and technologies developed to try to address them. If the full-power rifle round was an adequate means of breaching cover we would have never seen the trench mortar developed, the rifle-grenade launcher, etc.

Neither submachine guns nor assault rifles existed in WWI -- they were all developed after the war.
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You'll note the use of the word "eventually" in the sentence you replied to, though I suppose it could have been interpreted as "eventually in WW1" which was not what I meant to say.

That said, as others have noted the submachinegun is a WW1 era invention, and the Germans made use of them as fast as they could get them to the front late in the war. It remains more of a footnote than one of the "Top 10 Combat Weapons of All Time" (or some similar History Channel title) primarily because the US entry into the war trumped German refinements of tactics and equipment, rendering it and the Stosstruppen who carried it very much too little, too late.

At the very tail of the war -- by the time it was fielded, there was little fighting left to go.
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Germans used them in their 1918 offensive, which was one of the few events since the opening days of 1914 that looked anything like an offensive in modern terms. As stated above, the impact of the weapon was offset by US involvement in the war by that point, which tends to make it overlooked. Had we not been in the fight, things might be remember differently.
 
Germany did rearm in the '30s. They did replace their rifles with newer ones. There's no reason to suppose they could not have afforded something like the Garand -- the just didn't develop such a weapon.
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They did a lot of the initial theorizing and preliminarly R&D on what would eventually become the StG-44 in the 1930s, though at that time they favored an optimized 7mm round for a machine carbine rather than the 7.92 round settled on for wartime logistical/production reasons.

I believe they failed to field anything in the same timeframe as the Garand primarily because their solution was a more radical departure and so faced more challenges, both technical and in terms of the bureaucracy (though I don't think Hitler was personally opposed to the pre-war R&D effort -- possibly because he did not know about it at all -- despite his later resistance to idea once the war had begun).
 
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