Why Did America Win the Race for a Semi-Automatic Infantry Rifle?

[gunnie]

garand due to unusual circumstances

to me it is truly amazing that the US army would be thinking far enough ahead to start the development of a semi auto battle rifle back at the begining of the 20th century. same-o for the 1911 and the '03 sprngfld, which were in their formative stages at that time. the groundwork was laid for the M1917 with browning's recoil operated patent in 1901. it was truly the golden years for military small arms procurement.

US small arms were pretty much developed and tested in the private sector by civilians before that time. the settlers in the west were well into lever actions when the army was still fielding trapdoor sprgflds. and the turks were wasting a vastly superior russian military force with peabody martini rifles at distance, and then mowing them down at close range charges with henry levers.

the krag had its sideloader magazine because the army didn't think the grunts would keep up with a spent removable box magazine. prob same-o for the garand en bloc. the original 1911 models had lanyard loops on pistol and magazine for this reason.

"When they had no experience with machineguns, they nevertheless managed to acquire and test Gatlings."

well, not really. gatlin tried to sell his tumbling self loader to both the north and the south for the civil war. the brass in both were too wise to buy into a hairbrain system like that, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD SEEN IT WORK WITH THEIR OWN EYES. "intellegence" told both govts that it was a plot to involve manpower and manufacturing in a system that wouldn't work.

luckily for the south, the confederate officer who commanded the fort in new orleans trusted his eyes, and had made enough money in the shipping business pre-war to outfit his fort with this system. too bad for the union kids who tried taking it by full all-out charge until his ammo ran out.

john browning went to the army when it became obvious the US would get sucked into WWI, seeking funds to develop a lightweight fully that one grunt could carry from trench to trench in advance, or retreat. JMB wasn't a military man, yet foresaw this need. the army didn't.

LUCKILY, JMB WAS A PATRIOT, as he built and refined the BAR before we got into the war...AND GAVE THE RIGHTS TO THE ARMY, FREE GRATIS.

whereas now the military procurement system seems to be run by big business and politicians, scratching each other's backs. the small arms are designed to unrealisticly specified design parameters, and then changed to meet monetary constraints, and tested in the field by the soldier.

truly the worst shape it has been in from day one.

gunnie

 

[Tony Williams]

to me it is truly amazing that the US army would be thinking far enough ahead to start the development of a semi auto battle rifle back at the begining of the 20th century. same-o for the 1911 and the '03 sprngfld, which were in their formative stages at that time. the groundwork was laid for the M1917 with browning's recoil operated patent in 1901. it was truly the golden years for military small arms procurement.

There was nothing unique about US developments at that time. Various semi-auto military rifles were developed well before WW1, and some saw use in WW1 (but used by aircrew rather than ground troops). Auto pistols were also in service elsewhere early in the century.

If any country deserves the accolade for being forward-looking enough to actually order semi-auto rifles in quantity for their army, then it's Mexico. The Mondragon rifle (a gas-piston operated, rotating bolt action) was adopted by Mexico as the Model 1908 in that year, although they had to be made abroad (by SIG) and their stock was bought up by Germany at the start of the war. I'm not sure how many actually reached Mexico.

 

[gunnie]

"There was nothing unique about US developments at that time. Various semi-auto military rifles were developed well before WW1, and some saw use in WW1 (but used by aircrew rather than ground troops). Auto pistols were also in service elsewhere early in the century."

my point exactly. even the US civilians were armed with more modern weapons at that time.

perhaps the big push was due to current events in the world at that time, or the military finally seeing they needed to modernize.

gunnie

PS-above post (#151), should say winchester lever actions instead of henry.

 

[Ash]

"my point exactly. even the US civilians were armed with more modern weapons at that time."

Ah, but were they more reliable? Was the Remington self-loader suitable for combat? That's the real trick. The Mondragoon was not at all suitable for combat. The latest and greatest can be just that, great, but it can also be terrible and cause many deaths before being withdrawn. How many weapons, modern for their time, ended up being abject failures?

Ash

 

[slzy]

gatling evidently did not have a metallic cartridge example ready to go till 1866. the gatling book i have [but not with me right now} has all the cartrigdes that were chambered for the gatling pictured,to include the paper variety. if he had one in 45-70 in 1864,i imagine he could have moved some product.

 

[kragluver]

Obviously, I'm a late-comer to this thread, but just now took the time to read through it all this morning.

A couple of points --

#1 Refering to a very early post in this thread -- the Krag was NOT chosen because it was slow to load, it was chosen because it was the only rifle submitted to pass the full battery of "abuse" tests that Ordnance demanded in 1892. (As you can probably judge by my username, 'dems' fightin' words) Interestingly, the other rifle that faired well was the Lee-Enfield. Read Brophy's book The Springfield Armory -- Arsenal of Freedom. The Krag's short-comings were more a function of the cartridge than of the rifle. Smokeless powders available at the time created too much pressure when pushed to high velocity for the Krag action to handle. By 1900, they had solved the clip loading problem using the Parkhurst clip device. They should have gone with a lighter weight, pointed bullet and would have had acceptable ballistics (at least matching those of the SMLE Mk VII cartridge); but I digress...this is supposed to be about the Garand.

#2 I believe the Garand would have been just as successful (as it ended up being) had they stayed with the .276 round. Hatcher has much to say on this in The Book of the Garand and Hatcher's Notebook. Nevertheless, the choice to stay with the .30 cal round was probably correct from a cost and logistics standpoint. From the beginning, it was recognized that a short cartridge would result in a shorter receiver and bolt and lighter weight rifle. Weight was a key design criteria during the development of the Garand. Again, this will become clear when you read Book of the Garand.

#3 Finally, the development of the 7.62 NATO (aka .308) was influenced by the .276 (again, see Hatcher). I agree with one of the earlier posters who commented that had we gone with the .276 prior to WW2, chances are we wouldn't be saddled with the under-powered varmit rifle we have today. Interestingly, the British flirted with a .276 caliber cartridge that was much like our .276 Pederson in 1913. (I believe their cartridge was longer, with greater case capacity.) This, of course is what resulted in the development of the Enfield P13, then the P14 (in .303 British) and finally the Model 1917 in .30-06 (another fine battle rifle IMHO). I wonder if Pederson's work with the .276 cartridge was influenced by the British -- probably was.

BTW -- this has been a great thread. Very enjoyable seeing everyone's commentary and opinions.

 

[The Tourist]

I have a personal opinion on this topic.

We do have the example of the Gatling gun, which I view as a 'field piece.' For the purposes of this debate I'd like to keep it to arms issued to individual soldiers.

In that regard, I think America as a nation actually retarded the development of a semi-automatic.

For example, in its day during the Struggle for Southern Independence, a Spencer lever action was quite an invention. There are numerous examples where a small cadre' of soldiers defeated overwhelming odds. I believe one commander actually bought Spencers for his men.

Wow, the upper echelon officers must have loved that rifle.

In actuality, they tried to kill it. They felt it ruined marksmanship and wasted ammunition.

Had the rifle "got legs" and financial backing from inventors and tradesmen of the era--knowing the government would purchase such ordnance--we might have had a strong, function personal semi-automatic years before.

In fact, the top brass didn't even want the .45 ACP we know today. They wanted the 476 Eley.

I'm glad we had the Garand. I've heard that Marines didn't want to give up their M-14's. As a nation, we didn't lead on this issue, we followed.

 

[Vaarok]

Every nation on earth tried to fight off the idea of adopting cartridge rifles with magazines, except the French and Germans, who only acquiesced when the other side made moves to adopting same, but still insisted on magazine cutoffs.

The Swiss, who were rightly terrified of having to fight off either or both, are really the only nation to have enthusiastically accepted a magazine rifle, in the Vetterli-Vitali.

Look at the Beaumont, the Italian Vetterli, the Trapdoor, and the Martini, all of which persisted into the smokeless era, and how they influenced their replacements.

It's been argued that stripper clips were developed party because the military higher-ups would rather their troops reload small amounts rapidly in crisis than have a large magazine to draw on and waste ammo from the outset.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

"When they had no experience with machineguns, they nevertheless managed to acquire and test Gatlings."

well, not really. gatlin tried to sell his tumbling self loader to both the north and the south for the civil war. the brass in both were too wise to buy into a hairbrain system like that, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD SEEN IT WORK WITH THEIR OWN EYES.

That's a misinterpretation of history. The gatlings of the Civil War were clumsy and ineffective -- lacking metalic cartridges, what else could they be?

The gatling guns of the Indian wars were incapable of the proper machinegun function -- that is, delivering grazing fire. The French had a similar weapon, the mittraileuse which they used in the Franco-Prussian War. They lost that war -- badly.

It was not until the develop of smokeless powder that the potential of the gatling could be realized. Forward-looking army officers, like John H. Parker experimented with them and developed the tactics to maximize their effect in combat.

Modern machine gun tactics are rooted in Parker's work.

 

[NMshooter]

In my copy of Small Wars Manual (1940) it is mentioned that the BAR would no longer be needed in its original role of automatic rifle when M1 rifles became standard issue; They were to be refitted with bipods and used as LMGs.

I get the impression that a lot of folks after WW1 were looking for both volume fire and precision fire in the same package, but the technology was lacking. The stamped sheet metal assault rifles we are familiar with (AKM, AR-18, etc.) were not developed until after WW2. A lot of technological development had to take place before the bolt action rifle could be replaced by the self loading rifle.

It amazes me that some 5 million M1 rifles were manufactured by 1945, especially considering the difficulties most companies had making them.

 

[Tony Williams]

Interestingly, the British flirted with a .276 caliber cartridge that was much like our .276 Pederson in 1913. (I believe their cartridge was longer, with greater case capacity.) This, of course is what resulted in the development of the Enfield P13, then the P14 (in .303 British) and finally the Model 1917 in .30-06 (another fine battle rifle IMHO). I wonder if Pederson's work with the .276 cartridge was influenced by the British -- probably was.

I doubt it: the British .276 was a very powerful round, practically in the magnum class. It was the brainchild of long-range rifle-shooting enthusiasts who wanted to ensure that British troops would no longer be outranged by the enemy as they were in the Boer War. The cartridge proved to have serious problems with recoil, muzzle flash and barrel wear, and they were still wrestling with those when WW1 came along and stopped the project.

The British were very interested in the .276 Pedersen and may well have adopted it if the USA had done so.

 

[mgregg85]

Note that the brits trained their riflemen to "volley fire" with their smelly rifles. They didn't have the time/industrial ability to rearm their entire military with an autoloader but they did try to train them to fire quickly and they already had a very smooth bolt gun with a 10 round mag.

 

[kragluver]

Not just the British... infantry volley fire had been around since before the Spanish American War. This is why you see so many old rifles with ridiculously LONG sight range markings. Its also why the US and UK stayed with heavy bullets (>200 gr) for so long. This thinking is what I think handicapped the infantry rifle cartridge from having better ballistics than it could have had with the smokeless powders of the time (circa 1900). The machine gun replaced the infantry volley fire around WW1. The Germans seemed to have figured this out first.

 

[JoshM]

SSN Vet

maybe our armed forces being made up of citizen soldiers who were neither serfs or slaves had something to do with the value our democratic government place on the individual soldier, and how much to spend on that soldiers kit.

Gunnie

to me it is truly amazing that the US army would be thinking far enough ahead to start the development of a semi auto battle rifle back at the beginning of the 20th century.

Agree, - I think there is an aspect of this reflected in American thinking post WW1. In Europe there was an often held belief that WW1 was an aberration, and with its end there could be a return to military action based around the good old days of cavalry and colonial policing*. With the League of Nations to sort out the bigger problems.

In this view, “big battalions” of conscript infantry armed with bolt action rifles was just a, simple and cheap, continuation of the status quo, with little need for infantry to be liberally equipped with exotic automatic weaponry.

I expect the American view was more circumspect about the claimed end of hostilities between major European powers post the “war to end all wars”. Consequently, it would follow that future battlefields would again be a very dangerous environment to infantry in any new outbreak of war between major powers.

Clearly - early adoption, by the U.S. Army, of automatic rifles was seen as a way to mitigate some of those dangers for infantry.

(*Including those new fangled bombers as a cheap way of suppressing rebellious subjects in faraway provinces).

 

[JoshM]

For those interested in Post 120 where I noted Albert Speer’s book and the inability of Germany to adopt new rifles, here is the information/quote.

A Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Macmillan, 1970 - Pg 435

“During this inspection tour both our soldiers and officers complained about our lack of light infantry weapons. They particularly missed an effective submachine gun. The soldiers made do with captured Soviet weapons of this type. Hitler was directly responsible for this situation. The former First World War infantryman still clung to his familiar carbine. In the summer of 1942 he decided against a submachine gun that had already been developed and ruled that the rifle better served the ends of the infantry.

One lingering effect of his own experience in the trenches was, as I now saw in practice, that he promoted the heavy weapons and tanks he had then admired, to the neglect of infantry weapons.

Immediately after my return I tried to correct this un–balance. At the beginning of January our infantry program was supported with requests from the army General staff and the Commander in Chief of the reserve army. But Hitler, as his own expert on matters of armament, waited six months before approving our proposals, only afterward to hector us for any failure to meet our quotas on the deadlines. Within three-quarters of a year we achieved significant increases in this important area. In the case of the submachine gun we actually expanded production twenty fold – thought to be sure, hardly any of these guns had been produced previously (*15). We could have achieved these increases two years early without being compelled to use any facilities involved in the production of heavy weapons.”

(*15) Endnote - Pg 737.

Fuehrerprotokoll, June 28 -29 1944 – Point 55: “The Fuehrer stated very firmly that he would never agree to the production of the submachine gun unless it was designed for ordinary rifle ammunition. Besides, he is almost completely convinced that the rifle suits the purpose better.” On January 14, 1944, two weeks after the trip to Lapland, the infantry program was initiated. The increases it bought about can be seen from the following table.

Average Monthly Production

1941 1943 Nov 1944

• Rifles - 133,000 209,000 307,000
  
• Submachine guns – -- 2,600 55,100
  
• New rifles 41 and 43 - -- 7,900 32,500
  
• Machineguns 42 and 43 - 7,100 14,100 28,700

I abbreviated the table and left out the ammunition and other weapon stats.

 

[xd45gaper]

cause we won the wars so we wrote the history books

 

[Slamfire]

But Hitler, as his own expert on matters of armament, waited six months before approving our proposals, only afterward to hector us for any failure to meet our quotas on the deadlines.

Corporal Hitler delayed a bunch of arms programs, because he thought he knew better. Good for us!, there would be more dead Americans if Hitler was not a blockhead.

But this also shows the conservative nature of the infantry. If they have not used it, they don't like it.

 

[PercyShelley]

I doubt it: the British .276 was a very powerful round, practically in the magnum class. It was the brainchild of long-range rifle-shooting enthusiasts who wanted to ensure that British troops would no longer be outranged by the enemy as they were in the Boer War. The cartridge proved to have serious problems with recoil, muzzle flash and barrel wear, and they were still wrestling with those when WW1 came along and stopped the project.

Spurred on, IIRC, by comparisons of the long-range performance of the 8mm Mauser to the .303, in which the 8mm was decidedly favorable.

How fortunate that infantry basically don't shoot that far!

I am curious if anyone can give more insight into the claims that the Garand was superior from a mass-producability standpoint. While the SAFN-49 is a fine weapon; Venezuelan variants in 7mm with the muzzle brake being particularly mild indeed, the mind-boggling number of machined cuts on the receiver and parts suggest to me that the design is rather intensive to manufacture. From the pictures I have seen of it, likewise the Mondragon.

What about the Garand? Was that somewhat simpler to mass-produce? What about the SVT-40? That looks to be mostly stamped. I would nominate the K43, but that has a somewhat complicated bolt, and seems to have been used as a specialist's weapon anyhow; perhaps not truly intended for mass-manufacture.

 

[Gas Operated]

I used to have a Tokarev rifle. Outside the magazine, there is very little stamping and a lot of machining in it.

 

[Slamfire]

I have a gun designer friend whose opinion I respect.

He tells me the Garand/M14 receiver has a number of profiles and cuts that require non standard tooling. He believes that this is due to John Garand being a tool and die maker. Overall it is a difficult part to machine.

Interestingly, he claims the FN/FAL receiver is actually more difficult to machine. FN was importing these at $3,000 a copy back in the 70’s, which is a reflection of the high manufacturing cost.

I have not examined the other weapons you mention.

However, I have an American made PTR-91 which is a variant of the HK-91. This weapon is built from stampings and weldings. The barrel is pressed into the receiver. Only a few parts require high grade steel and expensive machining . It is a lot easier to teach someone to weld than to teach someone to be a machinist.

You can tell that the Germans learned their lesson about fast production of firearms. Why spend a lot of time and money building a weapon to last 90 years, when in 9 months the weapon and the infantry man carrying it, will be rotting in the mud.?

Also, my friend has told me that the M-16 does not have a single profile or cut that does not need to be there, and it does not require non standard cutting tools to make. Eugene Stoner deserves a lot of credit in thoroughly thinking about this aspect of weapon technology.

 

[Dr. Peter Venkman]

Since starting this thread some months ago, I have thought seriously about the comments made here. The more I think, the more attracted I am to the notion that the Garand was one outcome of the firepower and mobility doctrine adopted by the U.S. Army following its experience in World War One. During that war, the U.S. military largely waged a war of attrition that proved successful but also costly in casualities. As a result of that bitter experience, the military began to draw lessons on how to wage war more effectively in the modern era. That experience ultimately culminated into the mobility doctrine others described so many postings ago.

The emphasis on firepower and mobility also influenced the development of the 105mm howitzer and Sherman tank, both weapons that seem to support the position I am promoting. These three weapons-the Garand, the 105 and the Sherman-all seem like pieces of a puzzle that make sense when viewed through the eyes of a firepower and mobility doctrine. I hope this information helps with resolving the initial inquiry.


Timthinker

World War II (In the ETO) as waged by the United States was a war of attrition, nothing more, nothing less. There are nearly zero instances of mobile warfare being used successfully and operations of this kind are an extremely low percentage when compared to the real doctrine; find the enemy, call in artillery. Call in bombers, bomb the city. Advance. Find the enemy, call in artillery, etc. One of the greatest criticisms of AEF was the slow advance thanks to a lack of mobile warfare and a lack of exploiting initiatives. It was WWI repeated with better tanks, better planes, and bigger guns.

It was the same in Italy as it was in France and Germany. I won't even include Africa in the discussion since that front given Rommel's supplies and manpower was a joke.

 

[Tony Williams]

He tells me the Garand/M14 receiver has a number of profiles and cuts that require non standard tooling.

One of the reasons given for the Ordnance Department's support of the M14 over the FN FAL (apart from patriotism) was that they had loads of expensive special tooling for the Garand, and the M14 would allow them to use the same tools.

 

[PercyShelley]

I used to have a Tokarev rifle. Outside the magazine, there is very little stamping and a lot of machining in it.

Ah! I must have been thrown off by the ventilated metal thing at the end of the handuard. Thanks for the correction.

Interestingly, he claims the FN/FAL receiver is actually more difficult to machine. FN was importing these at $3,000 a copy back in the 70’s, which is a reflection of the high manufacturing cost.

I've also heard that FALs require more intensive manufacture than come comparable weapons, and tighter tolerances to boot.

 

[Slamfire]

One of the reasons given for the Ordnance Department's support of the M14 over the FN FAL (apart from patriotism) was that they had loads of expensive special tooling for the Garand, and the M14 would allow them to use the same tools.

According to the book “Great Rifle Controversy” by Edward Clinton Ezell this in fact turned out not to be as advantageous as thought.

Mr Ezell shows that the hierarchy at Springfield Armory were dominated by the Production Engineers, and that was a weakness in so far as developing a new weapon. From what I read, the Production Engineers had quite a sizeable vote in the early small arms procurement process, probably more than they should have. As such, they were familiar with the Garand and wanted a weapon like the Garand.

I do not want to demonize the Production group, the transition from development to full scale production is one of the most difficult, risky phases of any program. As such, Production types really don’t want any tinkering with known processes and production lines producing good product. They are truly the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” folks.

As such, some of their issues became justifications to the selection process.

 

[Bart Noir]

gunnie, I find I disagree with you. First, Gatling's patent was in November of 1862, so the war was well under way. He was a Southerner but was trying to sell to the Federals without much success.

But I don't believe that any of his guns were used by the Southern troops. There was one that was used in very small numbers, invented by a Southern officer named Williams. Hmmm.... Williams.....might have been one of Tony's ancestors who supported the Southern cause, to the extreme.

The Williams gun was cranked but not multi-barreled, so it overheated rapidly.

Bart Noir
Who doesn't mind a reference to prove him wrong.