Why Did America Win the Race for a Semi-Automatic Infantry Rifle?

[camp_gunner]

More thoughts on this issue

As noted, we got there first because of foresight on the part of a few well-placed men.

Now as to some other thoughts that have come up in this discussion.

The Garand for it’s time was a very good rifle, but the FN 49 design is better from a military standpoint. I have owned many of both and have fired thousands of rounds from each. The advantage of the FN design comes in the ability to clear the action when it becomes filled with dirt. The Garand effectively requires that the entire gun be taken apart to remove the bolt or to get into the area behind the bolt in the action. It breaks as a minimum into two large pieces, one of which will then have to be set aside so that cleaning can take place. The FN just requires that the receiver cover be removed to access this area. The cover can be put in your pocket while you clean the action. The gas system on the 49 is better as well; it is more adjustable and stays somewhat cleaner than the Garand. The Garand does offer an advantage in grenade launching, with the spring loaded plug it can automatically turn off the gas, this has to be done manually in the 49.

As to the 276 Pederson cartridge; I think that we missed the bet in not adopting the Garand in this cartridge. The gun would have held ten round, the recoil would have been lighter, and the troops would have been able to carry more ammo. If you have any doubts, put a 276 cartridge next to a 30/06. The size and weight difference is substantial. The statement has been made that it would not have made sense to have two different cartridges in use at the same time, but for all practical purposes, we had that exact situation. The Garand used a 150-grain bullet, and the automatics used the heavier 180-grain bullets.

Now on to the Johnson rifles. The marines hated them. One of my friend’s father was in the first Marine Raiders. They were issued Johnsons. To hear Bill tell it, they were doing a practice landing off Camp Pendleton; they entered the landing boats with their Johnsons, by the time they had reached the shore, all of the rifles had fallen into the water. They were then issued the M1 Garand. They also buried a bunch of Rising Subs out in the back country.

 

[johnmerry]

Because we were willing to put the time money and effort in to building the best all around service rifle that was ever designed.

 

[johnnyonthespot]

 

[PercyShelley]

If you have any doubts, put a 276 cartridge next to a 30/06. The size and weight difference is substantial.

I have no doubts, but .276 cartridges aren't exactly easy to come by for this sort of comparison!

One thing I do wonder is why the .308 was adopted post-war instead of digging up the old .276. Simply take the new wonder-powders that made the .308 almost as good as the .30-06, put them into the .276 and you have a service cartridge every bit as good as the 7mm mauser the .30-06 was intended to match in the first place!

 

[woodybrighton]

the lee Enfield was a pretty good rifle accurate reliable and fast firing millions of them about.
an 8 shot semi doesn't immediately appear to be a quantum leap.
Unlike say the em2 which would still be in service

 

[Tony Williams]

One thing I do wonder is why the .308 was adopted post-war instead of digging up the old .276. Simply take the new wonder-powders that made the .308 almost as good as the .30-06, put them into the .276 and you have a service cartridge every bit as good as the 7mm mauser the .30-06 was intended to match in the first place!

Because the Chief of Staff of the US Army, supported by the Ordnance Department, specified a cartridge of .30 calibre which had to remain effective out to 2,000 yards. In other words, they wanted the .30-06 in a smaller package; which is what they got.

The alternative cartridge in the NATO trials - which was actually recommended by US Army testers - was the 7x43 as used in the British EM-2 rifle. This had similar performance to the .276 but was shorter.

 

[MD_Willington]

... because a former Canadian designed it...

just bugging ya!

 

[Slamfire]

One thing I do wonder is why the .308 was adopted post-war instead of digging up the old .276. Simply take the new wonder-powders that made the .308 almost as good as the .30-06, put them into the .276 and you have a service cartridge every bit as good as the 7mm mauser the .30-06 was intended to match in the first place!

Also, there is no "Corporate Memory" in the military. There is continuity, but if the circle is broken, all previous learned knowledge goes right down the tubes.

The .276 cartridge trails were conducted in the 20’s. The people involved were gone by 1945, the reports, buried in dusty archives, available to no one, of interest to no one. By the time you get to 1945 you have new people with new ideas, and strong opinions.

And, the new people were wrong. The 276 would have made an excellent service round, much better than the .223 we now have.

 

[LaEscopeta]

the lee Enfield was a pretty good rifle accurate reliable and fast firing millions of them about.

Fast firing in the hands of a trained solider. It takes more time and ammo to get a new recuit fast firing with a SMLE than a M1 Garand.

Not that the SMLE is not a fine rifle, or that there was any real need not to use it in WWII.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

Corporate memory doesn't matter in this case. What matters is need.

If the Infantry (the functional proponent for rifles) had seen a need for a .276, that need would have driven re-development of such a cartridge. But despite the theories advanced here, the men who carried and used the rifles in combat never articulated such a need.

 

[woodybrighton]

well the british army had several century's of turning out fast firing trained infantry soldiers so not an immediate problem

 

[Tony Williams]

If the Infantry (the functional proponent for rifles) had seen a need for a .276, that need would have driven re-development of such a cartridge. But despite the theories advanced here, the men who carried and used the rifles in combat never articulated such a need.

That depends on how you define "the Infantry". The typical WW2 conscripted grunt would probably never have even thought about alternatives to the weapons they were given; they were handed them, so they used them. The general conclusion seems to have been that they loved the light weight and handiness of the M1 Carbine, but wanted hitting power more like the M1 Garand. This led to the .30 Light Rifle project which eventually resulted in the M14.

After the war when it was decided to replace the .30-06 with a new cartridge, the requirements were specified by the Ordnance Department - and specifically by its head, Studler. He had some very fixed ideas about what was required (as I've posted, it had to be of .30 calibre and capable of reaching out to 2,000 yards). At much the same time, other parts of the US military were carrying out reviews and tests which showed that this was inappropriate, that a smaller-calibre and less powerful cartridge would be better. And the US Army's own testers at Fort Benning, who compared the new 7.62mm and the 7x43 side-by-side, concluded that the 7x43 was better and should be selected for the new NATO round. The US top brass overrode this, apparently due to the NIH disease. A missed opportunity.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

There were people at Benning who wanted a smaller caliber -- but we staff such things. Proposals are sent throughout the Army for comments, and the Infantry consensus was a .30 caliber.

 

[Tony Williams]

There were people at Benning who wanted a smaller caliber -- but we staff such things. Proposals are sent throughout the Army for comments, and the Infantry consensus was a .30 caliber.

That is hardly surprising, in that the US military had no experience of using any smaller calibre than .30 (since the Navy's old and relatively ineffective 6mm Lee). So on what basis would they choose anything else?

To make an informed decision, you have to have a clear understanding of the alternatives and their pros and cons, and preferably have tested them. The US Army testers who did that concluded that the 7mm was better.

 

[Ash]

Ah, but which was a better machine gun round? I think when behind a Browning machine gun, I would prefer to have the 30-06 and its extended range and umph to fire down range. Granted, it isn't 100% necessary for the gp machinegun to fire the same round as the infantry, it certainly is better logistically.

Ash

 

[paintballdude902]

i believe that the fact that the m1 was adopted during the depression also had something to do with bringing us out of the depression

a large military contract must have created a very large number of jobs

 

[Tony Williams]

Ah, but which was a better machine gun round?

If you mean between the 7.62mm and the 7mm, it was a close match. The 7.62mm had a higher muzzle velocity giving it a flatter trajectory, but the 7mm's bullet had a higher BC which gave it greater hitting power past 1,000 yards.

 

[bogie]

Back then we wanted to do it, so we did it.

Today, we have bureaucracy.

 

[Slamfire]

There were people at Benning who wanted a smaller caliber -- but we staff such things. Proposals are sent throughout the Army for comments, and the Infantry consensus was a .30 caliber.

I don't know how it was done in the 50's, but in writing an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) which is the last big document before you go into Full Scale Development, you have a User Representative sitting across from the Developer.

The User Representative is a Green Suiter, backed by more Green suiters.

These guys are very conservative by nature. They are familiar with the equipment they use. They use the equipment in inventory, they seldom if ever get to use anyone else's equipment. So what they want, is what they have, only a little different.

There are claw marks on the table where the requirements are negotiated. Claw marks from the Green Suiter when he was dragged across the table, marks from the Developers side. Depending on the personalities, one side of the table is more chewed up.

From what I have read, the post WWII User was absolutely adamant about having a round that was 30-06 equivalent. The British prepared all sorts of data, tests, everything to show that was not an optimal approach. I have no doubt that similiar information was presented in the 20's when the 276 Pederson was developed. And almost was adopted.

But data made no difference. These institutions are so conservative that self reform is down right impossible.

When change did happen, it was from the Office of Secretary of Defense. When he mandated "you will use the .223", wrong decision or not, the Army had to obey.

 

[SSN Vet]

maybe our armed forces being made up of citizen soldiers who were neither serfs or slaves had something to do with the value our democratic government place on the individual soldier, and how much to spend on that soldiers kit.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

That is hardly surprising, in that the US military had no experience of using any smaller calibre than .30 (since the Navy's old and relatively ineffective 6mm Lee). So on what basis would they choose anything else?

When the US military had no experience with anything but flintlocks, they pressed ahead to develop a percussion weapon.

When they had no experience with breechloaders, they demanded them nonetheless -- the opposition coming from the "experts" in Ordnance, especially General Ripley.

When they had no experience with smokeless powder, they nevertheless wanted smokeless powder repeaters.

When they had no experience with machineguns, they nevertheless managed to acquire and test Gatlings.

When they had no experience with semi-automatic rifles, they nevertheless wanted them.

When they had no experience with field radios they nevertheless wanted them -- and had a concept for their use.

 

[Tony Williams]

Vern, in each of the examples you quote, the practical benefits were so large as to be obvious, even to the traditional military mindset described in post #144.

The advantages of a change in calibre are a lot more subtle. The gut instinct response was probably "hey, that means less effective - we don't want that."

The Ordnance Department's position in supporting the .30 Light Rifle project was, to be blunt, stupid. Why? Because they decided they wanted a light rifle (7 lbs target weight) to replace the M1 Garand, M1/2/3 carbine, BAR, and M3 SMG. It had to be of .30 calibre with a long-range performance equivalent to the .30-06. And it had to offer automatic fire.

Just think about that for a moment. A 7 lb automatic rifle chambered for 7.62mm NATO??? :banghead: Anyone with the slightest knowledge of firearms would have realised that it would be entirely uncontrollable in automatic fire. And so it proved, when the prototypes were tested. That didn't stop the Ordnance Department from slogging on with the project. Eventually, of course, they had to disable the M14's auto switch.

Their Light Rifle requirements which led to the M14 were a fantastic wish-list which had no chance of being achieved.

 

[Timthinker]

Since starting this thread some months ago, I have thought seriously about the comments made here. The more I think, the more attracted I am to the notion that the Garand was one outcome of the firepower and mobility doctrine adopted by the U.S. Army following its experience in World War One. During that war, the U.S. military largely waged a war of attrition that proved successful but also costly in casualities. As a result of that bitter experience, the military began to draw lessons on how to wage war more effectively in the modern era. That experience ultimately culminated into the mobility doctrine others described so many postings ago.

The emphasis on firepower and mobility also influenced the development of the 105mm howitzer and Sherman tank, both weapons that seem to support the position I am promoting. These three weapons-the Garand, the 105 and the Sherman-all seem like pieces of a puzzle that make sense when viewed through the eyes of a firepower and mobility doctrine. I hope this information helps with resolving the initial inquiry.


Timthinker

 

[Vern Humphrey]

To your list, you might also add centralized artillery fire control -- allowing anyone with a radio to call for and adjust fire from any guns in range (a truly American innovation) and field radios (other nations, of course, pursued that goal, too.)

In other areas, the Navy-Marine development of amphibious warfare doctrine, and equipment like the Higgins boat to support it, was a major innovation.

 

[44AMP]

Exellent thread with some interesting insights

And some mistaken perceptions as well. For all those who think that it was the "industrial might" or "capacity" of the United States that let us build the Garand where other nations couldn't, think for a moment.

Our enemies and our allies in WWII all built tanks, planes, battleships, and even machineguns. Their prewar industrial capacity was sufficient to equip their armies, which in some cases were larger than the prewar US army. They had the capacity. What they didn't have was the will (or see the need) for a semi auto infantry rifle as general issue, which we did. And, we barely did it. It took the pressure of war and the dispersion of production to multiple subcontractors that allowed us to field the numbers of rifles we did, in the time frame we did. And at that, there were units that fought the entire war with 1903 Springfields.

The Garand enbloc clip has advantages, but so does a decent capacity detatchable box magazine. The BAR and the Thompson had proved the suitability for military use, so why the enbloc clip? I don't know the real reason, but for decades the "urban legend" as to why the enbloc clip was used was because of some staff officers (some say Ordnance, others say General staff) but the old story is that these officers would only accept the Garand if the general profile was the same as the 1903 Springfield (no awkward box magazine) to interfere with rifle drill and the manual of arms.

We clearly know why the Garand had to be in .30-06, MacAurthur demanded it. The excuse is because of all the "left over" .30-06 ammo from WWI, but the reality is slightly more complicated. Because along with all that "left over" ammo is the tooling to make it, and to make .30 caliber barrels All these things cost money to replace, and in the early 1930s money is tight.

This is also the main reason European nations kept their bolt guns from WWI, with some slight mods. They had millions of them, and all the machinery to make them. Bottom line, the infantry rifle was a real back burner priority, even with the Axis powers. The Mauser was good enough, and with their new tactical philosophies, focusing on the light/medium machine gun, planes, tanks, combined arms tactics, and battlefield communication, they didn't see any need for a new infantry rifle.

And as the war progressed, and they won, this view was vindicated. Both the Germans and the Japanese succumed to victory disease, for a while. They won, and won big, so there was no pressing need to develope the next generation of weapons. And because they didn't need them until they stopped winning, replacement designs with superior performance were slow in coming, and mostly arrived too little, too late.

The assault rifle is a fine example. Hitler actually forbid developement of new rifles (for general service, the Luftwaffe got their FG 42, but only in small numbers), because he felt they were not needed, and would be a distraction to the war effort. Some German officers and designers went ahead anyway, creating the assault rifle, but calling it an MP (maschinen pistole - German for SMG), to get around Hitler's orders. Small numbers of the guns got field trials on the Eastern front as the MP 43. Troops using them clamored for more. One story is that some veterans being decorated by Hitler were asked what they needed, and they said "More of the new rifles!" "What new rifles?" Hitler asked. After being shown, Hitler became enthustiastic about the idea, and coined the term "Sturmgewehr" (assault rifle), and production went ahead on the Stg 44. But it was too little, too late.

We adopted the Garand because of a combination of factors, not the least of which was just serendipity. Add into that the stubborn determination of certain men to have their agenda carried out, the fact that our military did not have as much holdover equipment from WWI as they did in Europe, and about a dozen other things, greater and smaller, and ther rest is, as they say, history.