SCOPE OF "SPORTING PURPOSES"
As in the 1989 study, we had to determine the scope of "sporting purposes" as used in section 925(d)(3). Looking to the statute, its legislative history, the work of the Firearms Evaluation Panel (see exhibit 6), and prior ATF interpretations, we determined sporting purposes should be given a narrow reading, incorporating only the traditional sports of hunting and organized competitive target shooting (rather than a broader interpretation
that could include virtually any lawful activity or competition.)
In terms of the statute itself, the structure of the importation provisions suggests a somewhat narrow interpretation. Firearms are prohibited from importation (section 922(l)), with four specific exceptions (section 925(d)). A broad interpretation permitting a firearm to be imported because someone may wish to use it in some lawful shooting activity would render the general prohibition of section 922(l) meaningless.
Similarly, as discussed in the "Background" section, the legislative history of the GCA indicates that the term sporting purposes narrowly refers to the traditional sports of hunting and organized competitive target shooting. There is nothing in the history to indicate that it was intended to recognize every conceivable type of activity or competition that might employ a firearm.
In addition, the FEP specifically addressed the informal shooting activity of "plinking" (shooting at randomly selected targets such as bottles and cans) and determined that it was not a legitimate sporting purpose under the statute. The panel found that, "while many persons participate in this type of activity and much ammunition was expended in such endeavors, it was primarily a pastime and could not be considered a sport for the purposes
of importation. . . ." (See exhibit 6.)
Finally, the 1989 report determined that the term sporting purposes should be given a narrow reading incorporating the traditional rifle sports of hunting and organized competitive target shooting. In addition, the report determined that the statute's reference to sporting purposes was intended to stand in contrast with military and law enforcement applications. This is consistent with ATF’s interpretation in the context of the Striker-12
shotgun and the USAS-12 shotgun. It is also supported by the court’s decision in Gilbert Equipment Co. v. Higgins.
We received some comments urging us to find "practical shooting" is a sport for the purposes of section 925(d)(3).48 Further, we received information showing that practical shooting is gaining in popularity in the United States and is governed by an organization that has sponsored national events since 1989. It also has an international organization.
While some may consider practical shooting a sport, by its very nature it is closer to police/combat-style competition and is not comparable to the more traditional types of sports, such as hunting and organized competitive target shooting. Therefore, we are not convinced that practical shooting does, in fact, constitute a sporting purpose under section 925(d)(3).49 However, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that practical shooting is a sport for the purposes of the statute, we still would have to decide whether a
firearm that could be used in practical shooting meets the sporting purposes test. In other words, it still would need to be determined whether the firearm is of a type that is generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to practical shooting and other sporting purposes.50 Moreover, the legislative history makes clear that the use of a military weapon in a practical shooting competition would not make that weapon sporting: “if a military weapon is used in a special sporting event, it does not become a sporting weapon. It is a military weapon used in a special sporting event.”51 While none of the LCMM rifles are military weapons, they still retain the military feature of the ability to accept a large capacity military magazine.
