Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program
Updated Jan. 23, 2003
On Oct. 16, 2002, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush disclosed that North Korea had admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. With its admission, North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK, abrogated the Agreed Framework signed in 1994 with United States, under which the North Koreans agreed to freeze their nuclear weapons program.
On Dec. 10, 2002, North Korea announced it would restart plutonium production and eject the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who monitored North Korea's compliance with the Agreed Framework. On Jan. 10, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), an international accord prohibiting the acquisition and proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The fuel used in nuclear warheads can come from either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. North Korea has pursued both tracks. North Korea's uranium enrichment program, were it to continue, could produce highly-enriched uranium sufficient for nuclear weapons in roughly five years, depending on available technology.1 Prior to acceding to the Agreed Framework, North Korea probably produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons, although some estimates range to five or six. 2 It is unclear whether North Korea actually produced nuclear weapons with this plutonium. Today intelligence analysts generally agree that North Korea is capable of producing nuclear warheads.3 The Bush administration holds that North Korea has produced a few weapons, but many experts argue that difficulties in building detonation devices may thus far have prevented the North from finishing their weapons. 4 Resumed nuclear production could give North Korea enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon within a few months and five to seven nuclear weapons by mid-2003.5
North Korea's historical animus with the United States drives its nuclear weapons program. Across the 38th parallel, which has divided the Korean peninsula since the Korean War ended in 1953, 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. The United States threatened nuclear attack against both North Korea and China during the Korean War and stored nuclear weapons in South Korean until 1991. 6 The ability to deter a U.S. led invasion and blunt U.S. coercive power is the primary objective of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. North Korea also likely sees its nuclear weapons program as a means to get leverage to extract economic concessions in negotiations with the United States and even its nuclear-armed neighbors, Russia and China. Additionally, North Korea may view nuclear weapons, and particularly the missile systems that complement them, as a valuable export technology.
North Korea began nuclear research in 1964, when Kim Il Sung, the father of the current leader, Kim Jong Il, ordered construction of an atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. In the 1970s, North Korea modernized the facility and began work on a second reactor nearby. 7
In the 1980s, North Korea accelerated its efforts to produce plutonium fuel for nuclear weapons from these facilities. International concern began to focus on North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and in 1985 North Korea, under pressure, signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea completed the second reactor around 1987. It has a capacity of about five electrical megawatts, allowing annual production of seven kilograms of plutonium — enough for one or two nuclear weapons. 8 In the mid-1990s, North Korea began building two larger reactors with respective power of 50 and 200 electrical megawatts. When the Agreed Framework shut down these plants, they stood about two years from completion. Satellite photographs taken in 1990 indicate North Korea has constructed a structure at Yongbyon used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel — a critical stage in weaponizing plutonium. 9
In 1989, North Korea shut down its working reactor for two months — probably to remove the nuclear fuel rods, from which plutonium is reprocessed. 10 U.S. intelligence reports generally estimate that North Korea extracted 12-14 kilograms of plutonium from the rods, enough for one or two nuclear weapons. Japanese and South Korean intelligence estimates claim North Korea may have extracted more plutonium during reactor slowdowns in 1990 and 1991, giving the country up to 24 kilograms of plutonium. 11 North Korea may have acquired additional plutonium by smuggling it out of Russia. A 1993 report in the German magazine Stern cited a Russian counterintelligence report claiming that North Korea had bought 56 kilograms of Russian plutonium on the black market. 12
In the early 1990s, North Korea's progress in missile and plutonium development led to an international diplomatic push to control their weapons technology. In 1991, following the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South, North and South Korea signed a Non-Aggression Pact and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Declaration banned nuclear weapons in both nations and called for inspections to verify denuclearization. In January 1992, North Korea, fulfilling an obligation under the NPT, signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing inspections.
Diplomacy soon faltered. After a few inspections, North Korea refused to allow the inspectors access to certain facilities. In early 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. 13 That year, the CIA first reported that the North might have enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. 14
In 1994, the administration of President Bill Clinton had begun preparations for military action against North Korea when former President Jimmy Carter traveled to North Korea in June and extracted a promise from Kim Jong Il to freeze nuclear production. 1 The Agreed Framework was signed on Oct. 21, 1994.
Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to halt activities at its plutonium producing nuclear reactors in Pyongyang in exchange for a relaxation of economic sanctions, a gradual move toward normalization of diplomatic relations, fuel oil deliveries, and construction of a light-water reactor to replace the graphite-moderated reactor shut down at Pyongyang. Plutonium from light water reactors is harder to use for nuclear weapons than the plutonium procured by graphite-moderated reactors. 16 IAEA inspectors monitored North Korea's compliance. Upon completion of the light-water reactors, originally scheduled for 2003 but subsequently indefinitely delayed, North Korea was to dismantle its graphite reactors and ship its 8,000 remaining fuel rods out of the country. 17
Shortly after signing the agreement, North Korea began seeking nuclear weapons fuel through uranium enrichment. In the late 1990s, the United States began to receive scattered intelligence reports revealing a North Korean uranium enrichment program. Some evidence points to the existence of this program as early as 1987. 18 This program apparently received new life in 1997 when Pakistan, strapped for cash by U.S. sanctions, began paying for its North Korean missile imports with uranium enrichment technology.
An unclassified CIA report from early 2002 reported that "[North Korea] has been seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems." 19 Last January, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton accused North Korea of continuing its nuclear weapons program, and in February members of Congress expressed concern to the president about North Korea's uranium enrichment program. 20 According to the New Yorker Magazine, the CIA delivered a secret report to top Bush administration officials in June, which found that Pakistan had provided centrifuge technology to North Korea. 21 Centrifuges are essential in enriching uranium. A.Q. Khan, known as the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, has reportedly visited North Korea frequently in the last decade. 22 U.S. intelligence apparently found definitive evidence of North Korea's uranium program by tracing an attempt to purchase a large amount of high-strength uranium, a substance essential to equipment used to enrich uranium, to North Korea. Some North uranium enrichment facilities are likely located in the Hagap region, near the Chinese border. 23
The Yongbyon facility today houses 3,000 scientists and researchers, many of whom studied nuclear technology in the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. The military runs the nuclear weapons program along with the intelligence service — under the direct supervision of President Kim Jong-Il. 24
If North Korea restarts its five-megawatt facility, which would likely take about two months, it could produce at least one nuclear weapon per year beginning in mid 2003. 25 When completed, the two larger facilities could produce around 55 nuclear weapons annually. Additionally, by using its spent fuel and restarting its reprocessing plant, North Korea could likely begin producing nuclear weapons by spring 2003. With the entire Yongbyon facility up and running, North Korea could make more than 200 nuclear weapons by decade's end. 26
North Korea could deliver its nuclear weapons with missiles, although it is unclear what North Korean missiles are outfitted to carry nuclear warheads. All North Korean missiles are liquid-fueled. North Korea has an arsenal of hundreds of Scud missiles, which due to their extremely short range, could be used exclusively against targets in neighboring states. Additionally, North Korea may have as many as 100 short-range (about 800 miles or 1,300 km) No-Dong missiles, although estimates range far lower. 27 These missiles, likely developed with Soviet assistance, could reach all of South Korea and most of Japan. North Korea launched one such missile into the Sea of Japan in 1993. 28 North Korea is also developing longer-range Taepo Dong missiles. The Taepo Dong 1, one of which was test fired over Japan in 1998, has a range of 1,500-2,200 kilometers. The North Koreans also have an even longer-range missile, the Taepo Dong II, under development, which could have a range of up to 6,000 kilometers. These two-stage missiles might be able to hit Alaska or Hawaii. North Korea has exported missiles and missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and probably other nations. 29
End Notes
1 Dipali Mukhopadhyay and Jon Wolfsthal, :Ten Questions on North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Program,"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jan. 7, 2003,
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=3871
2 Larry A. Niksch, "North Nuclear Weapons Program," Congressional Research Service, Nov. 27, 2002, p.6,
http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf
3 David Albright, "North Korea's Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks," Institute for Science and International Security, Jan. 15, 2003,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/fastfacts.html
4 Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program - North Korea,"
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html
5 Albright,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/fastfacts.html
6 "North Korea's Motivations for Developing Nuclear Weapons," Daniel A. Pinkston
7 Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program - North Korea,"
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html
8 The general rule of thumb is that countries with North Korea's technical capacity require 8 kg of plutonium to produce a nuclear weapon, but many have challenged this standard as two high. The amount could be lowered by building smaller weapons. Some experts have argued that 3 kg of plutonium will suffice for small atomic weapons. Niksch, 7.
9 Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program - North Korea,"
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html
10 Niksch, 7.
11 "DPRK Nuclear Program," Global Security.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm
12 Niksch, p.8.
13 Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program - North Korea,"
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html
14 Glenn Kessler, "No Support for Strikes Against N. Korea," Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2003
15 Ibid
16 Gary Milhollin, Testimony to the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dec. 1, 1994,
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1994/12-1.html
17 Niksch, 14
18 Pinkston, 2
19 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001, Central Intelligence Agency,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2003.htm#5
20 Seymour Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," The New Yorker, January 27, 2002,
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030127fa_fact
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
23 "US Followed the Aluminum,"Washington Post, October 18, 2002
24 Niksch, 12
25 Albright,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/fastfacts.html
26 Ibid
27 "North Korea Special Weapons Guide," Global Security.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/index.html
28 "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," July 27, 1999, BBC Online Network,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/405150.stm
29 "Chronology of North Korea's Missile Trade and Development," Nuclear Threat Initiative,
http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/chron/NKMCH00Go_bg.html,
By Benjamin Friedman
Independent Analyst